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Foreword by Noura Ghazi1  
 
I am writing this foreword on behalf of Lama and her book, in my capacity as a human 
rights lawyer of more than 16 years, specializing in cases of enforced disappearance and 
arbitrary detention. And also, as an activist in the Syrian uprisings.  
In my opinion, the uprisings in Syria started after decades of attempts – since the 
time of Asaad the father, leading up to the current conflict. Uprisings have taken up 
different forms, starting from the national democratic movement of 1979, to what is 
referred to as the Kurdish uprising of 2004, the ‘Damascus Spring,’ and the Damascus-
Beirut declaration. These culminated in the civil uprisings which began in March 2011.  
The uprisings that began with the townspeople of Daraa paralleled the uprisings of 
the Arab Spring. Initially, those in Syria demanded for the release of political prisoners 
and for the uplift of the state of emergency, with the hope that this would transition 
Syria’s security state towards a state of law.  
Due to the violence inflicted on non-violent demonstrators, and the interference of 
Islamic groups and external states (whose agendas benefit their own policies), the 
uprising became a non-international armed conflict, which quickly developed into an 
international armed conflict. The most prominent external states in the Syrian armed 
conflict include Iran, Russia, Turkey, the US, as well as the countries supporting 
opposition groups such as the Gulf states.  
Eight years of conflict have produced all that is conceivable of human rights abuses, 
such as indiscriminate shelling on civilians, arbitrary arrests, executions, disappearances, 
besiegement, hunger, and internal displacement. In addition, there is overdependence of 
all conflict parties on their patrons, not to mention the Israeli violations on Syrian 
territory. All of these abuses led to an economic, social and perhaps intellectual and 
moral collapse in the structure of Syrian society. Moreover, internal displacement and 
migration has largely separated and affected families.  
I still remember the moment I first met Lama at the airport in Beirut. I was first 
drawn towards her name, since she shares the same name as my only sister, and the 
name of the daughter I would have liked to have with my husband, who has left this 
world without a chance of bearing his children.  
We were travelling to Bosnia and Herzegovina on the most emotional trip of my 
life. What I recognized during this trip, is her passion and empathy towards her work. 
Later on, I called this trip, the trip of our friendship, because I really feel that I am on a 
journey with her, searching for inner and outer peace. Our friendship grew quickly and 
Lama became not just a colleague, but a dear friend, and working on the issue of those 
who have gone missing in Syria was what brought us together. She was and still is very 
passionate about her work. She is a young Lebanese woman who is working on a 
sensitive and complex issue.  
                                                     




Since I left Syria, Lama has become a source of safety and support away from my 
family and country. I found in her my new home, one that is filled with love, support, 
trust, and hope. 
Everything is beautiful about Lama, but this book was a turning point in the way I 
perceive her. My reading of this book was smooth and deep, as it discusses some of the 
most complex political and legal issues, in a poetic literary style, making me dive deeper 
with each word, each idea, and each feeling. I was stunned with the sources she 
consulted and the analysis of the Syrian conflict, wherein Lama has explained different 
types of violence, and different types of peace. She has looked at these issues from 
different angles including philosophy, psychology, sociology and international law. All 
of this to understand peace.  
Since I have read this book, it has become part of my daily conversation with 
family, friends and work colleagues. It deserves to be considered as an important 
reference in explaining and understanding the Syrian armed conflict.  
Lama has put so much effort and feelings into this book. She has shown her ability 
to hold space for diverging and sometimes opposing views without judgement. Her 
description and analysis is highly transparent, and stays away from judgement. What is 
evident in the book is her emotion for a burning country and an abused population.  
As a final note, I hope to walk alongside Lama in her noble work. I look up to her 




   
                
Noura Ghazi is a Syrian human rights lawyer. She has assisted over 1,000 detainees and 
has supported their families in Syria. She founded NoPhotozone Organization, a civil 
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Many people have read the manuscript for this book and offered me tremendous 
feedback. I especially thank Josefina Echavarría Álvarez and Noura Ghazi for their 
feedback on the content. I also thank my parents, sisters, and brother for their 










This book is part of the Master of Peace Series.  
 
It is primarily about the armed conflict in Syria. And it is also very much about me; how 
I relate to myself, which ultimately extends into how I relate to the Syrian conflict. It 
took me a while to put this work together and it offered me a chance to deeply reflect 
on the ways in which I understand peace and conflict.  
 
I had many concerns in the writing of this book, how it could be perceived and what it 
could mean to different people. In the end, this process has helped me see the relational 
aspects emanating within, and from the silhouettes of conflict. It also made me 
confront my own authorship. Not Syrian and yet drawn to write about Syria, 
demonstrating the mesh of my understanding and potential misunderstanding of the 
complex realities of the Syrian armed conflict.  
 
Ultimately, I wanted this book to address a multiplicity of authors since it tackles topics 
relating to international relations, sociology, philosophy, and of course, peace and 
conflict studies. I also sought to offer an understanding of Syria beyond the prevalent 
discourses of justice and security. This book does not aim to uncover a truth 
concerning the armed conflict in Syria or concerning the “Four Towns Agreement.” 
The aim is to simply put different viewpoints and discourses into conversation with 
each other, and listen. Really listen. What kind of perspectives emerge? The aim is also 
not to prescribe solutions. Instead, I aim to understand. What I hope to show is the 
human element entrenched in conflicts; found even in the disquieting feelings of 
otherness and the shrinking belonging of our wold.   
 
On a final note, I am grateful for you, my reader, for allowing me to share these ideas 
with you. These ideas are mixed with the stories of those who have enriched my life 
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I hate the Middle East,  
I really do.  
I hate its listless trees,  
these meandering alleys of garbage now bacteria in our throats,  
these poisoned mute fish in a Mediterranean dazed,   
rooms of babies born into sins or sects,  
staggered into teenagers without eyes, 
girls birthing tumors where once were orgasms,  
men without spinal cords, bent into 
old people calling out to the final croak,  
and me, still here, with my fat and my rot and my words and my teeth always stinging. 
 







I met the Palestinian/American filmmaker and writer Hind Shoufani2 during a poetry 
night at an art exhibition in Beirut in 2017. She recited her poem beautifully and I knew 
at that moment that I wanted to include her work in my book. It is made up of seven 
parts, or as Hind calls them, songs, which I have spread across the chapters. Hind said 
that this poem is still a draft, a work in progress. But I think most writings, like this 
book, that explore aspects of people’s lives are drafts. They are never finished work.  
This book is about the many fissures and cracks of Syria. It is caught within a 
kaleidoscopic spectrum of emotions and realities that seem to make and unmake Syria 
the ragged, tormenting reality it is. But Syria adjusts in new realities. And through Syria, 
I continue to find and form my heart collectively. In this book, I try to connect 
different moments and thoughts with my readers. These moments are now shared by 
many people. This book is about a conflict that is full of sacred moments, of torment 
and salvation, signs that you can pin meaning onto or disregard. Through this book, I 
share snippets of the complex chorus of truths in Syria, which creates further 
complexity in the regional reality.  
Yet, on the outset, when it came down to writing, the words were exhausted; things 
felt dry. Vague textures and specific moods emerged, and I could not tell how it could 
sound or how it could feel. At the beginning of this endeavor, I try to map my relation 
to the Syrian conflict, only to rediscover myself at the heart of it. In the second chapter, 
I explore the conceptual framework upon which I build my research, which offers an 
explanation of different forms of violence, and its circular nature in conflicts. Next, I 
provide a background on Syria’s history, leading up to the Syrian armed conflict in 
2011, followed by an in-depth description of the conflict episode, the “Four Towns 
Agreement,” which entailed the transfer of populations from four towns in Syria in 
April 2017. After that, I analyze the conflict episode along the themes of harmony, 
justice, security and truth. Then, I explore the imbalances within the layers, traveling 
from the very personal aspects of family origin, to wider concepts such as the 
community and society. Finally, I describe the conflict parties involved in the conflict 
episode along with the actor’s pyramid. The analysis reveals the importance of 
sustaining a platform for interaction between non-like-minded parties to the conflict 
and the importance of recovering the web of relationships hampered through conflict.  
The method used for analysis is Elicitive Conflict Mapping (ECM). This tool allows 
me to explore a conflict episode from the Syrian conflict not as a conflict party. I try to 
map a conflict episode that is an excerpt from the Syrian war and treat it with respect, 
as it encompasses the lived experiences of many people who were involved: politicians, 
armed groups, militants, and the residents of the four towns. Surely, the challenge in the 
art of pursuing such a project is to “suspend judgment” as Lederach puts it (2005, 37). 
However, the purpose is not to flirt with positivism. The purpose is to research the 
                                                     
2 Hind Shoufani holds a Master in Fine Arts in film writing/directing from New York University and was also a 
writer in residence at the International Writers Program in 2011. Hind has been directing, producing and editing 
films for 20 years. She grew up in Damascus in her formative years, and still feels politically, spiritually and 




conflict episode in a way that is similar to active listening, just way more challenging, as 
the things that have happened generate great pain that in many ways is unspeakable 
(Lederach 2005).  
Understanding conflicts using an elicitive approach implies recognizing that 
conflicts are part of daily life. As such, this analysis does not provide a solution to 
violence since it does not believe in the guarantee of its non-existence. Lederach and 
Lederach (2010) adopt a circular understanding of social conflict and seek to change the 
political language that implies a linear development of violence. As such, Lederach and 
Lederach suggest that in the process towards nonviolent relationships, violent episodes 
are likely to occur (2010). What is important to note is that Lederach does not see the 
recurrence of violence as testimony to the failure of an agreement. Lederach 
understands that the nature of violence is cyclical making it likely to re-emerge. As such, 
one basic assumption of Elicitive Conflict Transformation (ECT) is the openness of all 
systems. Peace would be dead and tyrannous if it were a never-changing end-state. The 
“promise of static, closed, perfection is as sure to produce tyranny as its predecessor” 
(Friedman 2012, 7). Crutchfield (2011) argues that an ordered universe would be dead. 
Instead, chaos is needed for life’s dynamic mechanism, wherein useful randomness 
unfolds in nature. 
In line with the elicitive approach, conflicts are seen as a lens to peek into the 
sediment issues at play (Lederach 2003). Conflict transformation becomes a means to 
address the deeper and blocked energy at the epicenter, which is generating the 
conflictive episode. In the case of the conflict episode chosen, the “Four Towns 
Agreement,” this can facilitate a platform to draft new agreements with the purpose of 
including the views of non-like-minded people and a focus on the recovery of the web 
of relationships. Nevertheless, if new agreements do not seek transformation at the 
epicenter and only address the episodic expressions of conflict, new agreements are 
likely to emerge that only create more frustrated and unmet needs within the groups 
affected. Especially in a highly volatile environment such as Syria, agreements 
concerning the grassroots levels need to be drafted with the epicenter at the core of any 
sustainable and lasting agreement. 
 
“An episode of conflict is the visible expression of conflict rising within the relationship or 
system, usually within a distinct time frame. It generates attention and energy around a 
particular set of issues that need response. The epicenter of conflict is the web of relational 
patterns, often providing a history of lived episodes, from which new episodes and issues 
emerge. If the episode releases conflict energy in the relationship, the epicenter is where the 
energy is produced”. (Lederach, 2003, 31) 
 
ECT provides the basic conceptual framework for my analysis. Authors such as 
Lederach and Dietrich situate their work within a branch of peace and conflict research 
called Transrational Peace Philosophy, which, like any school, has its own ontological 
assumptions. They acknowledge the potential of non-rational categories such as 




non-prescriptive, making ECT the applied work of transrational peaces. Such theory 
will provide me with the foundation for analyzing the conflict episode of the “Four 
Towns Agreement” within the Syrian conflict. 
Combining experiential insights and Transrational Peace Philosophy, the ECM 
model emerged as a tool that investigates the plurality of actions at play within a 
conflict episode (Dietrich 2013). The model aids in the understanding of conflict 
episodes and parties, and most importantly for my research, it assists in visualizing the 
dynamic nature of the “Four Towns Agreement” through different themes, layers, and 
levels.   
 
 
1.1. Author’s Perspective and Research Interest 
 
Since both peace and conflict are relational, there is always a perceiving subject that 
understands and contextualizes the experience of peace and the experience of conflict 
(Dietrich 2012). At the heart of the ECM model is the researcher, and it is key that the 
researcher is self-aware throughout the entire process. The researcher continuously 
changes during the writing process, and as Hamed puts it, “the researcher is searching” 
(2016, 5). As such, in this section I address my personal background in relation to the 
conflict in Syria; this is important for contextualizing my research endeavor.  
I was born and raised in Beirut, Lebanon, a small country along the Mediterranean 
Sea. Much of my research is driven by the geographical location of my country and the 
implications that this has had on me. Due to the political tension in Lebanon and the 
armed conflicts with Israel, I grew up listening to the stories of war and violence 
committed against Lebanon. Israel was the perceived enemy, and the need for 
protection from this enemy grew in my own heart and mind.  
With the outbreak of the armed conflict in Syria, the Lebanese-Syrian border 
became threatened by the presence of the Islamic State (IS). At that point, I started to 
perceive a new enemy: the IS. This was not only my perception but the general 
perception in Lebanon and as a result, the Lebanese and Syrian armies ran many 
military operations to protect the Lebanese borders from IS. These security measures 
made me feel safer. They made me feel protected from my perceived ‘enemy.’ Many 
men died during these military operations, from both the Lebanese and the Syrian army. 
The longer the war in Syria, the more men died securing the border, and the more I felt 
that I owed Syrians something. There were people risking their lives so that I could lead 
the life I had in Beirut, which drove me to assume that there was a shared responsibility 
of the world towards Syria.  
I was so fixated on this concept of a shared responsibility towards Syria, that in 
every attempt to address politics during my graduate studies at the University of 
Innsbruck (UIBK), I took this particular image as a starting point. Always, my 
overriding purpose for including this was to create a dialogue that conceptually 




ways in which this concept had endowed me with the realization of the crucial role and 
responsibility that falls upon me as an observer—how I observe and, more importantly, 
react to suffering.  
 
 
In this art installation, artist June Lee (2015) accentuates the Bystander Effect3. In 
comparison with the bystander’s body size, the outcast is large, signifying the breadth 
and severity of the outcasts’ suffering and the indifference of the bystander. 
Furthermore, the modeling of the audience in this artwork rests on an ethical 
imperative: in different ways, it asks what behavior we will tolerate in the name of art – 
and, by extension, what we will tolerate in what other names. The unforgiving 
implication of such work is that there are no innocent bystanders.  
 
“The deeper we venture into the larger context of global crisis, the more directly we are 
affected personally. Paradoxically, the epicenter of a persona’s conflictive episode is as wide 
as it is deep, marking both innermost and outermost spheres. Therefore, those who maintain 
balance will be able to balance the world”. (Dietrich 2013, 227) 
                                                     
3 The term Bystander Effect was coined in 1968 after an American woman, Kitty Genovese, was murdered in 
front of 38 bystanders who witnessed the crime but did nothing to help. Darley and Latane (1968) established 
that in group situations, people are less likely to offer help since they wait for cues from others to intervene, and 
reassure themselves that someone else will help. 




When I started working with Syrian refugees in Lebanon, I read articles from authors 
who were in support of the regime and from authors who were bluntly against it. Some 
were convincing and others were resounding the usual mantra of the deeply-modern 
version of the Syrian war. And there was little room for other narratives about the 
conflict. Political narratives rendered the Syrian people invisible, their struggle an 
afterthought, their massacre a non-event.  
Even with that conviction, I felt that there was something missing from everything I 
read, something more human and relatable. Policy talk was geared towards stopping the 
violence using ‘sensible’ solutions, at the expense of diminishing all prospects of closure 
for Syrians. Ultimately, crimes will be “avenged, forgotten or redeemed on their terms, 
not on the whims of officials sitting in Washington, Moscow or Tehran” (Harling 
2016). Perhaps the problem lies in the ways the political discourses around Syria are 
posited as inexhaustible, making the few that are well known overshadow the many that 
are equally worth knowing. As such, the political narratives surrounding Syria can be 
mapped in innumerable ways, with each scheme casting before the viewer a particular 
point of view.  
The world of politics asserts and contradicts itself, ranging at extremes from a form 
of communicative rationality to episodic eruptions of resistance in a fragmented world. 
What seems to hold true for me is the ways in which politics weaves itself in-and-out of 
my relationship to the world. And within this, the question that poses itself is, how do I 
feel myself in politics?  
The answer is that in politics, the world and the self begin to intertwine. What may 
be understood is that political aspects cover a holistic and comprehensive relationship 
of the human to the world. Hannah Arendt described the poetic impulse to engage in 
politics as “the impulse to enter, with other humans, through language, into the order 
and disorder of the world” (as quoted in Calhoun and McGowan 1997, 28). What may 
be experienced is the potency to be tendered within political life. What may be done is 
simply to embrace the world with compassion, “recognizing its afflictions as extensions 
or mirror images of the conflicts or delusions we nurture in ourselves” (Joanna Macy, as 
quoted by Woodhouse and Lederach 2016, 183). In that, politics is transformed from a 
kind of tragic theatre into a concept that appreciates the purposeful nature of the 
human struggle.  
Through my experiences at Innsbruck, and the recognition of a human element in 
conflict, something within me changed. I am unable to really identify what it was, but it 
felt like the untying of a giant knot within. It provided Syria with a depth and 
profundity that made politics a quest for truth; truth in relation to something quite 
precise: what kind of world does one see from the point of view of two rather than 
one? The kind of world that I experienced after this was more hopeful; it was driven 
more by a plane of possibility of connectedness rather than a plane of hate. It even 
tendered the anger that the Syrian conflict had conjured in me. Buried under the rubble 
of politics and rude realism, I discovered a different part of myself; neither a child 




I chose the “Four Towns Agreement” as the conflict episode for this book because 
of my interest to write about Syrians who are still in Syria. I find that there is much 
research about the refugee issue because once Syrians leave Syria, the research becomes 
mostly about the countries hosting them. For this reason, I chose to write about an 
event in the Syrian armed conflict which encompasses the complexity of violence, 
security, and belonging within Syria.  
 
1.2. Research Interest 
 
The uprisings that began in 2011 developed into an armed conflict between the 
government in Damascus and a hodge-podge of armed groups such as Syrian armed 
forces, so-called moderates, Islamists and Kurds (Svoboda and Pantuliano 2015). The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared in July 2012 that the 
conflict in Syria has reached the level of civil war (National Public Radio 2012). 
According to interviews conducted by the Humanitarian Policy Group with politicians, 
there are 10-12 major groups, and a number of proliferating sub-groups (Svoboda and 
Pantuliano 2015). According to Boothroyd (2016), 150,000 groups are active across 
Syria comprised of armed men and defectors.  
Cunningham (2016) explains that what makes the situation even more complex is 
the external support that is flooding Syria with troops, weapons and financial assistance, 
contributing greatly to fragmentation within the opposition. For example, the 
emergence of Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and IS has made the 
situation even murkier, as well as triggering airstrikes by the United States (US) and 
Russia (Cunningham 2016).  
Another very divisive form of external support is armed actors from abroad, such as 
Iranian-trained fighters loyal to the government but separate from the Syrian army, 
Hezbollah and the National Defense Force (Svoboda and Pantuliano 2015). 
Cunningham (2016) argues that Syria’s fragmented actors and multi-party conflict has 
made it very difficult to identify who is responsible for which attack, making the 
environment within which humanitarian organizations operate ever more challenging.  
The top three donors for the Syrian response are the US, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Kuwait, to the two main funding streams: the Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Plan 
(SHARP), which covers Syria, and the Syria Regional Response Plan (SRRP), for Syrian 
refugees in the region (Slim and Trombetta 2014). International non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), United Nations (UN) 
agencies such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
(UNRWA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were present in Syria prior to the 
uprisings in 2011, primarily in their assistance to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees (Slim 
and Trombetta 2014). However, the international humanitarian system began its earnest 
engagement only in 2012, after the Syrian government granted the UN access to 




was granted to eight UN agencies and nine INGOs; and the number of accredited 
INGOs has gone up to 14 since then (Slim and Trombetta 2014).  
In September 2014, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Syria, Turkey and Jordan, drafted their operations 
into a single response plan, the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and the 2015 
Syria Strategic Response Plan (SSRP). As a result, the efforts brought together launched 
the Whole of Syria (WoS) approach in February 2015. The partnered efforts have 
achieved some notable successes, especially with regards to access of rebel-held areas, 
after the UN Security Council resolution 2165 that grants the UN access to enter Syria 
from the Turkish and Jordanian borders (UNOCHA 2016).  
Despite these improvements in access, according to a 2015 report by the Syrian 
American Medical Society (SAMS), since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, several 
sieges have intentionally denied people access to food, water and medicine, all of which 
have had devastating impacts such as starvation, dehydration and the spread of diseases. 
As such, persons of concern to humanitarian organizations in Syria continue to suffer 
from the scope and brutality of the violence, which can often be indiscriminate and 
sometimes deliberately targets populations of concern. In Syria, many tactics of war 
have led to widespread displacements due to the targeting of civilians, and the use of 
sieges has placed severe restrictions on their freedom of movement (SAMS 2015). As 
such, humanitarian actors face many obstacles in accounting for the protection needs of 
populations in enclaves and besieged areas (ibid).  
Besieged areas in Syria include locations in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Deir 
Ezzor, and Idleb governorates (The Syria Institute 2017). However, data emerging from 
different active organizations concerning besieged areas are conflicting. According to 
UNOCHA (2016) report that as of December 2015, the total number of people trapped 
under siege amounted to 393,700, more than half of whom were besieged by IS in Deir 
Ezzor. In contrast, The Syria Institute (2016) reports that only the two towns of Foah 
and Kafreya in the Idleb province are besieged by non-state armed opposition groups 
(NSAGs); and that both IS and the Government of Syria (GoS) hold a siege around a 
group of neighborhoods in Deir Ezzor city (2016). 
The outcome of the emerging different sets of data from different organizations is 
testimony to the fixation on ‘who is more of a perpetrator’ in Syria at the expense of 
dismissing prospects of closure for people. This has led to a donor-driven programming 
that funds ‘stabilization’ as the war worsens (Harling, Simon and Berthier 2017). 
Donors are supporting financially what they would like to see, short-term relief, often 
contributing to a “soft war” where humanitarian assistance comes to have political 
value (Braumen 2016, 7). With low prospects that the P5 + 14 will agree on President 
Bashar Al Assad (Aaronson 2014), Syria turned into a platform for polarized 
humanitarian assistance in a context of East-West rivalry (Braumen 2016). Under these 
                                                     





circumstances, Harling (2016) fears that spaces where Syrians can voice out their stories 
have been shrinking relentlessly, as most aid programs have become affiliated with 
either the regime or the opposition.  
 
“The core […] of the challenge [is] of linking a top-heavy international system with complex, 
fluid dynamics at the grassroots—a space where Syrians display the kind of agency that must 
be understood and harnessed if aid & development programs are to gain relevance and 
traction with the concerned”. (Harling, Simon and Berthier 2017) 
 
 
Moreover, in 2016, the UN reported monthly breaches in the 2139 UN resolution, 
which was adopted in 2014, wherein parties to the conflict exhibited repeated non-
compliance to the resolution’s demand on the protection of civilians and ensuring 
humanitarian access, even in besieged areas (UN 2016a). The disregard for international 
humanitarian and human rights law have given way to the humanitarian catastrophes of 
the four besieged towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani in Rural Damascus, and Kafreya and 
Foah in the Idleb governorate. 
The situation in these towns was dire, as the sieges made movement of people and 
commodities very difficult. Cross-border convoys reached all these four towns in 
October 2015, and critical medical cases were evacuated via Lebanon and Turkey in 
December 2015 (UNOCHA 2016). Despite this, in January 2016 more than 40 people 
died of starvation in Madaya over several months of the GoS blocking humanitarian aid 
to that town (UN 2016a).  
Recent data emerging from UNOCHA estimates that as of September 2017, hard-
to-reach (HTR) areas across the country are homes to three million people, 420,000 of 
whom live in besieged areas (2017). The figures have improved compared to the 
previous months, with a noticeable decrease by 33%, specifically from 4.5 million to 3 
UNOCHA Definitions 
 
“Hard to Reach areas: is an area that is not regularly accessible to 
humanitarian actors for the purposes of sustained humanitarian programming 
as a result of denial of access, including the need to negotiate access on an ad 
hoc basis, or due to restrictions such as active conflict, multiple security 
checkpoints, or failure of the authorities to provide timely approval”. 
(UNOCHA 2016) 
 
“Besieged locations: for the purposes of the Syrian conflict, a ‘besieged 
area’ is an area surrounded by armed actors with the sustained effect that 
humanitarian assistance cannot regularly enter, and civilians, the sick and 





million (UNOCHA 2017a). The improvements can largely be attributed to changes in 
access.   
 
 
Figure 2: Concentration of hard-to-reach and besieged areas in Syria (UNOCHA 2017a, 13) 
  
As mentioned previously, the Syrian conflict presents humanitarian actors with many 
obstacles in accounting for the protection needs of populations in enclaves and 
besieged areas. Humanitarian evacuations could be a response to these challenges, 
however only as a last resort and remain a temporary measure.  
 
“Humanitarian evacuations refer to large-scale relocations of civilians, who face an immediate 
threat to life in a conflict setting, to locations within their own country where they can be 
more effectively protected”. (UNHCR 2016, 5) 
 
In March 2017, an agreement was reached between the different conflict parties in Syria 
to evacuate the four towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Foah and Kafreya: the “Four 
Towns Agreement” (UNOCHA 2017b). However, the evacuation was poorly organized 
and implemented, which created separate protection risks and even loss of life. 
Although the evacuation assisted those stranded in enclaves for long periods, there are 
undertones that hint how this humanitarian evacuation became manipulated for 
political and military ends (Amnesty International 2017, United Nations Human Rights 




1.3. The “Four Towns Agreement” 
 
In September 2015, negotiations between conflict parties in Syria brokered around an 
agreement to evacuate four towns, treat the wounded, and deliver humanitarian 
assistance to the people. This was the original “Four Towns Agreement” whereby some 
of the terms were carried out, such as the provision of humanitarian access and the 
treatment of the wounded, but the implementation did not fully occur (UNOCHA 
2017b).  
Another “Four Towns Agreement” was reached in late March 2017, whereby 
parties to the conflict stipulated the evacuation of four Syrian towns and the facilitation 
of access to humanitarian assistance. The evacuations were to be carried out from the 
four towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah. Madaya and Az-Zabadani, 
whose residents are mostly Sunnis, were under the control of the NSAGs in Rural 
Damascus and were besieged by government forces (UNOCHA 2017b). Evacuees 
from these towns were to be transferred to the NSAG-held Idleb governorate. Kafreya 
and Foah, whose residents were mostly of the Shiite domination of Islam, were under 
the control of the GoS and were besieged by the armed opposition in the Idleb 
governorate. Evacuees from these towns were to cross to the GoS-held Aleppo city.  
The first phase of the agreement started on April 12, when the exchange of 
prisoners and dead bodies started between the parties. According to the UNOCHA 
report (2017b), government forces in Foah released sixteen prisoners and eight bodies, 
and NSAGs in the Idleb governorate released nineteen prisoners and one body. It also 
included the release of members of the Qatar royal family who had been kidnapped in 
Iraq. Their release became heavily tied to the negotiations and subsequent 
implementation of the “Four Towns Agreement” (The New York Times 2018).  
On April 15, the second phase of the agreement was carried out where an estimated 
2,350 people were evacuated from the town of Madaya, and 5,000 people were 
transferred from the towns of Kafreya and Foah. As part of the evacuation of the latter 
population, the evacuees were to be brought to a transit area on the western outskirts of 
Aleppo called al-Rashideen. While awaiting for their transfer to their final destination in 
Aleppo, a car bomb exploded killing 125 people. Since the explosion was in proximity 
to the evacuation buses, the majority of the victims were evacuees from Kafreya and 
Foah. In response to the explosion, cross-border partners exerted tremendous efforts 
and hospitals in Idleb, Aleppo, and Turkey provided patients with medical treatment.  
A few hours after the attack, the process resumed and evacuees from Madaya 
reached Idleb city, and those from Kafreya and Foah arrived in Aleppo. On April 19, 
the last phase of evacuations took place. Five hundred and fifty people were evacuated 
from several towns in the Damascus governorate, Az-Zabadani (158 people), Madaya 
(100 people), Bloudan mountain (150 people) and Sarghaya (100 people). Three 
thousand people departed from Kafreya and Foah towards Aleppo. Disputes between 
the warring factions caused hours of delays, leaving the evacuees waiting on evacuation 




completed and resulted in the relocation of populations from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, 
Kafreya and Foah.  
The evacuation agreement points to the need for creating and sustaining a platform 
for negotiations between the different conflict parties in Syria. Although the 
implementation process was a long and arduous task, conversations and discussions 
towards processes of peace and reconciliation are an important step. In his book The 
Moral Imagination, John Paul Lederach suggests that it is important to transform 
temporary peace negotiations into  
 
“a context-based, permanent, and dynamic platform capable of non-violently generating 
solutions to ongoing episodes of conflict, which they will experience in the ebb and flow of 
their social, political, and economic lives”. (2005, 23) 
 
In this, Lederach points to the ways in which visible expressions of conflict grow within 
a particular system, yet the ‘epicenter’ is the seat from which the conflictive energy is 
produced. The conflictive energy is tied up in the ebbs and flows of the relational 
patterns of the system (2005). Hence, Lederach (2005) urges us to consider that conflict 
transformation can only be successful if accomplished at the level of the epicenter. 
Addressing the visible manifestation of the conflict, which he terms as the ‘episode,’ is a 
means towards management and resolution, but does not work towards transformation. 
The episode could be temporarily resolved, without attending to the deeper layers, but 
this would make way for new episodes to reappear and emerge. Employing such an 
approach in conflict transformation is ‘elicitive’ since the method and direction of 
transformation is determined based on the relational energy of the conflict parties. ECT 
thus, “draws out, highlights, and catalyzes existing or communally held knowledge 
related to transforming conflicts between individuals, groups, and communities, while 
prescriptive approaches prefer prefabricated models” (UIBK 2017g).   
The purpose of my research is to address the epicenter of the conflict episode in 
order to unearth deeper dynamics of the conflict by inquiring in an elicitive way into the 
agreement and its implementation. I see the details of the agreement as visible 
expressions of the conflict episode, revealing a deeper web of relationality that created 
energy and violence around its implementation.  
My research question is: What does the episode of the “Four Towns Agreement” 
reveal about deeper themes, layers and levels at the epicenter of the Syrian conflict?  
Therefore, I seek to offer institutional introspection from a Transrational Peace 
Philosophy lens to key protection and operational considerations, and minimum 
standards for in-country humanitarian evacuations in Syria. I accomplish this by 
examining the “Four Towns Agreement” in depth through the themes, layers, and 
levels that are often overlooked in modern political narratives, using the elicitive 
conflict analysis tool, ECM. It does so by synthesizing and building on pre-existing 
guidance as well as drawing from the lessons learned and tools developed by UNHCR 





1.4. Elicitive Conflict Mapping  
 
At the heart of the ECM model is the elicitive conflict worker, who is connected to 
different ECM branches: principles, themes, layers and levels. The ‘principles’ pertain to 
correspondence, resonance, and homeostasis, all of which aid me, the conflict 
researcher, in orientation within conflict interventions. Correspondence establishes a 
non-linear relation between the inner and outer aspects of human beings within their 
encounters and conflicts (Echavarría Álvarez 2014a). Looking at the “Four Towns 
Agreement” through ECM, security becomes a relational issue and therefore, a systemic 
product. Inner security of those evacuated is reflected in the way they perceive the 
world. The second ECM principle is resonance, which describes the ability to be aware 
of both the physical manifestation of the conflict and the sediments lying beneath the 
surface; that is, to describe the correlation between the inner and outer aspects of 
human beings. It requires the ability to be aware of resonances and dissonances in order 
to be an authentic receiver and transmitter of conflict information. Within this model, 
dissonance between the inner and outer became unbearable, making physical violence 
possible, signified by the shooting and explosion during the implementation phase of 
the agreement (ibid).  
Dietrich (2018) argues that within a complex and dynamic system, third party 
interventions can bring in either harmonizing or disturbing effects. Social systems 
evolve more internally differentiated within a more complex system. Within the 
dynamics of such an open system, homeostasis is the system’s strive towards dynamic 
equilibrium. In the interactions between intra-personal and inter-personal tensions and 
conflict, homeostasis is the renewal of balance and equilibrium leading to peace. The 
question that poses itself for this model pivots around the agreement’s ability to restore 
balance for the people involved. How did they react to their evacuation? Was the 
evacuation voluntary, or was it forced? The ECM model will allow me to address such 
questions related to the “Four Towns Agreement.” 
 
 
1.4.1. Themes of Conflict  
 
The ‘themes’ tackle the different thematic narratives of peace (energetic, moral, 
modern, postmodern and transrational) as played out within the conflict episode. Each 
of these variations of peace understandings generate themes of harmony, justice, 
security and truth found in the conflict episode in varying degrees. Dietrich calls them 
the “five peace family” (2013). This type of mapping reveals the dominant theme of the 
storyline for a clearer understanding of the conflicting episode, the “Four Towns 
Agreement” within Syria.  
The five families of peace begin with the Energetic Peaces. The energetic peaces 
build on a holistic understanding of the interrelations between nature, society and the 




the individual is always a part of a greater relationality. Examples of energetic peaces 
include notions of fertility and harmony, exemplified in the growth of crops, the 
reproduction of animals, and the health of humans (UIBK 2017a). Within such 
energetic interpretations, peace comes out of harmony, manifested in the balance 
between interrelations. In the case of disharmony, the reaction would be the destruction 
of oneself or the other (ibid). For the adaptation of this model, it may be perceived that 
the conflict destroyed the energetic connection with the land that once was fertile. This 
disharmony manifested itself in the experience of extreme hunger of people under 
siege.  
The shift from energetic towards moral understandings of peace starts with the 
introduction of a higher and divine existence separated from the human worldly 
existence (UIBK 2017c). This assumption brings with it the dichotomies in morality of 
good and evil, right and wrong, true and false. This peace family builds on the notion of 
peace out of justice; driven heavily by the notion that justice will bring the good, the 
right and the truth. In seeking peace through justice, a linear perception of time unfolds 
where there is a constant projection into a better future. The better future can only be 
achieved once justice is restored. But what this often entails is revenge and “demands 
for food, housing, clothing, medical care, as well as access to sources of income, 
farmland, water, trade routes, resources, information” (UIBK 2017e). This is found 
within monotheistic religions, where a male, creator God provides the values of 
conduct, and obedience to these values brings peace. Given this hierarchy, the 
distinction between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ becomes omnipresent.   
Richard Rortry (1998) in “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality” examines 
the role of sentiments in grounding our categorization of people. That is, Rortry (1998) 
explores the ways in which historical conflicts exacerbated the intensity of ethnic 
grudges; the outcome being the emergence of a sense of identity that feels conflicted 
with the ‘other,’ the latter being a person or population who does not belong to the 
social group. This sense of ‘other’ divides people and dehumanizes them, rendering 
labels such as “pseudo-humans” and “borderline cases” possible (Rortry 1998, 167-
168). This peace family is significant for my analysis since moral understandings of 
peace assert reconciliation as the desired outcome of the agreement. Moral notions of 
peace also emerge by lending the hunger experienced by the people under siege, moral 
connotations.  
Modern peaces is the next peace family. It begins with the creation of the nation-
state, which substituted religion’s moral system and introduced a mechanical 
understanding of the world. Rationality became the foundation, where knowing the 
world was only possible through the senses. With this, the universe was perceived as a 
vast machine, following the laws of nature, cause, and effect. As such, the universe is 
knowable, predictable, and can be repaired, managed, and perfected (UIBK 2017b). 
Regarding human beings, an atomistic understanding emerged, where there was an 
assumption of inherently individual units characterized by their individual 




Within this family, peace emerges out of security. Peace becomes a final end-state of 
human evolution, enlightenment and civilization. This type of peace is a material one 
that can be measured and accumulated (UIBK 2017b). For the Syrian model I have 
chosen, this peace family will be very important since it carries the idea of a nation-
state. Wimmer and Feinstein define the nation-state as “an independent state with a 
written constitution, ruled in the name of a nation of equal citizens” (2010, 764). 
Security is the nation state’s promise against attacks from foreign armies or internal 
crimes (UIBK 2017e). This promise is likely to construct aggressors and can turn into 
phobicsecurity, where this fear creates an ‘other’ that is seen inherently aggressive (ibid).  
Post-modern peaces emerged from the disillusionment to their counterpart, the 
modern peaces. The postmodern peaces are understood according to its orientation 
towards plurality, which created a foundation for the celebration of the multiplicity of 
lived experiences (UIBK 2017d). Within this multiplicity, the postmodern peaces do not 
seek the resolution of contradiction. Moreover, peace becomes contextualized based on 
each new concrete encounter and the ones perceiving it. As such, peace is out of truths, 
relative to each person’s human encounter (UIBK 2017d).  
For this adaptation of the ECM, truth discourses are important for a discussion of 
the many truths emerging from the “Four Towns Agreement.” Within the conflict 
episode, there is no space for a multiplicity of truths. Instead, a dominant truth must 
prevail. This becomes evident especially in the discourses around the “Four Towns 
Agreement” where there is a strong emphasis on determining the main perpetrator in 
Syria in relation to the April 14 attack, which killed 125 people who originated from the 
evacuated towns of Kafreya and Foah (UNOCHA 2017b). As such, the search for truth 
in Syria is pursued within a modern not a postmodern framework. Postmodernity’s 
multiplicity of truths does not have space.  
In Transrational Peace Philosophy, transrational peaces focus on the systemic 
balance between the themes of harmony, justice, security and truth (Dietrich 2013). The 
core assumption is that there is a natural strive for balance, termed as dynamic 
equilibrium, for the different peace families. In transrational thought, the aim is the 
unification between the postmodern and energetic cosmovisions. Contrary to the other 
peace families, the purpose is not to repair by external intervention. Instead, healing and 
integrating the different peaces is accomplished through internal forces, making it 
process-oriented. Transrationality combines rationality with transpersonal and spiritual 
expressions towards a holistic understanding of peace (UIBK 2017f).   
Within this dynamic equilibrium of transrationality, each of the themes gains a 
relational aspect. Personal harmony within inter-personal encounters is understood as 
an unfolding between the material (physical and biological), intellectual and 
psychological processes. In this, contradictions are seen and trusted without annulling 
one force supremacy over another. The contradiction itself is the reality in all its 
manifoldness. Structural justice is no longer understood as a mechanistic satisfaction of 
a demand. Instead, it refers to the satisfaction of needs subjectively and communally, 
where growth is not an end in itself, but a process. Relational security is seen through 




local population. Truth becomes cultural, and refers to the respect and plurality that is 
found in different cultural environments (UIBK 2017f). The family of transrational 
peaces will allow me to consider the many themes pulling and tugging at the center and 
the peripheries of the “Four Towns Agreement.” The power of this type of mapping 
lies in the ways in which this allows me to contact, even to embrace, all of the episode's 
dimensions. 
 
1.4.2. Layers of Conflict  
 
After identifying the dominant theme of the conflict narrative, the next ECM branch 
inquires into the inner and outer ‘layers’ behind the conflict episode, all of which follow 
the seven chakra system of Yoga philosophy. The layers include inquiring into the 
persona and her sexual-family, emotional-communal, mental-societal, spiritual-policitary 
and global awareness layers. The last two layers are not part of applied conflict 
transformation work since they pertain to the perception of the all-oneness in all 
beings. While they are important for a holistic understanding of the layers based on the 
chakra principles, they are not part of the mapping of the conflict. 
The first ECM layer is the dance of the persona. It is the most physical 
manifestation of the conflict episode. It encompasses the physical aspects that form the 
sensual world that humans live in (Dietrich 2013). In the next layer, under the sexual-
familial layer, the security of sexuality and family origin become key factors. According 
to Dietrich (2013), sexuality is the energy of life and always influences behavior. In line 
with impulses of sexual attraction and rejection, sexuality is also a desire to adapt. For 
this security of the sexual energy, trust becomes key since it is harnessed through 
human relationships and the acknowledgement of personal experiences.  
With regards to trust, this bears great weight within an understanding of the “Four 
Towns Agreement”. The residents of these towns were evacuated and left behind their 
homes and the lives they had so heartedly woven for themselves and families. The 
question that poses itself here concerns their trust in the evacuation agreement and 
whether their fears of building new homes were acknowledged. Family origin is also 
very significant at this layer. During the evacuation process, many families were 
separated and many family members were killed in the explosion, which entails a deep 
sense of loss of family origin. When family ties are broken, families find it extremely 
difficult to restore a sense of meaning and purpose to their lives (Lederach and 
Lederach 2010). 
Given that community influences trust, the next ECM layer is the emotional-
communal layer. The emotional-communal layer expands from the immediate family to 
the community, where the latter attends to the interpersonal need for belonging 
(Dietrich 2013). The community is a culmination of lived relationships that includes the 
previous two layers as well. Physical violence in communities emerges as a reaction to 




I believe the emotional-communal layer will be essential for my model since 
blockages of “determination, ego, willpower, dynamism and expansion” often exist in 
this layer (Echavarría Álvarez 2014a, 66). In the context of the “Four Towns 
Agreement,” this becomes essential since the movement and relocation of the people 
from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah means “attempting to relocate a sense 
of place and purpose in a context where few things make sense and must constantly be 
negotiated” (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 13). Through the evacuation, they lost a 
sense of “at-homeness” in the world (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 63). Lederach and 
Lederach describe how the phraseology of ‘internally displaced people’ is deeply 
metaphoric at different levels, from physical displacement to emotional displacement 
and a sense of loss (2010).   
Within the mental-societal layer, the ability to reason and create mental concepts is 
central. At this level, the person is able to become aware of all previous layers. Here, 
society is a social category that extends beyond the realm of the community. In 
addition, the need for control, domination and dogma are prevalent where a narrow 
and hermetic concept of society can emerge from the danger of delusion (Echavarría 
Álvarez 2014a). This can become violent since it links to absolute end-states. Here, 
ideals of home, country, and resistance are likely to emerge, all of which feed into the 
modern notions of peace. Lederach and Lederach (2010) argue that in settings of 
violence, people look for physical spaces and mechanisms for protection. Violence also 
produces a sense of internal insecurity, which largely shapes the way people react and 
perceive the world (ibid).  
The spiritual-policitary layer goes beyond individual and conscious aspects of the 
ego, allowing greed and power-obsession to fade away. On an intra-personal level, the 
internal observer emerges from spirituality and observes without casting judgments. 
This is the ability to observe whilst not commenting with love, hate, pride or shame. It 
instead grows on silence and unconditional love towards everything. Within this layer, 
space and time are experienced as a continuum, transcending death and climaxing in the 
unity of humans in the all-oneness. The policital aspect of this layer concerns the 
external observer that is compassionate but not judging in its observation. Compassion 
refers to feeling the suffering in oneself and others and being committed to alleviate it. 
The next and final layers in the ECM analysis are the global layer and the epicenter, 
where everything dissolves into a shapeless awareness rendering concepts of security 
and justice unimportant. 
Observing the episode without judgment allows a human element to emerge 
through the conflict episode. It entails understanding the conflict parties in a systemic 
and holistic manner, which has the potential to impact and transform the episode. This 
means to closely look at an episode or an experience, which in my view, can give a 
better understanding of the conflict itself, and open up to possibilities of active listening 
to all parties. Certainly, there is only so much that can be done in Syria. The limitations 
faced by humanitarian organizations are very challenging, in terms of distributing food 




however, the possibility to improve our listening and understanding, which may be 
more important than one might initially warrant.   
 
1.4.3. Levels of Conflict  
 
The next ECM branch concerns the ‘levels’ of the conflict pyramid. Drawing on the 
work of John Paul Lederach (1997) from his book Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation 
in Divided Societies, a conflict can be mapped at three different vertical levels, each with 
different actors: Top, Middle Range, and Grassroots Leaders. It was a time when 
Lederach viewed conflict in a more structuralist manner, where he believed it was clear 
the entities that fit within each level. In his more recent work, Lederach starts to view 
conflict in a more systemic approach, where there is no longer a clear-cut distinction of 
the levels. In his book The Moral Imagination, Lederach (2005) asserts that these levels 
interact not mechanically but dynamically, trickling across feedback loops through both 
top-down and bottom-up influences.  
These layers of leadership are taken up by Dietrich (2013) within the ECM model to 
describe the different actors of the conflict and understand their position. This branch 
is also essential for my research to aid in a systemic understanding of the interaction 
between state-level, middle-range INGO work, and the grassroots base of society 
within Syria’s “Four Towns Agreement”. It will reveal both the connections and 
disconnections amongst these levels, making way for a deeper consideration of the 
dynamic relations surrounding the evacuation agreement.    
The Top Level Leadership refers to the key political and military figures that 
possess great visibility within the conflict, making them largely inflexible. Their means 
towards peacebuilding is mainly negotiation. For this adaptation, the top leadership 
level includes the parties of the conflict that negotiated and agreed on the premises of 
the “Four Towns Agreement”. The top-leadership level has created a strictly tight net 
of relations that has excluded other societal groups. Transfixed by the fear of 
eradication, the conflict parties have crammed the residents of these towns with ‘real-
politik’ ideas, while the cries at the grassroots remain too shrill to be heard.   
The Middle Leadership Level comprises figures from the education, agriculture, 
business, journalism and humanitarian sector. They have access to both the Top and 
the Grassroots level, engaging in multi-track diplomacy peace activities such as 
workshops, capacity and relationship building. Within the “Four Towns Agreement,” 
the middle-range leadership include the ICRC, the Syrian Arab Crescent (SARC) and 
the UN who facilitated the evacuation of people from the four towns. Although 
middle-range actors are very important for inclusive civil society engagement, the power 
of the top-range leadership impedes the effectiveness of the work that Syrian civil 
society can play.  
Finally, the Grassroots Leadership Level makes up the base and anchor of society 
whose leadership is based on a day-to-day “survival mentality” (Lederach 1997, 42). In 




understanding of the conflict episode. Within this, the focus of agreements, such as the 
“Four Towns Agreement,” becomes on the people, and where the critical analysis of 
power structures is based on realities instead of normative assumptions. As such, a 
genuine understanding of the realities of the people is needed beyond the normative 
assessment of living conditions of nutrition, water and sanitation, health, protection and 
so on. In placing people at the center, the community efforts should, for example, begin 
to mend the broken relationship between Syrians from these four towns, which is as 
important as repairing the broken relationship between Syrians and the outside world. 
No ceasefire or peace-treaty, no governmental vacuum or governmental installation will 
last unless the relationships between Syrians are addressed (Harling 2017).  
 
1.5. State of the Art 
 
In their book Contemporary Conflict Resolution (2011), Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 
assert that although peace and conflict research emerged in the 1950s, the philosophical 
discourses that affect it date back much further. They argue that this highly political 
discipline reflects and influences the political landscape. Peace and Conflict Studies has 
largely focused on European and North-American debates, offering Eurocentric 
perspectives. For this reason, The Palgrave International Handbook of Peace Studies (Dietrich 
et.al. 2011) is an important work which provides interpretations of peace from various 
cultural contexts. Because of the political nature of peace and conflict research, it has 
influenced political discourses and theories to a large degree. During the Cold War, 
heated debates emerged between the idealist and realist schools of thought which were 
separated mostly between the structuralism of European thought and the systemic 
debates of North America (Hamed 2016).   
In order to thoroughly address the different aspects that my research question 
entails, I will approach it from a trans-disciplinary perspective, integrating the different 
disciplines that crosscut the many branches of this issue. For writing this book, it is 
essential to provide the reader with a thorough understanding of the basic assumptions 
on which I am basing my research. Previously I stated that my book explores a conflict 
episode, specifically the “Four Towns Agreement” through Transrational Peace 
Philosophy. Towards such an endeavor, the discipline of conflict transformation is 
important for me, and the works of Lederach (1997, 2005, Lederach and Lederach 
2010) and Dietrich (2012, 2013, 2018) provide the main theoretical framework. As 
stated previously, the works of Lederach and Dietrich belong to a branch of peace and 
conflict research called transrational peace philosophy and its applied work is ECT. 
This approach to conflict is elicitive, not prescriptive, which renders non-rational 
categories such as spirituality and intuition important. This theory will provide me with 
the foundation for analyzing the conflict episode of the “Four Towns Agreement.”  
The Moral Imagination (2005) is an interesting work by Lederach that presents the 
importance of understanding conflicts in terms of their relations. This relationship-




processes, noting that a process of conflict transformation seeks to rebuild the relations 
that have fallen. In addition, in their book When Blood and Bones Cry Out (2010), Angela 
and John Paul Lederach discuss how political language is oftentimes disconnected from 
the dynamic swirl of day-to-day life in a conflict zone. They explore healing and 
reconciliation in settings of protracted violence, arguing that violence is resilient within 
such settings, making violence reappear even after politicians classify the conflict as 
officially over. Other works by Lederach that are important for me are Building Peace: 
Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) and The Little Book of Conflict 
Transformation (2003).  
Since transrational peace theory emphasizes that a world without conflict would be 
dead, Francisco Muñoz’s work Imperfect Peace (2006) is essential since he criticizes any 
notion of perfectionism in our world. He argues that violence is more easily perceived 
than peace because violence is a finished act, committed in a place and a time. It cannot 
be reversed. Peace on the other hand, is not a finished state and is always a work-in-
progress. Complimenting this, Norbert Koppensteiner’s Beyond Postmodernity: Living and 
Thinking: A Nietzschean Journey (2009) is important to explain the turn from 
postmodernity to transrationality.  
Since I am using the ECM tool, I will resort to Wolfgang Dietrich’s transrational 
model in Elicitive Conflict Transformation and the Transrational Shift in Peace Politics (2013) 
which affords a new lens with which to view and understand conflicts. It offers a 
holistic interpretation of peace since there are as many understandings of peace as there 
are individuals, as outlined in Dietrich’s Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture (2012). 
Dietrich’s Elicitive Conflict Mapping (2018) also provides me with the foundational work 
upon which I prepare my analysis across the different ECM branches: principles, 
themes, layers, and levels. For the adaptation of the ECM, I will also consult Echavarría 
Álvarez’ works (2016 and 2018). Echavarría Álvarez uses ECM to understand the no-
vote against the peace agreement in Colombia (2016), and a terrorist attack in Germany 
(2018). In both these works, she chooses a conflict episode and analyzes it across the 
branches of ECM. Although the adaptation to the context is different, her work has 
been extremely helpful to gain a deep understanding of the branches of ECM.  
Johan Galtung’s Peace by Peaceful Means (1996) offers many important contributions 
to the study of peace. Galtung (1996) understands that there are different forms of 
violence: direct and structural, where the former pertains to actions that deliberately 
intend to harm or kill someone, while the latter refers to actions that indirectly hamper 
someone’s ability to reach their full potential. Galtung (1996) also differentiates 
between positive and negative peace. Negative peace is pessimistic, is the absence of 
violence, and is peace that is not necessarily achieved through peaceful means. Positive 
peace is optimistic, is preventive of violence, and is achieved through peaceful means.  
In addition, the paper by Annette Büchs, “The Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in 
Syria under Hafez and Bashar Al-Asad” (2009) is particularly important for a modern 
understanding of how the al-Asaad regime maintains power. She argues that in Syria’s 
case, there is a lack of clear distinction between regime and state since the regime has to 




Other important works for the study of power in Syria include the seminal work of 
Volker Perthes (1997) where he analyzes the power of the security apparatus in Syria, 
which he considers the regime’s most effective way at creating an atmosphere of fear. 
Raymond Hinnebusch’s works “Party and Peasant in Syria: Rural Politics and Social 
Change under the Ba’th” (1979) and his Syria: Revolution from Above (2001) are both 
essential for understanding the rise of the Baath party in Syria. His works are 
particularly helpful to understand how the Baath party forged alliances across many 
sectors of society including peasants, middle-class intellectuals, and the rich Sunnis of 
Syria. Nazih Ayubi’s work Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East 
(1995) is particularly important for my discussion on the power tactics of the regime 
since he coins the term “tacit pact.” The concept of a “tacit pact” reveals an inequitable 
relationship between the state and the individuals by creating dependency wherein the 
receiver of the economic rewards owes the distributer loyalty. Within this discussion, 
Lisa Wedeen’s (1999) work Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in 
Contemporary Syria provides insights on the creation of a personality cult around the 
president in Syria and how this frames the understanding of citizenship in the minds 
and hearts of individuals.  
For a discussion on the history of Syria, I resort to the work by the International 
Crisis Group (2004), which provides insights into the rise of the Baath party and the 
internal turbulences that Syria experienced up until 2004. This is complimented by the 
works of Zisser (1998) and Perthes (1997) who provide important insights on the Baath 
rule.  
With regards to the “Four Towns Agreement,” I relied mostly on the article written 
by The New York Times in 2018 which outlines in great detail the behind-the-scenes of 
the conflict episode, especially Qatar’s role in facilitating the negotiations with the 
opposition groups. Other sources include the 2017 report by UNOCHA that describes 
the process of evacuations of the “Four Towns Agreement” and the main humanitarian 
actors involved. The research paper written by Böttcher (2017) explains the 
underpinnings of the conflict episode, and its political motivations for demographic 
change. Echoing this, the United Nations Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) report 
(2017) and the Amnesty International 2017 report on internal displacement is integral 
for a discussion regarding the agreement emerging as a forced displacement deal. Other 
sources that address the process of the “Four Towns Agreement” include news sources 
such as The National, Al Etihad Press and The Washington Post. Furthermore, to 
discuss the moral underpinnings of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the works of Haneef 
(2011) and Bangura (2005) are essential. Their works aid me in understanding the 
Islamic roots of positive and negative peace, and reconciliation. In light of this 
understanding, the ECM model allows us to perceive the moral readings of the “Four 
Towns Agreement.”  
Since the “Four Towns Agreement” is a physical agreement, located in a particular 
place and time, the conceptualization of land and home become essential in the 
discussion on the layers of the conflict episode. For this, the work of Elden (2010) 




and the ways that this metaphorical language affects our perceptions and understanding 
of home and the nation-state. Also, Foucault’s Questions on Geography (2007) is essential 
for explaining the relationship between geography and the military, and its creation of a 
political notion of territory entrenched by concepts of power. Further, the sense of 
belonging and connection that people derive from their land is explained using 
Gregory’s The Dictionary of Human Geography (2009), and Block’s Community: the Structure of 
Belonging (2008). Lederach and Lederach’s seminal work, When Blood and Bones Cry Out 
(2010), further compliments the discussion on home and belonging.  
Since the question of nature, land, and territory are at the heart of my discussion on 
belonging, loss, politics, and power, the work of Étienne Balibar (2004) is important to 
understand how collective identities are assigned within structures of power. Further, 
Edward Said’s seminal work Orientalism (1978) explains imagined boundaries and our 
territorialized identities. Another important work for this discussion is George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson’s book The Metaphors We Live By (1980) where they describe the ways 
in which we perceive and understand the world in an embodied manner. They argue 
that ontological metaphors make the world knowable through categorization. This is 
especially relevant for the analysis of the ECM layers of the “Four Towns Agreement,” 
since each layer is understood as being physically embodied. Despite the importance of 
ontological metaphors in knowing the world through categorization and distinction, 
they make the connections invisible by blurring the areas where properties of the world 
are actually connected. Moreover, since the “Four Towns Agreement” opens up a 
discussion on displacement and modes of mobility, the concept of home becomes 
important. For this, the works of Shiva and Mies (1993) Ecofeminism and Braidotti’s 
(2006) Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics are essential to discuss uprootedness in a time of 
forced exile.  
In addition, the role of civil society actors emerges in the analysis of the ‘levels’ of 
the ECM tool. The analysis reveals that the middle-range level is very important for 
inclusive social cohesion and civil society participation. Researcher Thania Paffenholz’s 
works are essential for understanding active and passive exclusion in political, 
economic, or social decision-making areas. Paffenholz also explains the important work 
carried out by civil society and the significant role they should be allowed to play for 
quality and sustainable peace processes. I also resort to Fetherston and Nordstrom 
(1995) who explain that a holistic and transformative perspective of peacebuilding is 
built on the internal traditions inherent in local cultures. In line with this, I also resort to 
Donais (2012) who emphasizes that external actors can support and facilitate, but 
cannot decide the type of peace to be built.  
Other sources of information for my book include publications by different UN 
agencies, particularly the yearly Syria Strategic Response, the Whole of Syria Response, 
and the HNO. Such institutional documents provide me with necessary data and 
statistics regarding the humanitarian assistance issues within the four towns of Madaya, 
Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah. Since so far, the list of references is quite Euro-
centric, I also want to use sources from Syria. Local research initiatives such as Badael 




NGOs in Syria—produced an interesting report that assesses the work and challenges 
that civil society actors encounter in the conflict. In addition, Citizens for Syria is a local 
initiative that aims at strengthening relations between local organizations and 
international donors in Syria. They insist on the importance of the work that civil 
society does in highlighting human rights issues in Syria.  
Other important works include Abd Al Karim’s (2002) “Totalitarianism” which 
offers important insights about the regime’s method of garnering support. At a political 
level, the regime relied on support from both Alawites and Sunnis. At the 
socioeconomic level, the regime received support from Sunni peasants, and the new 
middle class. His work is important since it sheds light on the political economy of the 
Baath rule, which provides a deeper understanding of the network of allegiance that the 
Baath rule crafted. In addition, Deeb’s (2011) Syria’s Modern History: from the French 
Mandate till Summer 2011, is essential for understanding Syria’s political history, especially 
in relation to the social and political atmosphere that civil society movements found 
themselves in. According to Deeb (2011), although Bashar al-Asaad embarked on a 
political and economic reform movement in 2000, he was preoccupied with wanting to 
control the pace of the reform and fearing that reform would negatively affect Syria’s 
struggle with Israel.  
Deeb (2011) also explains that the ‘Damascus Spring,’ which was led by a group of 
lawyers, writers, and political analysts in Syria, was repressed by the government’s highly 
nationalistic discourse. The ‘Damascus Spring’ of the early 2000s was a reformist 
movement which called for economic liberalization and democratic rule. The demands 
were unmet, and Deeb (2011) explains that these demands resurfaced in the 2011 
demonstrations. This is complimented by the work of Hassan Abbas (2013) who 
explains the intellectual environment which emerged during the ‘Damascus Spring’ 
wherein by 2001, there were around 170 discussion forums being held to discuss once-
taboo topics, such as public freedoms, human rights, and the fate of detainees and 
exiles.  
In speaking about the initial uprisings, the works of Abu Najem (2011) and Khoury 
(2013) offer important insights into the pluralism and diversity of ethnicity and sects of 
the 2011 uprisings. Ajami’s (2012) contributions offer important insights into the 
discussion on the nature of the armed conflict in Syria, in specific, in relation to the 
sectarian undertones of the conflict. Within the discussion on the political opposition in 
Syria, Daher (2019) is essential for understanding the emergence of the two leading 
political opposition factions and their patrons. Moreover, lawyer Anwar Al Bunni 
(2019), who is a leading figure in Syrian civil society, is essential for understanding 
initiatives led by civil society on universal jurisdiction.   
For a discussion on disappearance in Syria, the work of Syrian lawyer Noura Ghazi 
is pivotal for understanding what it means to be a family of the missing. This becomes 
significant within the analysis of the sexual-familial layer, which explores aspects of the 
kidnapping of the 45 wounded individuals from Kafreya and Foah. Leila Al Shami’s 




allows government units to confiscate land without compensation. This contributes to 
the discussion of the pain of the laws and the institutionalization of land.  
Therefore, throughout the book, I resort to a variety of authors and sources who 
offer different interpretations and faces of the Syrian armed conflict. The aim is exactly 
this: to put these authors into conversation without the need to reconcile their 
differences or to merge their opinions. This goes back to what I mention in the author’s 
perspective. The aim of this book is to wonder: what kind of Syria would I see and 










A man gulps down the last few leaves of a morning glory plant he tended for years. 
How could it taste so bitter. 
I fed you so much time, thought of nothing but the sweetness of your green. 
How could you not flower wheat, meat and juice citrus, ripe, ready, clean? 
Orange, red, purple,  
delicious pulp, seed for the kindling.  Bitter, bitter, bitter. 
 
A man gags, vomits the last few leaves of a plant he had to kill,  
thinks of forgiveness for a murder that won’t save him. 
 
Outside the bombs orchestrate the shaking of bodies, shimmying in hunger.  
Faraway men make more money from the promise of dinner. 
 
A woman stirs a pot of black pepper, onions and rust ridden water, 
looks at the dirt of all that’s left  
and thinks of minerals.  
 






As part of this research endeavor, I previously stated that I am using the ECM tool in 
order to understand the themes, layers, and levels that are part of the conflict epicenter, 
which are feeding the conflict episode the “Four Towns Agreement.” In this chapter, I 
highlight the main conceptual framework that the ECM tool draws upon. As such, this 
section travels through concepts of violence and peace, achieving peace through 
peaceful and un-peaceful means. These concepts are then placed into the contexts of 
modernity and postmodernity as ways of understanding and relating to the world. This 
chapter also explores Dietrich’s (2012) five-peace family, which recognizes a plurality of 
truths, and hence, Dietrich coined the term “peaces.” This reflects the plurality in 
understandings of peace, as different people experience and relate to peace differently.   
 
2.1. Violence and Peace  
 
Galtung, the Norwegian sociologist who is a principal founder of peace and conflict 
studies, introduced three different dimensions of violence: direct, structural, and 
cultural. He asserts that destructive situations are not only caused by direct violence, but 
can also be caused by structural and cultural violence, which cyclically could lead to 
direct violence (1996). Zimbardo (2008) sees the latter two as very difficult to 
acknowledge and to resist.  
Galtung defines direct violence as aggression that hurts the body, mind, or spirit of 
the self or of others. Hence, it could be verbal or physical aggression. Structural 
violence refers to aspects of political repression and economic exploitation that are 
upheld by marginalization in a society. Finally, cultural violence does not refer to 
cultures per se, but to aspects of culture such as religion, ideology, language, art, and 
formal sciences. These cultural aspects can be used to legitimize direct or structural 
violence. For example, stereotypes and beliefs based on religion or political ideology 
can be used to justify discrimination (which is a representation of structural violence).   
In addition to Galtung’s contributions on violence, Galtung (1996) also greatly 
influenced the understanding of peace. Galtung has posited that there are two types of 
peace: positive and negative peace. He suggests that peace can be understood in relation 
to the absence or presence of certain social conditions. For example, negative peace 
refers to a condition where there is no direct violence. Therefore, negative peace is the 
absence of war. Negative peace often entails the suppression of aggressive energy in the 
society. This is signified by threatening society with punishment such as jail, death 
penalty, and cultural exclusion. As such, this negative peace is achieved by instilling in 
people fear of resorting to violence. In order to control and reduce actual and potential 
violence, negative peace requires the management of interpersonal and organizational 
conflict. Instruments for achieving negative peace include the military and the rule-of-
law. Ceasefires and the signing of peace agreements between conflicting parties or 
countries are examples of managing conflict by suppressing and minimizing the 




Positive peace is the “integration of human society” (Galtung 1964, 2). According 
to Galtung, examples of positive peace include improved communication and 
understanding, peace education, arbitration, conflict management and so on. While 
negative peace is seen as pessimistic, positive peace is seen as optimistic. Galtung (1964) 
derives his understanding of peace from health studies, where health is understood not 
merely as an absence of illness, but something more: the ability to resist disease. 
Adapted to peace studies, Galtung believes that two understandings are important: 
curative approaches aimed at negative peace, and preventive approaches aimed at 
positive peace. As such, it is important to understand the conditions for the absence of 
violence, and the conditions for peace. Peace is the absence of direct and structural 
violence. Galtung’s contributions to the study of peace lie in the necessity to research 
peace beyond the narrow vision of negative peace which aims at ending or reducing 
violence at a direct or structural level. Instead, Galtung calls for efforts to understand 
conditions for preventive violence. Towards such an endeavor, Galtung argues that 
peace and violence need to be looked at in their totality at all levels. For example, 
addressing inter-gender violence is as important as addressing inter-state violence. 




The modern understanding of peace as a universal concept exists in the context of a 
“concrete societal project characterized by Newtonian physics, Cartesian reductionism, 
the nation-state of Thomas Hobbes, and the capitalist world system” (Dietrich and 
Sützl 2006, 283). In academia, this manner of relating to and understanding the world is 
called modernity. According to Esteva and Prakash, modernity has three main 
characteristics that they refer to as “modern sacred cows,” which are certainties that 
cannot be questioned by modern thought (1998, 9). (1) The myth of global thinking: 
entrenched in globalization is the idea that there is only one universal and valid way of 
understanding social reality. This represents the intellectual counterpart of the global 
economy. (2) Universality of human rights: which are based on Western notions and 
understandings, without taking into account differences in traditions, faith, and moral 
perspectives. (3) The myth of the individual self as distinct and distanced from people 
in communities. 
Postmodern philosophers deconstructed these three sacred certainties of modernity. 
Jean-François Lyotard asserts that modernism is based on metanarratives (1984, 27), 
which legitimize scientific inquiry but are themselves not open for rational scrutiny. 
Lyotard’s point that legitimizing scientific inquiry with these three first principles is 
derived from Plato and his allegory of The Cave (Koppensteiner 2009). Plato’s work 
resurfaces in modern texts such as Descartes’ “Discourse on Method” (Koppensteiner 
2009). Koppensteiner (2009, 15) argues that Plato’s The Cave is a story or a 
metanarrative because it can neither be proven nor refuted using its own premises. 




to reason as a way to determine the one unquestionable truth. For Wilber, modernity is 
the “enlightenment paradigm” (Wilber 2007, 86). 
On the one hand, through the focus on logic, modernity has brought forward great 
developments in natural sciences using Newtonian physics and the ability to predict and 
control the world using natural laws. Under this light, humans relate to the world in a 
mechanistic way, where the world is knowable through the senses, and hence, can be 
managed and controlled. On the other hand, with modernity came a set of principles 
that were derived from the rightness of the one truth. This has implied that certain 
things and phenomena do not belong to the one truth, which has in turn, challenged 
humans in deciding how to understand and relate to non-truths. One way to deal with 
non-truths is to cut out their existence. As such, the human need for the elimination of 
wrongness was born. Along this line of thought, many peace theorists have suggested 
that much of the violence experienced by humans is derived specifically from attempts 
by persons or cultures to achieve peace by way of elimination (Dietrich 2006).  
The academic discipline of International Peace Research was born at the beginning 
of the twentieth century following the violent events of World War I (Dietrich and 
Sützl 2006). In 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, British and US American 
delegations deemed it important to establish research on International Relations (IR). 
The aim was to fix and resolve the violence that had been experienced during World 
War I and bring forth universal peace. Instead, World War II shocked the world with 
an escalation of violence and the inability to bring forth a system of one universal peace 
(Dietrich and Sützl 2006).  
 
“[Peace research] institutions were to conduct their research for several decades and through 
another World War before it became acceptable among experts to suspect that it may be 
precisely this linear, universalist and reductionist basic assumption aimed at a paradise on 
earth, the one truth, the one and perpetual peace, the one world society, and the one 
civilizing process that carries in it the germ of a self-reproductive structure of violence, and 
that this kind of idea of salvation is in itself intellectual violence because it simply lacks 
respect for otherness and its secrets. How is one to treat others like members of one’s own 
kin if the difference among kins has long been eliminated through nationalization and 
universalization, and as long as the other is still considered synonymous with imperfection?” 
(Dietrich and Sützl 2006, 292)  
 
Furthermore, derived from the idea of the truth, the universalism of modernity has 
brought forth clear separating lines of people and behaviors along dual categories: 
correct/incorrect, normal/abnormal, good/evil. Culturally, these have translated into 
social exclusion, discrimination and dictatorships. Those who do not fit the accepted 










In attempting to establish the one truth of modernity, which is geared towards 
development and progress, Ivan Illich asserts “a worldwide war has been waged against 
people’s peace” (2006, 173). Dietrich and Sützl (2006) insist that a plurality of peace is 
needed for communities to organize themselves. As such, the philosophy of the many 
peaces offers an understanding of peace that is contextual, vernacular, and therefore, 
plural. This state of mind that is disillusioned with absolute truths is known as 
postmodernity. Postmodern thought was born in Europe in the second half of the 
nineteenth century as a reaction to, and disappointment with modernism.  
Postmodernity criticizes modernity’s promise of absolute truth and instead calls for 
pluralistic relativism. It is a “worldview characterized by anti-hierarchy, social 
construction of reality, strong equality, multiculturalism and relativistic value systems” 
(Wilber 2000, 50). In its relativity, postmodernity does not seek to replace the one truth 
of modernity with a new truth. Instead, it simply encourages disillusionment and 
skepticism with modernity, which ultimately causes doubt in the universalism of 
modernity’s promises. As such, a more contextual and relative way of relating to and 
understanding the world emerges. As such, postmodernity rejects the dual categories of 
modernity that align people and behaviors across an abnormal/incorrect scale. Drawing 
upon its relativity, people engaged in postmodern thought “… become aware of the 
relativity of those truths in whose absolute validity they used to believe. As a 
consequence, those truths have lost their binding character” (Dietrich and Sützl 2006, 
283). The skeptical way of thinking towards modernity is a theoretical worldview that 
many authors were critically engaged in, such as, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, 
Gianni Vattimo, Jean François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, 
Michael Foucault and Jean Baudrillard (Koppensteiner 2009). Their contributions to 
literature all provide insights into the relativity of seemingly absolute modern truths.  
Vattimo’s idea of ‘Weak Thinking’ (2006) is based on the notion of the ability and 
possibility to permanently transform our thoughts. He also refers to our ability to go 
well beyond metaphysics, not by rejecting it, but by distorting it. In his doctoral thesis, 
which was published in 1931, mathematician Gödel presented two Incompleteness 
Theorems, which have become a major contribution to the philosophy of mathematics 
and also peace research (Dietrich 2011). Drucker asserts that the mathematical logic 
that Gödel introduces proves, in a paradoxical manner, the “unprovability of 
consistency” (Drucker 2008, 87). The theorems explain that:  
 
“[A] sufficiently powerful formal system has to be either incomplete or contradictory. It can 
be consistent or complete, but never both at the same time. If a system is in itself completely 
consistent, then there are fundamental truths that cannot be derived from it. That is why it is 
incomplete. But if the system is changed in such manner that it can take in those truths, that 
is, if completeness is striven for, then contradictions will appear in some places and it will be 





Based on the discussions that Gödel was engaged in with other mathematicians and 
philosophers of his time, Drucker asserts that Gödel was highly aware of “the formal 
indefinability of the notion of truth” (Drucker 2008, 88). In addition, in A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari (1987), introduce the botanic 
concept of the Rhizome to explain the connections and multiplicities that exist in 
nature. A rhizome is a plant system that lives underground and is horizontal in its 
nature. It produces the shoot and root systems of plants. The rhizome gives strength to 
the parent plant to grow vegetatively and survive difficult seasons and weather 
situations underground (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018a). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
contrast rhizomes with trees or roots, which have individual and hierarchical structures. 
Rhizomes, on the other hand, are multiple and horizontal nets. In philosophy, the 
concept of a rhizome is used to understand connections as opposed to hierarchical 
structures of inclusion and exclusion. Philosophically speaking, the concept of a 
rhizome delineates from the modern concept of individuum, which cannot be divided 
in modern thought. From a postmodern perspective, “the subject in this rendering is no 
longer indivisible and neither is it a single unit separable from its surroundings” 
(Koppensteiner 2009, 118). 
In his book Imperfect Peace, Muñoz (2006) criticizes the modern understanding of 
peace as one that is a state of perfect, pure utopia. He asserts that such a state is simply 
unattainable, making modernity’s promise a violent one. Muñoz (2006) explains that 
modernity tries to achieve the ideal state of purity through violent means. Hence, there 
can be no absence of violence or conflicts. Instead, Muñoz (2006) proposes an 
understanding of peace as an unfinished project, one that is permanently under 
construction, one that defies the antagonistic dualisms of the pacifist/violent, 
good/evil. Muñoz (2006) urges us to explore moments and situations of fertility that 
arise between those rigid dual categories.  
 
2.4. Energetic Peace 
 
Energetic understandings of peace are present across all continents and across all times 
(Dietrich 2006). Yet, in general, they are associated more with indigenous and native 
pre-colonial communities in Africa and the Americas and in Eastern cultures. In these 
settings, peace is experiential harmony. It is peace that is felt and experienced by being 
nourished by Mother Nature and being in harmony with all visible and invisible things. 
Dietrich (2006) explains that although energetic peace is an ancient concept, it finds 
resonance in today’s Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and mystical traditions of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam. Koppensteiner (2017) describes it as philosophia perennis, which 
was originally termed by Aldous Huxley in the 1940s. It assumes that timeless mystical 
experiences are the foundation of all institutional religions and their superstructures 





In energetic practices, all that is, exists in relation to all other things. As such, the 
cosmos, nature, and society form a reciprocal relationship that is intricate and 
inextricable. When this cosmic relationship is balanced, it is experienced as peace. 
Energetic peace is a recurring experience that transcends the cultural context and 
intellectual epoch. It can be experienced by all existence at any place and at any time. 
Energetic interpretations of peace perceive the dualities of the Ying Yang as 
complementary rather than exclusive, and hence, the balance of these dualities is 
experienced as harmonious peace. From this, the universe becomes a relational whole, 
where all existence is interconnected, making even the smallest being important and 
related to everything else. All existence becomes divine. As such, the human is always 
relational. 
 
2.5. Moral Peace  
 
From energetic approaches, we move into a moral understanding of peace with the 
introduction of monotheistic religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. The transition 
from energetic to moral shifts the understanding of peace. Instead of local, peace 
becomes universal; instead of peace being experiential, it becomes understood; and 
instead of peace being based on harmonious relations, peace becomes based on 
categorical norms. In energetic perspectives, all being is divine. But with monotheistic 
religions came the separation between God and humans. As such, in moral 
understandings, the one male God, who is separate and supreme to the existence of 
humans, establishes the norms of the good and moral life (Dietrich 2012).  
When Mediterranean cultures began to turn towards this understanding of an 
unquestionable truth dictated by a male God, the European world also endorsed this 
conception of peace into its institutions. For example, the philosophy of absolute 
norms encouraged the establishment of powerful institutions. This imposes a 
peacemaking imperative on all individuals to promote social fit and obedience to the 
holy book of norms. Given that there can be no perfect peace and justice on earth, 
Augustine and, later on, Thomas Aquinas derived a reduced right to just war for peace 
(bellum lustrum) (Dietrich 2006).  
 
2.6. Modern Peace  
 
Modernity shifts from moral understandings by replacing God with reason. As 
previously explained, modernity is a worldview that upholds a universal truth that is 
derived from rationality. In modern peace, God does not provide the book of rules and 
norms. Instead, the nation-state creates a system of obedience and social order through 
reason. The universe becomes knowable through the material objects, which can be 
analyzed and more importantly, improved. Scientific truth becomes the absolute truth 




emergence of modern concepts of peace was driven by the crisis facing the moral 
institution of the church, the disruptions within science and economy, the trauma of 
war, and the fear and hope that is instilled in people during the process of 
enlightenment and secularization. Hence, the need for security is born. The nation-state 
promises to fulfill the need of security for its people and ensures a ‘perfect peace’ 
(Muñoz 2006). Peace becomes contractually-arranged absence of violence 
(Koppensteiner 2017). The nation-state enforces normative conceptualizations to 
achieve perfect social order and justice. Under this idealization of peace, we find 
International Law, which derives from one absolute truth as dictated by nation-states.  
 
2.7. Postmodern Peace(s) 
 
Born out of disillusionment with modernity’s dystopia and failed promise, 
postmodernity emerges to insist that modernity did not bring peace, but only brought 
more violence. Postmodern thought criticizes modernity’s homogenizing attempts of 
achieving perfect utopias, security and universal development. All such attempts lead to 
violence and leave no space for others to exist. As such, postmodern scholars 
understand the human condition as one that is vulnerable, continuously adapting and 
becoming (Koppensteiner 2017). Postmodern thought rejects absolute truths of 
modernity, and instead calls for pluralist relativism, and a celebration of diversity. As 
such, postmodern thought does not offer a finished and perfected concept of peace. 
Instead, postmodern peaces exist contextually wherever life flows.  
Following this, postmodern thought has led to different ways of understanding 
conflict. In modernity, conflict is the equivalent of wrongness, which is to be avoided 
and fixed using reason. Postmodernity calls for the inclusion of conflict as part of life’s 
process of transformation and becoming. For example, Galtung (1996) explains that 
conflict and violence are two different things. Conflict is creative energy that inspires 
social transformation, and violence is one possible way to deal with conflict. Peace is 
“what we have when creative conflict transformation takes place nonviolently” 
(Galtung 1996, 265). In postmodernity, there is a welcoming of plurality and relativism. 
As such, there is space for those who were violently excluded by modernity’s 
discriminating project: persons, groups, and ideas that delineated from modernity’s one 
truth. Integrating such realities opens up possibilities for experiencing different cultures 
of peace. However, postmodernity remains an entirely rational project of 
deconstruction (Wilber 2007). As such, postmodernity finds itself  
 
“trapped in the limits of the explicability of things by modern means with which it continues 
to be a state of mind and continues to lead to anomy. It says: there are no universal truths, 
but that stance itself claims to be universally true”. (Wilber 2007, 92) 
 
As such, the limitations of reason emerge, such that postmodern thought realizes that 




Dietrich (2006) asserts that this is a fundamental pitfall of postmodern thought for 
Peace and Conflict research, which is also the starting point for his theory on 
transrational understandings of peace.  
 
2.8. Transrational Peaces 
 
Transrational peaces is a rather new approach to contemporary peace research. It 
follows the premise that rational and spiritual aspects of human perception are essential 
for an understanding of peace. Towards this integration, Dietrich explains that  
 
“Galtung tried to redefine peace as the ability to transform conflicts by empathy, non-
violence and creativity. Hence he crosses the Rubicon of postmodernity when he 
understands peace as an attitude, rather close to Gandhi’s definition of ahimsa, and not as a 
status anymore”. (Dietrich 2000, 13) 
 
In so doing, Dietrich addresses this postmodern dilemma by arguing that not all truths 
of modernity have to be rejected in order to respect the existence of a plurality of 
truths. While plurality of truths might be incompatible with modernity, they are not 
necessarily conflicted with it. Along the same lines, Wilber (2007) describes modernity 
as being too narrow and limited. Following the Hegelian5 sense, transrationality tries to 
“lift” modern truths and integrate them with spiritual approaches. Dietrich explains that 
this type of integration opens up space for a postmodern recognition of a multiplicity of 
truths “but also to something beyond these (post-) modern notions” (Dietrich 2006, 
37).  
 
2.8.1. From Greek Tragedy to Modernity  
 
Dietrich (2006) draws upon Nietzsche’s argument on Greek tragedy in The Birth of 
Tragedy from the Spirit of Music (originally published in 1872) to explain the separation of 
the Greek Gods in relation to the change in experiences of peace. That is, Dietrich 
(2006) argues that when the Greek Gods of form (Apollo) and energy (Dionysus) were 
separated, the energetic harmonious experience of peace shifted to one that is 
conceptualized within moral/modern/postmodern frameworks. In Ancient Greece, the 
two Gods, Apollo and Dionysus, were not considered opposites or rivals. A conceptual 
change began with the transformation of society. For example, in Christian thought, 
Apollo, the God of form, evolved into the moral and rational Christian concepts of the 
one truth, rightness, and normality (Dietrich 2006). Dionysus, the God of energy, 
evolved as Satan, personifying error, wrongness, and abnormality (ibid). According to 
                                                     
5 Hegel uses the Geman word aufheben, which means to lift and preserve. Contextually, it follows the belief that 




Dietrich (2006), what follows is a suppression of energy and the reign of form that 
sweeps over the Mediterranean cultures.  
Therefore, with Christianity, Apollo became associated with Christ and Dionysus with 
the dark. Previously known as form and energy, Apollo and Dionysus become Christ and 
Satan in Christianity, representing good and evil. Dietrich argues that this separation of 
the two Greek Gods “has created a psychic schism” that has largely influenced and 
determined Western civilization (2006, 37). Dietrich emphasizes that there is a strong 
connection between Dionysus’ flight in the classic tragedy, with the development of the 
Polis and the nature of the later Mediterranean cultures and their understanding of 
peace.  
According to Wilber (1995), compelled by Phobos (fear), Apollo uses aggression to 
ensure heteronomy and the suppression of Dionysian energy. In modernity, this comes 
via the modern nation-state and institutionalized religions which reign like tyrants and 
impose their dogma globally.  
 
“It opens space for a culture that constantly suppresses the energetic nature and desires 
within itself and so is reduced to the mere formal, from where is difficult to imagine energetic 
realities. Nietzsche calls this habit the white man’s disease”. (Dietrich 2006, 37) 
 
From this discussion on philosophical dichotomy in Ancient Greece, Dietrich (2006) 
suggests that the suppression of Dionysus forms the foundation for the Psychoanalysis 
work of Sigmund Freud. Assagioli, who was a leading psychotherapist, capitalizes on 
Nietzche’s concepts of form-energy Gods, and fuses it with oriental wisdom and 
enlightened European traditions. As such, he creates “psycho-synthesis” which refers to 
the potential among humans to integrate complexity into their minds regularly (Dietrich 
2006). Later on, C.G. Jung developed his theory of the collective unconscious, which 
builds heavily on Freud’s concepts of suppressed sexual desires. He goes on to refer to 
the functional elements of the collective unconscious as archetypes (1969). Archetypes are 
universal structures of the psyche that make up the collective legacy of humanity. 
Regardless of the individual character and differences in race, class, religion, or time, 
Jung (1969) argues that certain circumstances provoke the same thoughts, images, and 
feelings in all human beings. As such, Jung believes that all humans develop 
“archetypical potential” of our psyche, which is the result of personal experiences but 
also based on the archaic legacy of mankind (Jung 1969). In relation to peace studies, 
this is significant because Jung argues that each human has the potential for committing 
horrible actions but also has the potential for creating warm relations. The result 
depends on the circumstances and what they trigger. This is also very much in line with 
energetic perspectives of peace that recognize that evil and good are intertwined, and 








2.8.2. Quantum Physics 
 
According to Dietrich (2006), European modern science was heavily influenced by 
Jung’s archetypes, especially in understanding energy and matter. For example, through 
Quantum Physics, science understood that each particle is a carrier of the information 
of the whole universe. From this came the realization that, as Jung suggested, the 
energetic nature of every human being makes him/her “a carrier of the complete 
information of humankind” (Dietrich 2006, 39). Following this, psychologists and 
scientists delineated from the previously held notion of independent individuals or clear 
units, as understood from Newtonian physics and Psychoanalysis. Instead, they realized 
that the human psyche, behaviors, and material objects are heavily interconnected, 
echoing the classical myth of the interrelatedness of all things, known as Indra.6 
Later on in Psychology, this understanding developed from Humanistic Psychology 
to what became known as Transpersonal Psychology through Abraham Maslow (1971). 
Transpersonal Psychology was developed at the Esalen Institute in California, bringing 
psychologists, scientists and peace activists together. Famous names include Frederick 
Perls, Carl Rogers, Roger Walsh, Erich Fromm, Ivan Illich, Marshall B. Rosenberg and 
Ken Wilber (Dietrich 2006). Dietrich (2006) points out that Paul Goodman began to 
link the mentioned names with the popular peace movement.  
The twentieth century scientific notion of connectedness reveals strong links to the 
energetic understanding of peace. In the modern and postmodern conditions that 
humans find themselves in, transrational peaces do not necessarily refer to the ancient 
energetic experience of spirituality with the cosmos, nature and society. Instead, 
transrational peaces refer to twisting and integrating reason.  
 
“It does not call for ‘overcoming’ modernity but rather for ‘twisting’ it in the sense of 
Heidegger, that is, integrating rationality and differentiating it from its divine status in the 
modern world, so that the a higher spiritual-rational consciousness of peace and culture […] 
can be reached. Hence this paper does not call for a romantic illusion of earlier ‘energetic’ 
interpretations of peace, but for a courageous integration of morally based, normative 
concepts of peace and energetically based spiritual ones for a non-violent and fruitful 
approach of the existing cultures, which at this level could gradually twist the pain of what we 
nowadays call the ‘clash of civilizations’”. (Dietrich 2006, 26)  
 
Drawing upon the introductory arguments by Joan Stambaugh in Heidegger’s book The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking (Heidegger 1973), Koppensteiner (2009) argues 
that the concept of twisting refers to incorporating worldviews, without attempting to 
overcome, romanticize, or defeat the different teachings. As such, a transrational 
                                                     
6 According to Brook (2007), Indra’s net is a Buddhist metaphor that demonstrates the interconnectedness of all 
things. The myth describes a web-like world that was created by God Indra wherein at every point of web-
contact, there is a pearl. And all that has existed and continues to exist is a pearl in the net of Indra’s world. As 
such, every pearl is connected to every other pearl, and every pearl reflects every other pearl in the web-like 




perspective understands the need to integrate all aspects of our human potential, and 
sees peace as one that is contextual and relational. Therefore, the roots of transrational 
peace philosophy is in postmodern thinking which was born as an academic discipline 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Postmodernity was triggered by the 
frustration and disillusionment with modernity’s dogmatic, homogenizing narratives 
about the universal truth, and ensuing exclusion of alternatives. In Syria, the uprisings 
that started in 2011 were largely also driven by the disillusionment with the moral and 
modern absolute truths of the Syrian regime. This line of thinking encouraged 
discourses of emancipation of excluded groups such as Kurds, Druze, women and the 
working class. As such, state discourses of homogenization of identities were 
challenged, making way for new understandings of realities being plural (Wimmen 
2016).  
Using a postmodern lens, Dietrich (2006) finds the radicalization of rational notions 
of peace highly problematic since they justify and legitimize the use of state violence 
against diverging groups. Any behavior or reality that delineates from the one/absolute 
truth of the state is punished and repressed, in order to preserve modernity’s promise 
of security. In the context of the Syrian armed conflict, the demonstrations which 
began in Daraa in 2011 were suppressed by the military power of the GoS, killing and 
detaining hundreds of protestors (Al Jazeera 2018a). The GoS justified its actions on 
the grounds that it would restore social order and security in the country. Therefore, a 
modern understanding of peace is contractual, making modernity’s peace a status. 
Dietrich (2006) argues that modern peace is just one of the many variations of peace, 
alongside energetic, moral and postmodern and transrational peaces.  
Dietrich (2006) explains that rational means are insufficient to approach peace and 
conflict issues, and so, he proposes re-integrating energetic elements of our existence. 
By conceptualizing a world where there is more than one peace, the door to plurality is 
opened, allowing dualities to be perceived as forming a harmonious whole instead. The 
spiritual human component unifies the dualities of our world through our emotional 
capabilities of empathy and compassion. Empathy and compassion cannot be 
understood solely through rationality, nor can they be imposed by normative 
conceptualizations of the modern state. As such, from an energetic perspective, peace is 
an attitude not a status.  
 
2.8.3. The Movement Structures of Conflict   
 
Social healing is a concept that has not been as fully developed and explored as social 
reconciliation. Social healing is an emerging field (O’Dea 2004) that sits between 
individual healing and collective reconciliation (Lederach and Lederach 2010). In their 
seminal book, When Blood and Bones Cry Out, Lederach and Lederach (2010) explore the 
underlying metaphoric structures of wounds created by conflict and the distillation of 




Lederach and Lederach (2010) frame their discussion and exploration of social 
healing in contexts pertaining to the temporal terms of the midst and aftermath of open 
violence. They argue that in contexts of systematic violence, violence is experienced 
before, during, and after the signing of peace agreements. This is usually not associated 
with whether, or the extent to which, peace agreements are adhered to (Lederach and 
Lederach 2010). Literature on the aftermath of armed conflict has gained momentum in 
recent years, echoing the multifaceted experiences that people face even after the 
signing of peace agreements, since patterns of violence are likely to re-emerge (Brison 
2002). As such, Lederach and Lederach (2010) point out that violence follows a 
repetitious circular pattern, not one that is easily linear.  
Communities that find themselves in armed strife experience violence in “phoenix-
like forms” (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 45). Violence is negatively resilient, re-
emerging again and again in known and new forms. The declaration of a ceasefire does 
not mean the end or halt of violence. As such, healing and reconciliation work face 
dynamic and unpredictable settings, regardless of whether agreements have been signed. 
This opens up the discussion on the different views of movement structures of 
violence: cyclical or linear.  
According to Lederach and Lederach (2010), authors who note the nature of 
conflict is cyclical include theorists such as Adam Curle (1971), Johann Galtung (1975) 
and Michael Lund (1996). On the other hand, a linear understanding of conflict 
developed as an analytical construct which emerged with the practical applications of 
negotiations and peace accords. The linear view of conflict argues that conflict unfolds 
in categorical phases.   
Tracing the etymology of the word ‘analysis’ to its Greek origins reveals that it 
refers to breaking something apart. Applied to scientific study, this means 
deconstructing complex phenomena into smaller parts to understand the complexity 
better. Adopted to peacebuilding, this approach has been used to identify the wave of 
violence, as it increases and decreases, and the effects of the wave on the roles and 
activities.  As such, a bell-curve image of the life cycle of conflict was created (Crocker, 
Hampson, and Aall 2001). The life cycle of conflict looks like a single wave, and 
describes the progression of conflict and its major phases, such as its escalation and de-
escalation, and peacebuilding activities related to the phase. The wave begins at the pre-
conflict stage where conflict is latent. The emergence of violence signifies the start of 
conflict. Then violence could escalate into open warfare. The top end of the wave-
graph is the point where negotiations begin and aim to stop the conflict. Through 
negotiations, the declaration of a ceasefire or a signed peace agreement becomes 
possible, after which the conflict begins to regress and subside, and represents the post-
conflict phase. “This tool presents the rise and descent of open violence as the defining 







        Figure 3: Life Cycle of Conflict (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 47) 
 
Almost in parallel to the time that the bell curve emerged, UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote his famous Agenda for Peace in 1992. In his document, 
he calls for a sharpened definition of roles of the UN in warfare settings in 
peacemaking and peacekeeping. He also referred to an unprecedented term in UN 
documents: post-conflict peacebuilding. Since then, the mid-nineties witnessed a wide 
acceptance of terminology such as post-conflict, post-violence and post-accord 
(Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001; Lund 1996). As such, post-conflict peacebuilding 
now exists as an academic specialization, with dozens of books devoted to the topic 
and its sub specializations.    
Lederach and Lederach explain that “the metaphoric structure of this ‘post’ 
language builds around a view that conflict and peace flow in a linear and phase-based 
manner” (2010, 48). Under the wave-graph of the progression of conflict, healing and 
reconciliation are usually categorized in the post-conflict phase. The post-conflict phase 
emerges with the signing of peace agreements or enactment of ceasefires, and hence, 
post-conflict is associated with the termination of open violence. Following this logic, 
the need and potential of healing and reconciliation become important only after the 




“The temporal and directional image embedded in this view is one based on seeing conflict as 
a forward-moving progression that fits and follows a metaphoric structure suggestive that 
social change is linear and sequential. The phase-based understanding, captured in prevalent 
linguistic terms like transition, pre-conflict, post-conflict, postaccord, post-violence and post-
war, dominates the mainstream literature. In this widely accepted metaphoric framework, 
trauma healing and reconciliation become programmatically relevant tasks possible to 
achieve, and required to sustain wider political transition at the point a phase or stage opens 
with the signing of an agreement”. (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 48-49) 
 
Lederach and Lederach argue that the metaphoric structure that is created by accepting 
the terminology of post-conflict stage are the implications that: “Conflict is linear. 
Peace is sequential” (2010, 49). In that sense, the accepted metaphoric structure implies 
that conflict and peace follow a linear system that is forward-moving and progressive. 
However, the lived community experiences reveal that the process of conflict and peace 
is much less linear, and much more fluid. Lederach and Lederach (2010) assert that 
local communities that find themselves in protracted settings of violence do not 
experience in a clear and linear sense the frontiers of the start and end of the post-
conflict stage, healing and reconciliation, as suggested by the wave-graph. Instead, 
violence resurrects in repeated waves as both structural and direct, even in the midst of 
the post-conflict stage.  
To elaborate on this, Lederach and Lederach (2010) resort to the works of Galtung 
(1975) and Adam Curle (1971) where they noted the need to understand violence as 
developing in different forms. As previously mentioned, Galtung (1975) drew a 
distinction between direct and structural violence. Direct violence refers to open 
fighting, the use of weapon with the intention of killing, and damaging the enemy. 
Therefore, direct violence is war in its systemic expression. Structural violence refers to 
patterns that impede the potential to live a full life. Different social factors increase 
structural violence such as diminishing political and economic structures and the 
inability of people to access basic needs. Such factors hinder the human potential.  
In settings of protracted violence, people are exposed to both structural and direct 
violence. The resiliency of violence suggests its capacity to re-appear in new forms and 
replicate old ones. Despite efforts of the post-conflict stage to eliminate open violence 
and declare the conflict as officially over, people face the resilient patterns of violence. 
Lederach and Lederach (2010) insist that this is not seen as paranoia of the local people, 
but represents the resiliency of violence and the legacy of structural violence and armed 
conflict. As such, Lederach and Lederach (2010) affirm that the signing of an agreement 
does not end violence in its open direct form, or its less visible structural expressions. 
In a similar vein, healing and reconciliation do not necessarily become 
programmatically possible with the culmination of negotiations and agreements. They 
cannot simply be initiated as if they were elements in a sequential, phase-based process 
of change. Lederach and Lederach (2010) urge us to realize that the political language of 
describing social dynamics is, in the end, a conceptual construct. Behavior and reality of 
the life of conflict are expected to fit within these linguistic markers. However, the 




describe but hide certain aspects of lived realities of people (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
By categorizing a period of the life of conflict as ‘post’ suggests that something is over 
and finished. By its very nature, this suggests that peace is sequential. Describing 
conflict with the metaphorical structure of the word ‘post’ might serve high-level 
leaders more than people whose day-to-day lives sees the conflict as unfinished, and in 
many cases, reappearing. This highlights the cyclical nature of conflict, not its linear 
progression as suggested by the bell-curve figure.  
 
2.8.4. Healing and Reconciliation  
 
In their lived experiences, healing and reconciliation are embedded in contexts where 
people face both conflict and peace. Healing and reconciliation do not exist in a 
vacuum, where they are achieved neatly and following the same order of the bell-curve 
figure. As such, they are captured better in dynamic relationships rather than within 
clear linear progressions. Yoder (2005) explains that even in settings of violence, people 
exhibit a strong ability to begin healing processes and engage in activities that go 
beyond securing survival needs. Yoder (2005) notes that the capacity to survive is in 
itself an act of creative resiliency. To face life-threatening situations, people create 
experiences and interactions that foster life-giving opportunities and spaces where 
relationships can gain solidarity and flourish (Yoder 2005).  
Lederach and Lederach (2010) describe healing and reconciliation processes as seed-
like potential that capitalize on the human capacity to survive and exhibit resilience. 
These human responses to violence do not follow the sequential phases of the bell-
curve graph. Instead, these coping modalities surface during conflict and during the 
period designated as ‘post-conflict.’ A more accurate depiction of the latter would be 
“characteristics of both the aftermath of war and the rebirth of new forms of violence” 
(Lederach and Lederach 2010, 53).  
In the midst of a never-quite-‘post-conflict’-situation, local communities face 
multiple challenges to create space for healing and reconciliation. Lederach and 
Lederach (2010) argue that healing and reconciliation are not necessarily seeds of ‘post’ 
conflict, but are constantly available, and are born and reborn in conditions of violence.  
 
“These conditions are rarely conducive for the very thing they most hope to forge – a safe, 
flourishing and meaningful life. In other words, survival links resistance, resiliency and 
flourishing as simultaneously available and circular phenomena – whether during or after 
spikes of open violence – precisely because direct and structural violence are not experienced 
at community levels as linear and sequential, even though they may officially be presented as 
such”. (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 54) 
 
Lederach and Lederach (2010) acknowledge the usefulness of using linearity and 
sequentiality to organize theory on the nature of change. They argue that this is 




analytical purposes, Lederach and Lederach (2010) see it as an important endeavor that 
is often helpful to understand aspects of the big picture. They assert that many aspects 
of healing and reconciliation processes exhibit important patterns that follow a linear 
progression. However, what this creates is a dominant view that overlooks other 
realities that are part of healing and reconciliation in the midst and aftermath of 
conflict. When there is a dominant lens, it risks diminishing and hiding other aspects of 
lived realities. This metaphoric organization hides and reveals reality (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980).  
 
“The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of 
another… will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one 
aspect of a concept … a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of 
the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor”. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 10) 
 
Lederach and Lederach (2010) explain that the dominance of the linear lens hides 
aspects that are contradictory, and that echo the circular and repetitive depths and 
patterns of the healing and reconciliation processes. Given that these aspects of lived 
reality do not easily fit into the categories created for donors to organize their funding, 
they are often less explored, and at times, even disregarded. Such aspects become 
peripheral, and awkward for inclusion in program development, and structures of 
program evaluation. Therefore, the metaphoric organization of linearity and 
sequentiality are useful for observing broad views of conflict and change. When this 
construct becomes dominant, it leaves out aspects of lived experiences that reveal the 
circular patterns of healing and reconciliation.  
In settings of protracted violence, communities experience a gap within national 
processes of signing peace agreements. The gap emerges between the increased 
expectations for change that follows from ending the armed strife and the simultaneous 
experience of exclusion and violence that communities experience even after formal 
peace agreements. This reveals significant metaphoric structures of the circular nature 
of conflict. During political transitions, people experience healing and reconciliation in 
turbulent, dynamic, and sometimes violent settings. As such, the linear progression of 
conflict is often not experienced by communities, because of the legacy of structural 
and direct violence – often stretched across decades – which reappear in new and old 















I must eat less, I have told myself all year.  
Perhaps for the entirety of the past decade. 
Flab on my belly, a jiggle in my ass, reminders of being lazy. 
 
Perhaps a diet of only writing for the cheeks of the child with eyes like sink smudged 
dishes, 
for the jawline sunken sharp of the man carrying only skin. 
 
If we could eat language,  
I would pour all the poems in my stomach into your hands. 
All the words my beautiful mother ever said to me in twenty years, now at your lips. 
Everything my father wrote on salvation for a century, at the back of your throat. 
The thousand books they left me in our burning house in Damascus, warm in your 
center. 
I would never write again if it meant you could be full. 
Fuck you, says the hum of the air conditioning of distant cities. 
Your false humility can blow me, really. 
Take your modest reflection on your gluttony and pander it elsewhere. 
 
No one cares that you care. 
Just, shut up. 
 






As previously mentioned, in this book I analyze the conflict episode of the “Four 
Towns Agreement” using the ECM tool. For such an endeavor, I find it important to 
offer my readers background information about Syria in general and the Syrian armed 
conflict in specific. The first section provides a brief history of the rise of the Baath 
party up until Bashar al-Asaad assumed power in 2000 following his father’s death. I 
find that it is essential for my readers to understand Syria before Bashar al-Asaad’s time, 
for a more comprehensive analysis of any episode of the current armed conflict. The 
current armed conflict does not exist in a vacuum; rather it is highly influenced and 
driven by Syria’s modern history.  
The second section discusses how the war started, the intervention of external 
states in the conflict, and the negotiations that took place during the period of the 
conflict. Within this, I try to offer an account of who participated in the uprisings in 
order to counter the common perception that the Syrian armed conflict only consisted 
of armed factions. The aim of this section is not to provide a full account of all the 
events and actors in the Syrian conflict, but to serve as background knowledge for my 
readers.  
In the third secion, I explain the conflict episode the “Four Towns Agreement” in 
detail. This offers information regarding the premises of the agreement, the parties and 
individuals involved, and the process of implementation. This will serve as the 
foundation upon which the analysis builds.  
 
3.1. Prior to the Baath Rule 
 
The history of foreign control over Syrian territory is vast, as it was occupied at 
different times by Amorites, Hittites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, 
Romans, Arabs, Turks, and the French, among others. These different stages of 
occupation have rendered Syria populated by many different ethnic and religious 
groups. It also meant that Syria, as we know it today as a distinct entity, did not exist 
until it became under French mandate in 1920 (Hinnebusch 2004). During the 
Ottoman Empire, “Syria” included what today is known as Syria, and also Lebanon, 
Jordan, Palestine, and parts of Israel.7 At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed, and France established Syria and Lebanon as French mandates through the 
League of Nations, and Britain established Palestine and Jordan as British mandates 
(ibid). Again, this left the Syrian state under another foreign power, and the sense of 
national identity of Syrians was obscured since they previously identified with smaller 
units such as their city, tribe, sect, or larger identity such as the Arab nation, Islam, or 
the Empire (ibid). According to Hinnebusch (2004), Syrians also felt betrayed by 
Western nations because Syria had supported the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 
return for the creation of an Arab state.  
                                                     




As such, there was fertile ground for political movements based on the desire to 
unite the many fractionalized ethnic and religious groups. To that end, Pan-Arab and 
Islamist movements emerged in Syria. Movements calling for a Pan-Arab identity were 
highly appealing in Syria because they called for the unity between tribal and religious 
sects under a common Arab identity. Following Syria’s independence from the French 
in 1946, Syrian politics experienced a plethora of nationalist movements, namely Baath 
party and other Pan-Arab groups, Islamists, and Communists (Hinnebusch 2004). 
Within this environment, Syria experienced great political instability as governments 
were being overthrown through a series of military coups between 1949 and the 1950s.  
The region witnessed the rise of the nationalistic and strong anti-imperialist leader 
Jamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt. He was very popular across the Arab world and in Syria. 
Nasser’s popularity and influence made the US and Britain uneasy, especially that 
Nasser had strong ties to the Soviet Union. As such, they plotted to overthrow the 
Baathist coalition government which had strong ties to Nasser (Mufti 1996). 
Nevertheless, Syria and Egypt united in 1958 and formed the United Arab Republic 
(UAR), which lasted 3 years before being overthrown by an anti-Nasserite coup.  
In March 1963, another military coup by forces loyal to Nasser, led to the Baath 
party seizing power in Syria and sought to reunite Syria with Egypt. This coup was 
different in that it was led by strong Baath party members, and hence was referred to as 
“the revolution from above” (Hinnebusch 2001). On the day of the coup, the Baath 
party passed Legislative Decree No. 1 of 8 March 1963 which brought the country into 
a state of emergency8. Following this, the Syria-Egypt allegiance disintegrated, and the 
Baath party exploited the state of emergency to purge Nasserists, Communists and 
other opposition groups (ibid).   
 
3.2. The Rise of the Baath Party (1963) 
 
The origins of modern-day Syria is linked heavily to the Baath Party and the country’s 
military (International Crisis Group 2004). The Baath party’s ideology is founded on the 
perception that Arabs form one nation, and are only artificially divided by the game of 
imperialism which sought to keep the Arabs weak and subjugated. As such, it sought 
unity among the Arab nation under a single state. In addition, its radical secular and 
socialist ideas made it very appealing to the public (International Crisis Group 2004). 
The army in Syria played a significant role in the history of modern Syria (International 
Crisis Group 2004). The Baath government’s foundation was the army, the security 
services and the Baath political party (Seale 1999).  
The Baath party was active across many parts of the region, including Syria and 
Iraq. It originally became appealing to ethnic religious minorities in Syria (such as 
                                                     
8 The emergency legislation put the country under the imposition of direct military control, otherwise known as 
martial law. Within such difficult circumstances, civil law and civil rights were suspended, and civilians were put 




Druze, Christians, and Alawites), and to lower middle-class intellectuals (International 
Crisis Group 2004). Following Syria’s independence from France, Sunni Muslims in 
Syria sought to weaken minorities’ autonomy and power. As such, the Baath party 
appealed to these minority groups, as the Baath party stood out as a “pan-Arab, 
socialist, secular message” and emphasized the importance of the military as protection 
from the dominant Sunni population (International Crisis Group 2004, 1). According to 
Hinnebusch (1979), the Baath party recruited those who were previously marginalized, 
and those who were born outside the system of connections of Sunni dominance on 
which the old regime was born.   
On March 8th 1963, the Baath party assumed power. This followed a period of 
internal tension, rivalry between political organizations, and military conspiracies. The 
coup, through which the Baath party came to power, involved officers from several 
Arab nationalism parties but was primarily led by Baathists. The Baath party managed 
to consolidate its power by acquiring key positions in the military and security forces 
which led to widespread influence across the country at large. With the Baath party 
becoming a key player throughout the 1960s, the other political parties disseminated 
and the Baath party experienced almost political monopoly. Even in its early days, the 
Baath party experienced deep internal divisions, which were driven by competing 
personal ambitions and differences along regional and religious aspects.9  
 
“The center of power had moved from the political arena, to the army, to the Baathists 
within the military and, from 1966 on, to those Alawi officers who held dominant positions 
in both party and army”. (International Crisis Group 2004, 2) 
 
Given that the Baath party and the army were very closely related, a mutually 
reinforcing system of recruitment emerged wherein Alawites were disproportionately 
represented in the Baath party and in the army’s senior positions. Although this meant 
that the rule in Syria was based on a narrow communal base, broader constituencies 
were also represented through a broad system of institutions. For example, the Alawites 
held for the first time core military and security positions. In previous regimes, Alawites 
held less influential positions, but during al-Asaad’s time they openly became the 
power-holders. For example, al-Asaad appointed his kin10 and members of his personal 
followers to crucial security and military positions (Hinnebusch 2001; International 
Crisis Group 2004)11. To ensure broader representation of Syria’s populations, Al-
                                                     
9 Internal tensions led to heightened rivalry between officers. For example, in 1966, a faction led by Hafez al-
Asaad and Salah Jedid, resulted in the exclusion of the party’s historic leaders, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din 
Bitar (International Crisis Group 2004).  
10 Specifically, members of al-Asaad’s Qalbiyya tribe (International Crisis Group 2004).  
11 Security services and intelligence agencies include Political Security and Military intelligence, which are 
subdivided into several branches: Palestine Branch, Investigative Branch, Regional Branch and Airforce Branch. 
General Security is divided into Investigative Branch, Domestic Branch and Foreign Branch. Each agency is 
responsible for its own prisons and interrogation centers, and it operates these in almost complete independence 




Asaad meticulously placed the defense ministry, the vice presidency and the foreign 
affairs ministry under Sunni personnel (Zisser 1998).  
Therefore, at the political level, al-Asaad’s regime was founded on an Alawite/Sunni 
contract. At the socioeconomic level, the Baath rule sought to benefit Sunni peasants, 
the new middle class that emerged, those who live in remote areas and blue-collar 
workers (Abd Al Karim 2002). Syria’s economy was based on a network of allegiance 
and corruption, where the government formed many trade unions and associations for 
different populations of society including peasants, workers, teachers, students, 
engineers and artists. These associations soon became instruments of support to the 
Baath party, and political surveillance of the Baath party over the activities and 
ideologies of these associations. Politically, the regime practiced tight control and 
violent repression by its security services.  
The 1966 faction, led by Defense Minister Hafez al-Asaad, had gained significant 
control over all key security and military branches by 1970. In November of 1970, 
Defense Minister Hafez al-Asaad led the ‘Corrective Movement’ coup, which 
successfully validated the Baath party’s legitimacy and established the military’s 
supremacy over the party.12 The coup also transitioned Syria into a new phase which 
ushered in a focus on Syria’s relationship with Israel. During this time, Syria 
experienced unprecedented stability which was heavily focused on state and institution-
building. It was also highly dependent on the emergence of al-Asaad’s own personalized 
power, in contrast to the years of battles between collective leadership in the Baath 
party. Hafez al-Asaad represented firm and stable leadership (Zisser 1998).  
From its early days of creation, the Baath’s most threatening enemy was the Islamist 
opposition led by the Muslim Brotherhood, who were mostly concentrated in Sunni 
urban centers such as Homs, Hama and Aleppo. In these areas, there was a strong 
affirmation towards resisting an Alawite military leader. Tension between the Baath 
party and the Muslim Brotherhood turned bloody in 1982 when the Muslim 
Brotherhood led a violent uprising in Hama. The government responded with brute 
force, which resulted in the deaths ranging between 10,000 and 30,000 from both sides. 
Following the events of Hama, the Muslim Brotherhood no longer posed a threat to 
the Baath party as most of the former’s leadership was either killed or exiled to Europe, 
Iraq, or Saudi Arabia (International Crisis Group 2004).  
Shortly after the Hama events, the Baath party became threatened from within. In 
1983, Hafez al-Asaad fell ill, and his younger brother Rifaat al-Asaad began plotting 
against him. Rifaat was the second most influential and powerful member of the Baath 
party after the president. He played a significant role in defeating the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Hama events. Antagonism between the president and his brother 
grew, which forced members of the Baath party to take sides, splitting the army and the 
party. Following more disputes, Rifaat and 70 of those loyal to him were banished from 
Syria (International Crisis Group 2004).  
                                                     




Another challenge that the Baath party faced in the early 1980s was the emergence 
of non-religious opposition which was comprised of trade unions and left-wing parties. 
They called for “democratic reform as a third way between Baathist authoritarianism 
and Islamism” (International Crisis Group 2004, 4). The Bar Association led 
professional unions and called for the end of the martial law and the establishment of a 
rule of law and a multiparty system. The government responded with disbanding the 
union’s elected councils, arrested union heads, and appointed Baathists to their 
positions. The communist party, led by Riad Al-Turk, also called for similar demands. 
The regime responded again with large-scale arrests to the leadership of the Communist 
Party (ibid).  
The 1980s established the regime’s success against both religious and secular 
opposition through the use of repression, permitted through the emergency law. In the 
mid-1990s, the government lifted some of its repressive aspects and released detainees, 
some of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hafez al-Asaad died on June 10, 
2000 after 30 years of rule, longer than any of his predecessors. His rule had survived 
several internal insurgency movements, several conflicts with Israel and the rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
3.3. The Rule of Bashar al-Asaad (2000-Present) 
 
Following the death of Hafez, there was wide consensus that his son, Bashar, would 
succeed him, in what became the first Arab republican hereditary regime.13 The strength 
of the regime rested on Hafez al-Asaad which made the overdependence on Hafez’ rule 
and tactical balance of power both the regime’s strength and weakness in his absence. 
The balance of power crafted by Hafez was highly tactical, wherein modifications to the 
system could lead to sectarian and socio-economic rivalries (International Crisis Group 
2004).  
As such, Bashar emerged as the only candidate whose accession would not 
jeopardize the political equilibrium crafted by Hafez al-Asaad.14 Bashar inherited his 
father’s key titles, including Secretary General of the Baath and Commander-in-Chief of 
the armed forces (International Crisis Group 2004). He was appointed a difficult task: 
to inherit the system built by his father, and to continue to balance the political 
architecture (ibid).  
I find it important to mention the ‘Damascus Spring’ of 2001, since it heavily relates 
to the 2011 uprising (Al Bunni 2019). The ‘Damascus Spring’ refers to the period 
between 2001 and 2002 characterized by intense activism and tentative political 
liberalization following the death of Hafez al-Asaad. The movement demanded 
                                                     
13 Originally, Bassel al-Asaad, Hafez’ oldest son was meant to be his successor, but Bassel was killed in a car 
accident in January 1994 (International Crisis Group 2004). 
14 Bashar, who was 34 at the time, was younger than the minimum legal age to be president. The constitution was 




political, legal and economic reforms. Given that Bashar had received Western 
education in London for three years, and given his young age, there were high 
expectations of his intention to modernize the country and fight corruption 
(International Crisis Group 2004). 
Within this new atmosphere, between June 2000 and August 2001, the long-silenced 
civil society in Syria began to call for democratic opening and reform. Once taboo 
topics, poets and writers began calling for public freedoms, human rights, and the fate 
of detainees and exiles. Meetings were held and public discussions grew, engaging in 
topics relating to citizenship and governance (Abbas 2013). In September 2000, the 
petition ‘Manifesto of the 99’ was created and signed by leading intellectuals who 
demanded lifting the 1963 state of emergency, providing amnesty for all political 
prisoners, and allowing the return of political exiles. The manifesto also called for 
freedom of expression and the press. A further statement was signed by 1000 
intellectuals and insisted on a multiparty democracy and ending the Baath political 
monopoly. The movement did not challenge the legitimacy of Bashar al-Asaad’s 
succession or demand regime change (Carnegie Middle East Center 2012).   
Initially, the government responded with a series of reformist measures, where 
amnesty was granted for hundreds of political prisoners including both communists and 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime also shut down two notorious 
prisons, Al Mazza and Palmyra prisons. Political change was encouraging as the 
government approved other parties publish their own private magazines, Ad-
Dumari15and Al-Iqtisadiyya. 
However, the initial encouraging response of the government halted in February 
2001 when government officials accused the activists of endorsing neocolonial ideas by 
cooperating with Syria’s enemies and risking Syria’s stability (George 2003). As such, 
the regime tightened its grip again using censorship, exerted strict control over political 
activities, and launched a campaign of arrests against the key activists. Despite these 
pressures, in May 2003, a letter addressed to President Bashar al-Asaad was signed by 
300 intellectuals, lawyers, and activists who affirmed that reform does not contradict 
the strategies, ideologies or the interests of the state. Instead, they asserted that reform 
would strengthen Syria’s ability to fight the US invasion of Iraq, and Israel (Daher 
2019).  
Deeb (2011) explains that the difficult regional circumstances of Bashar’s early years 
(the Palestinian intifada of 2000, the 9/11 attacks in the US, the invasion of Iraq by the 
US in 2003, the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister in 2005, and the 
Lebanese-Israeli war of 2006) was highly unsuitable for reform. For the regime, reform 
would have to be done in less turbulent time for the entire region (ibid). This is the 
rhetoric and discourse that the regime used to continue to postpone reform, until 
                                                     
15 The newspaper Ad-Dumari offered satire news coverage by the colomnist Ali Farzat who sought to “kick the 
police out of the minds of Syrians” (translated from Arabic by author). Ad-Dumari would sell-out just hours 




spring 2009 when Bashar al-Asaad declared that the reform process would begin again, 
but was characterized as very slow, once again (ibid).  
 
3.4. The Syrian Conflict (2011-Present) 
 
Deeb (2011) explains that the reformist movement in Syria was divided. It ranged from 
radical leftist movements to extreme Islamists. As such, he notes that the reformist 
movement was unable to garner the support needed from the people against the Baath 
regime. What the general public understood was that the alternative to al-Asaad’s rule is 
not a Western, liberal and democratic system, but a system that mirrors those found in 
pro-US states such as in Egypt and Tunisia, or perhaps an Islamic rule where the 
minorities would be completely subjugated. As such, the Baath rule continued to appear 
more acceptable and appealing to the general public. Despite this, Bashar al-Asaad 
promised the country reform but at a slow pace to ensure that the reform does not 
cause internal instability (Deeb 2011). But 10 years later and the reform still did not 
come, which led to the 2011 demonstrations.  
There are many different accounts of how the Syrian conflict started, echoing the 
multiplicity of experiences and realities in Syria. The general outlook is that the Syrian 
conflict was inspired by the wave of demonstrations that swept through several Arab 
countries including Tunisia (Al Jazeera 2011a), Egypt (Al Jazeera 2011b), Libya, 
Bahrain, and Yemen (Daher 2019, Deeb 2011, Heydemann 2013). Within a few weeks, 
the protests garnered successful results in Tunisia and Egypt, progress in reform in 
Algeria, a civil war in Libya, and turned into a Gulf-backed military intervention in 
Bahrain, and a bloody repression in Yemen (Deeb 2011).  
In January 2011, The Wall Street Journal interviewed Syrian President Bashar al-
Asaad, who asserted that Syria was immune to such disorder and protests. He argued 
that despite economic difficulties faced by many Syrians, his administration aligned with 
the beliefs of the Syrian people, especially with regards to being resistant to US and 
Israeli political agendas (The Wall Street Journal 2011). He focused on security 
discourses where the need for defense against attacks or invasions from perceived 
enemies was highlighted. However, demonstrations started a few weeks after the 
interview (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018b), revealing the wide discrepancy between his 
realpolitik narrative and the clamoring truths of the people. 
The initial major demonstrations began in the drought-stricken Daraa governorate 
in the South of Syria. The army responded harshly by killing hundreds and detaining 
many more. Within weeks, similar demonstrations appeared in other cities around the 
country. The demonstrations called for fighting corruption and ending the misuse of 
power (Daher 2019, Deeb 2011). There were also demands for the increase of public 
freedom through the abolishment of the emergency legislation of 1963, and the right to 
practice freedom of speech, assembly and association (Human Rights Watch 2011).  
According to their report, the Syrian Center for Policy Research explain that the 




9), reflecting the inability of formal institutions to allow larger segments of society to 
contribute meaningfully in political, economic, and social aspects (Syrian Center for 
Policy Research 2013). Hence, the uprisings in Syria operated in an environment of 
repression and inequality in wealth, creating an array of unmet needs amongst those 
unsatisfied with the regime (Daher 2019).   
In response to the demonstrations, Syrian authorities resorted to broadly worded 
‘security’ discourses and provisions, as laid out within Syria’s Penal Code. Examples of 
this include Syrian authorities releasing statements where they ban demonstrators from 
“issuing calls that weaken national sentiment” or “spreading false or exaggerated 
information” (Human Rights Watch 2011).  
Despite the fact that the regime declared a series of reforms at the end of March 
2011, including the abolishment of the emergency legislation, the cycle of violence 
spread across many cities in Syria and the slogan of the demonstrations turned into calls 
for overthrowing the regime (Deeb 2011). Deeb (2011) argues that the unmet reform 
promises of 2000 – which were inspired by the ‘Damascus Spring’ – led to the 
demonstrations of 2011.  
According to Daher (2019), the initial uprisings were characterized by pluralism and 
diversity of ethnicity and sects. The majority were, however, Sunnis. The movement 
nevertheless showed unity of purpose. The people who engaged in the protests were 
activists who were involved in movements dating back before 2011, and some were 
secular democrats from religious and ethnic minorities (Abu Najem 2011; Khoury 
2013).  
Daher argues that the most prominent figures of the early days of the uprising were 
the same groups that had once benefited from the Baath Party’s social and economic 
policies (Daher 2019). Pondering over the geography of the protests (Idleb, Daraa and 
other small towns) reveals a pattern, wherein the once historical strongholds of the 
regime were now prominent areas of protest (Seifan 2013).  
University students, young graduates, and youth also comprised an important 
segment of the uprising. In September 2011, the Union of Free Syrian Students (UFSS) 
was established and called for pluralistic democracy. The regime responded to UFSS 
with force and by July 2012, a quarter of all those killed in protests were university 
students (Daher 2019). As for the bourgeoisie of Syria, they initially adopted a passive 
attitude, and hesitated to participate out of fear over their economic interests (Abbas 
2011).  
 
3.4.1. Political Opposition 
 
Without covering the entire scope of political opposition groups, I now explain some of 
the key groups and figures of political opposition. As such, in this section, I discuss the 
Syrian National Council (SNC) and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and 




Coordination Body for Democratic Change which is an opposition coalition formed 
inside Syria. The SNC and the Coalition both refer to opposition groups outside Syria.  
In October 2011, the SNC was established. It includes individuals who were 
signatories of the Damascus Declaration of 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood, Kurdish 
groups, and individuals from local coordination committees. The overdependence of 
the SNC on foreign actors led to a rift between the interests of its patron states and its 
own motivations. This ultimately led to divisions over the fate of Assad (Daher 2019). 
Qatar and Turkey massively funded and supported the SNC. Western and Gulf states 
also supported the SNC initiative and in 2012, the SNC became recognized by more 
than 100 countries as being the main opposition reference (ibid). The SNC criticized 
opposition groups that welcomed negotiations and dialogue with the regime.  
Following advocacy by the US and other Western states for the creation of a more 
inclusive and diverse Syrian opposition group, the Coalition was established in Doha, 
Qatar in 2012. There was hope by Western states that the Coalition would serve their 
interests (Carnegie Middle East Center 2013). The SNC then joined the Coalition and 
the new coalition initially had support from the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The initial 
patrons of the Coalition were Qatar and Turkey and later on Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, 
regional actors were keener on securing their own interests than on the effectiveness of 
the Coalition. The external support exacerbated divisions, especially with rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the patrons’ decreasing interest in al-Asaad’s 
departure. Instead, Saudi Arabia was focused on fighting Iran’s growing influence 
(Hennigan 2018). The rivalry between patrons, and the inability of the SNC and the 
Coalition to offer inclusive political strategies weakened it as an opposition body. Daher 
(2019) argues that this weakened position pushed these opposition bodies to legitimize 
the growing influence of Islamist factions and jihadist groups.  
The National Coordination Body for Democratic Change was established in June 
2011 and is a non-armed opposition coalition based in Syria. It was established with the 
aim of uniting the opposition’s demands and calling for peaceful anti-regime protests. It 
is committed to the following principles: “‘No’ to foreign military intervention, ‘No’ to 
religious and sectarian instigation, and ‘No’ to violence and the militarization of the 
revolution” (Carnegie Middle East Center 2012). Its main demands include peaceful 
protests as a means of securing basic demands, the release of political prisoners, 
allowing plurality of political participation, and lifting the emergency legislation. 
The National Coordination Body and the SNC continue to be divided regarding 
negotiations with the GoS. When the early protests started, the National Coordination 
Body supported negotiations with the GoS and did not call for overthrowing the al-
Asaad regime, contrary to the demands of the SNC. Another dividing point is the 
approach to the FSA. While it believes that the FSA played an essential part in the 
uprisings in Syria, the National Coordination Body rejects all calls to arm the FSA and 
rejects violent means. In addition, the National Coordination Body rejected the 
domination of the Muslim Brotherhood in the SNC and found it a misrepresentation of 





3.4.2. Civil Society Initiatives 
 
As previously stated, the ICRC declared Syria a civil war in July 2012 (National Public 
Radio 2012). However, according to Yassin-Kassab and Al Shami (2016), human rights 
activists in Syria disagreed with this qualification since they saw the conflict in Syria as 
mostly one-sided, with the government assaulting civilians and poorly-organized armed 
groups. As such, it is important to highlight non-armed political opposition that 
emerged in Syria, forming strong coalitions within both national and international 
spheres.  
During the time of the Baath rule, civil society initiatives were often associated with 
the US and those who called for an active civil society were labeled as traitors and 
seeking to disrupt social order (Deeb 2011). Despite this, many opposition figures have 
established their own civil society organizations outside Syria and have become key 
players in the international arena. For example, human rights lawyer Anwar Al Bunni, 
who was one of the signatories to the ‘Manifesto of the 99’ and the ‘Damascus 
Declaration,’ was arrested for five years on charges of “spreading false rumors which 
might discourage the nation’s morale” (Al Bunni 2019). He has now established the 
Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research (SCLSR) in Berlin, Germany. According 
to the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), human rights lawyer Mazen 
Darwish was also arrested for three years for his work to promote freedom of speech in 
Syria and for participating in a rally to call for the release of political prisoners (FIDH 
2011). Darwish established the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression 
(abbreviated as SCM) in Berlin. Both Al Bunni and Darwish are leading figures on 
international jurisdiction and their work has heavily contributed to French judges 
issuing international arrest warrants against three high-level officials in the Syrian 
government (Amnesty International 2018, FIDH 2018, SCLSR 2019, SCM 2019 and 
SCM n.d).16 
 
3.4.3. Armed Opposition Groups 
 
As stated previously, the GoS responded with force to the uprisings where the first 
protests led to the killing of around 100 people (Daher 2019). Daher (2019) states that 
the GoS launched a targeted attack on democratically-organized and secular activists. 
The regime felt threatened by the inclusive rhetoric of these individuals, since this 
undermines the propaganda that the regime was trying to spread about the movement 
being led by conspiring armed extremists and sectarian groups (Daher 2019).  
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As the movement grew, so did the number of defections amongst the army. Many 
soldiers refused to shoot on protestors who were not carrying arms. Simultaneously, 
armed resistance began to emerge against security services. According to Boothroyd 
(2016), the release of Islamic radicals from prison facilitated the creation of armed 
groups. In June 2011, the GoS granted general amnesty to hundreds of prisoners who 
were identified as Islamic radicals (BBC 2011). The government presented this as 
reform in response to the uprisings (ibid). Boothroyd explains that many of the fighters 
released were part of armed resistance in Iraq. As such, upon their release, “they 
reconnected with their underground networks to form Islamic armed brigades” (2016, 
44).  
A few months later, a number of armed brigades were created and the FSA was 
established (Boothroyd 2016, Daher 2019). FSA was one of the most prominent 
NSAGs. By the end of 2011, armed resistance became the norm in Syria. Armed 
factions comprised of army defectors, and people who had taken up arms (Holliday 
2012). There was little coordination between armed groups on political or strategic 
decisions (ibid). Holliday (2012) explains that FSA was based in Turkey, making it the 
umbrella comprising many other armed factions, and that in almost each governorate in 
Syria, armed opposition factions emerged. The growth of opposition factions grew after 
the GoS launched of attack on Homs (ibid).  
Holliday (2012) asserts that in February 2012, the GoS exhibited the type of force 
and escalation it is willing to undergo in order to destroy the opposition group. In 
Homs, in a neighborhood called Baba Amr, the GoS enacted a one-month siege of an 
opposition enclave. This eventually forced the opposition fighters to abandon the area. 
However, while the regime was able to regain terrain, it did not defeat the armed 
opposition, as the latter regrouped, re-strategized, and began fighting in other areas. 
Holliday (2012) explains that in Hama in 1982, the force of the regime ended the 
insurgency and the uprising. However, Holliday (2012) explains that the regime’s 2012 
strategy to escalate the attack on Hama had the opposite effect, which led to an 
accelerated growth of armed opposition groups. The latter have stretched out the 
national army’s capacities by forcing them to fight multiple battles and fronts at the 
same time (ibid).  
 
“Regarding concerns that Syria’s armed opposition remains disorganized, it is important to 
distinguish between fragmentation and localized organization. The armed opposition has 
shown a propensity for organization at the local level. Insurgencies are inherently 
decentralized; finding a single leader who commands the allegiance of the grassroots 
resistance movement is not a reasonable expectation”. (Holliday 2012, 10) 
 
As armed clashes between the regime and the opposition continued, foreign powers 
started getting involved directly with the armed opposition groups. External states such 
as Turkey, Russia, Iran, the US and the Gulf States, had competing objectives and were 
all frantically trying to sway the results to their advantage, wherein “foreign intervention 




(Daher 2019, 7). According to Boothroyd (2016) many of the opposition resorted to 
robbery and smuggling to fund their operations. They often held checkpoints and 
forced travelers to pay taxes. They also took hold of oil fields and power plants, making 
way to “warlordism and infighting as some factions grew rich” (Boothroyd 2016, 52). In 
the following section, I provide brief information about major armed opposition groups 
in Syria. Going into more detail goes beyond the purpose of this research endeavor.  
 
- The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed in 2011 by defectors from the 
Syrian army mainly but also from civilians who got armed. They received 
support from the US, Turkey and several Gulf states. In December 2016, 
the GoS gained its biggest victory against FSA when it recaptured 
Aleppo. As such, FSA now only controls limited areas in northwestern 
Syria. In 2018, backed by Turkey, FSA took control over the town of 
Afrin from the hands of the Kurdish rebel fighters. Afrin is at the 
Turkish-Syrian border (Al Jazeera 2018a).  
- In 2013, IS emerged in northern and eastern Syria and in large parts of 
Iraq. It formed from off-shoots of Al-Qaeda. The executions they carried 
out against hostages and their use of social media to recruit foreign 
fighters sparked a wave of international interest in the group 
(Orozobekova 2016). They are funded largely by Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
(Norton 2016) and the US (Global Research 2014).  
- Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, also known as Al-Nusra Front, have strong ties to 
Al-Qaeda. They are considered the second strongest group after IS in 
Syria. Since January 2017, it operates as part of the opposition coalition of 
HTS. Since 2018, it controls large portions of Idleb (Counter Extremism 
Project n.d.). In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” HTS were 
the opposition group that enacted the siege around the towns of Kafreya 
and Foah in Idleb in 2015 (UNOCHA 2017b).   
- Other opposition groups include the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). They control 
the Kurdish areas of Syria, now known as Rojava, or Western Kurdistan. 
It was formed in 2004 and expanded rapidly during the Syrian conflict 
(The Kurdish Project n.d.).  
 
3.4.4. Regional and International Intervention 
 
Regional involvement by external states and foreign backing have largely shaped Syria’s 
conflict. For example, regional actors include governments of Shiite countries such as 
Iran and Iraq, and Lebanon-based Shiite group Hezbollah (Svoboda and Pantuliano 
2015). They have supported strongly the al-Asaad regime by deploying forces to Syria 
to fight armed opposition groups. On the other side of the regional chessboard are 




to overthrow the al-Asaad regime (Svoboda and Pantuliano 2015). With IS emerging 
and shocking the world with brutal videos of executions, a coalition of states emerged 
that aimed at destroying IS forces (Al Jazeera 2018a). For example, in efforts to protect 
its borders, Turkish troops led several military operations against IS (ibid). The anti-IS 
coalition was led by the US and began its military operations against IS targets in 2014 
(ibid). At the same time, the US funded other opposition groups with cash and arms. 
Regional involvement also came from Israel’s side, where Israel targeted Hezbollah 
in Syria by air raids, making the situation even more complex (Al Jazeera 2018a). In all 
of these examples, security discourses are the most prominent, where defense of 
nation-states and borders is the steering wheel for the policies of the countries involved. 
The two main international actors involved in the Syrian war are the US and Russia, 
with Russia involving itself more deeply on the ground. Former US President Barack 
Obama warned that the US would intervene militarily if there was use of chemical 
weapons in Syria (Al Jazeera 2013). On April 4, 2017, there were allegations that a 
chemical weapons attack had hit the town of Khan Sheikhoun in the Idleb governorate 
(Arms Control Association 2018). According to the report by the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), there is evidence of the use of sarine and 
sarine-like gas (OPCW 2017). Pro-government forces, including Russia, have countered 
these claims arguing that the investigation carried out by the OPCW was done remotely 
in New York, The Hague and in a country bordering Syria (SANA News 2017). In 
response, the US directed its first military operation against al-Asaad’s forces by 
destroying a Syrian air base with 59 missiles (Al Jazeera 2018a). The site is believed to 
be where the chemical weapons attack against Khan Sheikoun had been launched (ibid). 
The US was involved in many covert programs in Syria. Perhaps the most notable is 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) training that began in 2013 as a covert program 
which intended to arm, fund, and train opposition groups against the al-Asaad regime 
(Al Jazeera 2017a). It was later stopped once the news was revealed to the public. The 
CIA spent $500 million and trained 60 fighters before shutting down the program (Al 
Jazeera 2015). On the other side of international involvement is Russia’s campaign. 
Russia began its military engagement in Syria in September 2015 when it launched a 
campaign against terrorist groups backed by the US (Al Jazeera 2018a). To strengthen 
al-Asaad’s army, Russia deployed military advisers who helped train the Syrian army 
(ibid). With regards to the UN Security Council, perhaps the most significant roles have 
been played by Russia and China who have vetoed the West’s plans of how to resolve 
the conflict in Syria (Al Jazeera 2018b).  
According to the Syrian researcher, Akram Al Bunni, the international involvement 
in the conflict at the political and military level has been at the expense of internal 
conditions (2018). Away from any talk about the regime winning the war and the 
opposition losing, there is a need to acknowledge that the regime has lost its 
capabilities, and its sovereignty to make decisions, unable to sustain its rule without 





3.4.5. Negotiation Efforts 
 
On June 30, 2012, the UN and country representatives including the US, Russia, China, 
France, UK, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the European Union (EU) met during an 
international peace conference for Syria. This Geneva framework issued the “Geneva 
Communiqué” (UN 2012).  The Communiqué proposed a six-point plan which focused 
on the creation of a transitional governing body to lead a political transition. The 
purpose was to create an agreed framework for negotiations which would garner a 
comprehensive political settlement (Roman and Bick 2017).  
Roman and Bick (2017) argue that this “awkward compromise” is demonstrated 
mostly in the communiqué’s critical focus on a transitional body based on “mutual 
consent” (UN 2012), “which meant the Assad regime would have to approve its own 
negotiated demise” (Heller 2017b). The structure of negotiations was not assigned by 
the communiqué. A series of trilateral meetings between the US, Russia, and the UN in 
2013 resulted in an agreement that the negotiations would take place between the Syrian 
government and a representative delegation from the opposition (Roman and Bick 
2017).  
In 2014, the regime and the opposition met again during the Geneva II talks (Heller 
2017b). In February 2017, Geneva IV talks initiated, in parallel to negotiation efforts 
held as part of the Astana talks, which were sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey. This 
spurred fear that the Astana route would make Geneva’s efforts irrelevant. However, 
the Geneva process remained within a frame of indirect talks where the regime and 
opposition delegations met de Mistura’s team, but did not meet with each other. Heller 
(2017b) argues that the government delegation refused to speak about transition, and 
instead turned the talks on the need to crush terrorism, which is a label the regime 
assigns to all its opponents. On the other hand, the opposition delegation continuously 
focused on the need for a transition, which ultimately would amount to regime change.  
Despite the uncertain future of the Geneva talks, Heller (2017b) argues that its 
continuity of the process is important. That way, the Geneva forum is available for a 
future point when a complete deal could be brokered, and hence, plugged within the 
Geneva forum to make it internationally legitimate. For a political process to be 
meaningful, many pieces would have to be set first. For example, Heller (2017a) notes 
that opposition groups believe that a political process might require a grand bargain 
between the US and Russia, or Russia’s ability to motivate major structural changes in 
the Syrian regime.  
Heller (2017b) explains that “there is also the fear that, without Geneva, everything 
will become Astana.” The Astana talks began in December in 2016 and consolidated in 
January 2017 and were based on negotiations between opposition groups, Russia, and 
Turkey to evacuate the last rebel-held neighborhoods of Aleppo city (Heller 2017a). 
The sponsors of the Astana talks have been Russia, Iran and Turkey. Astana was 
presented as a format for brokering ceasefires wherein Heller (2017a) notes that the 




In an interview held with a Western diplomat, the Astana format was viewed as serving 
primarily Russia and its political-military ends.  
 
“And Astana has a qualitatively different feel than Geneva, one with which many Geneva 
attendees are uncomfortable. Geneva enjoys international political legitimacy and, 
interviewees told me, is based on principles they considered worthy and laudable. Astana 
skews more towards grubby deal-making, in a way that’s especially alarming for civilians 
mostly excluded from a forum for armed actors”. (Heller 2017b, 5) 
 
Negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition factions have usually 
aimed to reach a military ceasefire, thereby transitioning the country. However, the fate 
of al-Asaad has been the main point of negotiations and peace talks (Al Jazeera 2018b). 
The UN facilitated the first round of peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, between the 
GoS and opposition delegates in June 2012. The final round of talks was concluded in 
December 2017 when disputes over al-Asaad in a transitional government ended the 
talks.17   
Eight years into the armed conflict, many Syrians have been forced to flee their 
homes and seek refuge elsewhere in the country or beyond (Al Jazeera 2018a). 
According to UNHCR, as of November 2018, there are over 5.5 million registered 
refugees from Syria and over 6.5 million internally displaced Syrians. Host countries 
with the highest numbers of Syrian refugees are Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. 
According to Al Bunni (2018), it is impossible to conceptualize the Syrian conflict away 
from the humanitarian costs that it has entailed, in terms of casualties, injuries, 
detainees and missing persons, internally displaced persons, and migrants.  
 
3.5. Episode at a Glance 
 
The Syrian armed conflict has caused a massive influx of people seeking refuge in 
neighboring countries. In Syria, far more people are internally displaced within the 
country than outside it (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2017). Local 
agreements have been a means to implement an interim ceasefire and to provide aid 
and services to people. Such truces have stood as glimmers of hope in difficult 
situations. However, these agreements need to be linked to a broader process of 
peacebuilding in order to demonstrate a commitment to peace (Turkmani et al. 2014). 
In an effort to better understand the conflict episode, the ECM analysis requires 
unraveling answers regarding the “Four Towns Agreement” along 6 basic questions: 
 
 
                                                     
17 The UN special envoys for Syria have been Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi as Joint Special Representative of the 
Secretaries-General of the UN and the Arab League, Staffan de Mistura as special envoy and finally the current 




What:   
- Exchange of bodies and prisoners between GoS and NSAGs 
- Evacuation of a set number of wounded individuals and a set number of 
civilians and githers from the four towns 
- Uplift of sieges and implementation of ceasefires across the four towns 
Who: 
- Regime and patrons: GoS, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran  
- NSAG and patrons: HTS and Qatar 
- Evacuees from the four towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and 
Foah 
- The United Nations was not a party to the agreement 
Where: 
- The agreement was sealed in Doha, Qatar after the spokesperson for 
HTS visited Qatar and finalized the agreement. The implementation of 
the agreement took place within Syria. In effect, the agreement clears the 
capital, Damascus, from the stronghold of the HTS and moves the 
opposition group towards the suburban areas of Syria, mainly the Idleb 
governorate. Regime supporters in Kafreya and Foah were given refuge in 
Aleppo, GoS-controlled governorate.  
Why:   
- Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the four towns have 
witnessed several intermittent ceasefire agreements. Under the Office of 
the Special Envoy for Syria, negotiations in Istanbul between the warring 
parties resulted in the first ceasefire agreement and its implementation 
began on 22 September 2015. The agreement lasted for six months. By 
the end of 2016, demands for ceasefires shifted into ones for evacuation 
of people from the four towns. Under the patronage of Iran and Qatar, 
negotiations between the warring factions over the transfer of civilians 
resumed and also included the release of Qatari royal family members 
who had been kidnapped in Iraq. In return, Qatar pressured the 
opposition-group to release its prisoners and uplift the siege from 
Kafreya and Foah.  
How:  
- The agreement stipulated that the evacuees would depart to a transit area 
before arriving to the final destination. On April 14, 2017, an estimated 
2,350 people from Madaya departed to the GoS-held Ramouseh garage 
area in Aleppo city and were to be transported to the NSAG-held Idleb 
governorate. In parallel, 5,000 people from Foah and Kafreya towns were 
taken towards the NSAG-held transit point in al-Rashideen area, and 
would finally be transported to the GoS-held area of Aleppo city. A car 
exploded at the al-Rashideen waiting area where evacuees were waiting to 
cross to GoS-held Aleppo, killing 125 people. On 19 April 2017, the 




2017, 2,900 people were transferred from Madaya and Az-Zabadani to 
Idleb and 8,000 people were evacuated from Kafreya and Foah to 
Aleppo. The towns of Madaya and Az-Zabadani were then handed over 
to pro-regime forces.  
When:  
- In a retaliatory dynamic between the GoS and the NSAGs, the four 
towns were besieged in 2015. Kafreya and Foah which were under the 
GoS-control became besieged by the NSAGs in March 2015. In 
retaliation, Madaya and Az-Zabadani which were under NSAG-control, 
became besieged by GoS and loyal forces in July 2015. After the 
humanitarian situation worsened in the four besieged towns, negotiations 
between the GoS and the NSAGs began in March 2017 and materialized 




On April 12, 2017, the first phase of the “Four Towns Agreement” initiated with the 
exchange of bodies and prisoners between the NSAGs and the GoS. A total of 16 
prisoners and 8 bodies were released from the government-controlled town of Foah, 
and nineteen prisoners and one body was released from the NSAGs-controlled Idleb 
governorate (UNOCHA 2017b). The UNHRC produced a report which asserts that the 
agreement also included the release of 1,500 detainees by the al-Asaad regime (2017). 
According to the New York Times (2018), the “Four Towns Agreement” also involved 
the release of 28 Qataris who were kidnapped in Iraq in 2015. Their release became tied 
to the “Four Towns Agreement” and was used as a leverage point by the GoS to 
pressure the opposition groups to comply with the conditions stipulated in the 
agreement.  
Following the exchange of prisoners and bodies, between the 13th and the 19th of 
April, a total of 2,900 people had been evacuated from the towns of Madaya and Az-
Zabadani from the Damascus governorate to the Idleb governorate, and 8,000 had 
evacuated from the towns of Kafreya and Foah to the Aleppo governorate.  
As the cease-fire and the truce was implemented according to the premises of the 
“Four Towns Agreement”, pro-regime forces initiated a reconciliation process. In that, 
certain individuals from the previously besieged areas were required to undergo this 
reconciliation process as a condition to remain in their towns, while others were not 
given the opportunity to reconcile. In July 2016, Legislative Decree No. 15 was 
established as the basis for reconciliation, whereby individuals and fugitives who turn 
themselves in and surrender their weapons are given amnesty (UNHRC 2017). 
According to the UNHRC, the vast majority of these individuals have been fighters and 




Based on observations by the UNHRC, the reconciliation process allowed the 
government to categorize the fighting-age male populations of the four towns on the 
basis of allegiance. In effect, it filtered males aged 18 to 45 into two categories:  
- Wanted individuals and armed men whose only choice is to leave the 
locality otherwise they risk detention 
- Those who agree to pledge loyalty to the government and hence are 
permitted to stay in their towns 
 
While the latter group is allowed to stay, they are forced to serve in governmental units. 
Forced conscription includes two alternatives: local units within the National Defense 
Forces or under the umbrella of a paramilitary force, or they serve at the front lines in 
the Syrian army after a six-month notice period. However, the reconciliation process 
was not comprehensive across the four towns. For example, reconciliation was not a 
viable option for all civilians in Madaya, as no reconciliation was offered to health-care 
personnel. Moreover, in Madaya, those who exhibited sympathy with opposition groups 
were not offered reconciliation. Those who were allowed to stay in Madaya pledged 
loyalty to the regime by providing fingerprint statements and undergoing background 
checks. As such, the UNHRC argues that the incomprehensive reconciliation process 
has, in effect, “induced the displacement of both fighters and groups of dissident 
civilians in the form of organized evacuations” (2017, 6).  
 
3.5.2. Who  
 
The “Four Towns Agreement” had been compiled in two years of negotiations between 
the GoS, NSAGs, and Third States. It stipulated the safe evacuation of people from the 
towns, evacuation of the injured, and access to humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA 
2017b). The conflict parties that were directly involved in the agreement were the al-
Asaad regime, the NSAGs and external third states. It was brokered by the al-Asaad 
regime and Iran on one side, and Qatar, representing the armed opposition on the 
other. The UN was not involved in the agreement (Böttcher 2017). Drawing upon the 
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the BBC reports that the specific groups 
included HTS on the side of the opposition groups, Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Group Corps (IRGC) on the side of the regime, and Iran and Qatar as 
mediators (2017).  
According to Böttcher (2017), Qatar played an important role in the 2017 
agreement. Qatar’s prominent representation dates back to mid-December 2015, when 
a group of Qatari and Saudi nationals were kidnapped by Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iranian-
backed Shiite militia, while they were bird hunting in the Muthanna governorate in 
southern Iraq. Negotiations over their release were added to the “Four Towns 
Agreement” and the details were arranged in March 2017 in Doha, Qatar. Böttcher 
(2017) asserts that media outlets reported that Qatar paid millions of dollars to the 




Figure 4: Evacuations from the four towns (UNOCHA 2017b, 1) 
fighters in exchange for the release of the Qatari hostages. In a press release by 
Physicians for Human Rights, they asserted that the agreement was handled primarily 
by Iran (an al-Asaad patron) and Qatar (a prominent opposition supporter) and no 
regime officials were actually involved, demonstrating “the extent to which the war has 




While it remains unclear 
where all the negotiations 
took place,  Al Monitor 
confirmed that on March 26, 
2017, Hussam al-Shafi (also 
known as Zaid al-Attar), 
spokesman for Jabhat Fatah 
al-Sham and political chief of 
HTS, visited Qatar to strike 
the deal (Mardasov 2017). 
With regards to the 
implementation phase of the 
agreement, the agreement can 
be seen as a means to clear 
the capital, Damascus, from 
the stronghold of the NSAGs 
and to move the opposition 
groups towards the suburban 
areas of Syria, mainly the 
Idleb governorate (UNHRC 
2017). According to UNHRC, 
the evacuation of the 
Damascus-besieged 
populations and armed 
groups from the towns 
Madaya and Az-Zabadani to 
the Idleb governorate serves 
as a calculated warring 
strategy. In that, the 
evacuation achieves the removal of both opposition actors and their supporters to the 
northwest area of Syria (ibid). 
Going back to the reconciliation process conditions, those who are perceived to be 
sympathetic to opposition factions (including civilians, doctors, relief workers, activists, 




and stay in their towns (UNHRC 2017). Those who pledge loyalty to the government 
are allowed to stay in their hometowns. As such, the population transfer can be seen as 
a pattern intended towards engineering changes in the political demographics of 
political support. In effect, what the agreement achieves is redrawing and 
reconsolidating the bases of support for the government in Aleppo and squeezing the 
opposition group factions in Idleb. By doing so, the regime is able to strike an offensive 
against the opposition groups in Idleb, without risking casualties to its Shiite supporters 
in the two towns of Kafreya and Foah (UNHRC 2017). 
On April 12, the first phase of the agreement started with the exchange of prisoners 
and dead bodies between the warring factions. According to the UNOCHA (2017b), 
government forces in Foah released sixteen prisoners and eight bodies, and NSAGs in 
the Idleb governorate released nineteen prisoners and one body. It is unclear whether 
the Qatari and Saudi hostages were released in this initial exchange. 
In the days following its implementation, the agreement was delayed and 
interrupted on several occasions. On April 13, a car bomb exploded outside the SARC 
office in Idleb city, and later that day, several mortar rounds struck the towns of Foah 
and Kafreya, wounding some individuals and damaging some of the evacuation buses 
(UNOCHA 2017b).   
Nevertheless, the evacuations began on April 14 for all towns. The agreement 
stipulated that the evacuees would depart to a transit area before arriving to the final 
destination. And so, on April 14, an estimated 2,350 people from Madaya departed to 
the GoS-held Ramouseh garage area in Aleppo city and were to be transported to the 
NSAG-held Idleb governorate. In parallel, 5,000 people from Foah and Kafreya towns 
headed towards the NSAG-held transit point in al-Rashideen18 area, and would finally 
be transported to the GoS-held area of Aleppo city. Disagreements and disputes 
between the conflict parties over the implementation of the agreement resulted in some 
delays, with the evacuees sitting on the evacuation buses for several hours (UNOCHA 
2017b). 
On April 15, upon the arrival of both groups to the transit points, the agreement 
again faced disputes between the conflict parties, which resulted in a 12-hour delay. 
While negotiations were taking place, NSAGs allowed the evacuees to get off the buses, 
during which two vehicles (a car and a van) approached the evacuation convoy and 
started distributing snacks to the evacuees. Due to the 12-hour wait, the evacuees were 
hungry. When a bigger car approached, the NSAGs encouraged them to collect the 
food. At around 3:30 pm, the car exploded at the al-Rashideen waiting area, where 
evacuees from Foah and Kafreya were waiting to cross to GoS-held Aleppo. Local 
health authorities reported that the explosion killed 125 people, including at least 67 
children, 13 women and 16 men, and the wounding of 413 people including 58 
children, and 7 humanitarian workers (UNOCHA 2017b). 
                                                     




Following the attack, humanitarian organizations and cross-border partners in 
Turkey provided sporadic assistance to the wounded where 275 people were treated in 
hospitals in Idleb, 138 people in Aleppo and 30 patients requiring advanced medical 
treatment were transferred to Turkey. In the aftermath, it was found that 45 Shiite 
individuals went missing, because they were taken hostage by NSAGs after receiving 
medical treatment in Aleppo. According to UNHRC (2017), some hostages were later 
released after prolonged negotiations to swap one high-ranking opposition leader, but 
at least 15 remain missing, including one 4-year-old child who remains in captivity. 
A few hours after the explosion, the agreement ensued and the evacuation buses 
from the towns of Madaya and Az-Zabadani reached Idleb, and those from Foah and 
Kafreya crossed to Aleppo. On April 19, the second evacuation process took place 
from the four towns, with the same operating procedures. Around 550 persons 
evacuated from Madaya and Az-Zabadani to Idleb city, and 3,000 people departed from 
Foah and Kafreya towards Aleppo. Interruptions and delays also made the evacuation 
process slower. Nevertheless, according to UNOCHA (2017b), Az-Zabadani is now 
completely empty of people.  
According to interviews conducted by UNHRC, civilians shared that their decision 
to leave their besieged towns was involuntary (2017). For example, in Madaya, those 
who were interviewed stressed their desire to remain in their homes. Fearing forced 
conscription, they did not trust the government forces enough to stay. This atmosphere 
of mistrust caused many people to be reluctant to accept the regime’s offer to reconcile 
because they feared detention. Many noted that they feared ever returning home, and 
some had given up on that prospect. Some recalled that their homes had been 
appropriated by pro-government forces, making a journey back home almost 
impossible. 
In a similar vein, civilians in Kafreya noted that they did not want to abandon their 
homes, but the deteriorating siege conditions forced them to accept the evacuation 
plan. Several accounts recalled that increased attacks, malnourishment, and the outbreak 
of diseases made the evacuation agreement the only viable option. Interviewees from 
Kafreya also expressed their desire to return to their homes but were doubtful regarding 
those prospects (UNHRC 2017). 
Testimonies from civilians over their involuntary evacuation from their homes show 
the delineation of such agreements from the clamoring truths on the ground. According 
to UNHRC (2017), the participation of the SARC during the evacuation plan for 
Madaya does not render the agreement lawful. Moreover, local councils have been 
created in opposition-held areas in order to maintain understanding with armed groups. 
Such memorandums have affirmed their capacities as quasi-civil governance bodies.  
 
“Despite this, neither political leaders, such as local council representatives, nor military 
commanders, such as pro-Government or armed group fighters, possess the requisite 






3.5.4. How and When 
 
When anti-regime protests started in the summer of 2011, the people of the town of 
Madaya joined and rallied for political freedom and hoisted the flag of the revolution in 
the town’s square (Amnesty International 2017). With the armed conflict escalating, the 
Syrian army began tightening its control over movements in and out of the valley where 
Madaya and Az-Zabadani are nestled. Their very close proximity to the Lebanese 
borders allowed Syrians to pass a single road from these two towns and make their way 
to Lebanon. In parallel, the towns of Kafreya and Foah are predominantly home to 
Shiite populations in the Idleb governorate, which is predominantly Sunni. In Syria, the 
Shiite population is generally known for being an avid supporter of the Syrian regime 
and Iran.  
In 2015, the opposition group committed an offensive on the Idleb governorate, 
and established a stronghold around the two Shiite towns. And in March 2015, several 
armed opposition groups began encircling the two adjacent towns of Kafreya and Foah. 
The siege was primarily held by HTS and the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement (The 
Syria Institute 2016).  
Since Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah are interested in protecting these Shiite 
towns, the regime forces retaliated and encircled the two towns of Madaya and Az-
Zabadani in July 2015. The GoS enacted a total siege which blocked the road to 
Damascus, and the towns’ borders with Lebanon were encircled by the regime’s 
Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The only road to enter and exit the two towns was manned 
by pro-regime forces and checkpoints (Amnesty International 2017).  
According to Amnesty International’s report on mass displacement (2017), in Idleb, 
armed opposition groups attacked civilians using shelling and explosives, restricted the 
transport of humanitarian and medical aid, and stole medical supplies from aid convoys. 
The indiscriminate attacks on civilians violate international humanitarian law and, in 
some cases, amount to war crimes. For example, according to Amnesty International 
(2017), 3,000 people, the majority of them being civilians, were killed in Foah during 
the two-year siege, as a result of indiscriminate shelling and attacks. In addition, 
according to the Violations Documentation Center (VDC) in Syria, 51 civilians were 
killed by GoS attacks on Madaya between July 1, 2015 and April 14, 2017, mostly as a 
result of sniper fire (VDC 2017)19.  
Since their siege in 2015, the four towns remained critically besieged by forces loyal 
to the regime including Hezbollah, Iraqi armed groups and the Syrian army, and from 
the opposition’s side, primarily HTS. During 2016, humanitarian conditions worsened 
and by early September 2016, malnutrition was a major problem for all populations. 
The unavailability of basic goods and the price inflation made it very difficult for people 
to access food items (Amnesty International 2017).  
                                                     




The humanitarian response to the crisis was inadequate due to difficulties in gaining 
access to the target populations. Access to the towns was granted in a tit-for-tat 
manner, where the GoS only allowed the UN access to Madaya and Az-Zabadani in 
return for the NSAGs granting humanitarian access to Kafreya and Foah. Following 
this retaliatory dynamic, between October 2015 and March 2017, the UN and its 
partners delivered aid to the four towns on nine occasions (Amnesty International 
2017). However, on two occasions, humanitarian aid was unable to reach more than 
60,000 people in the four towns for periods of four to five months in 2016 and 2017 
(ibid). With the tightening conditions under which humanitarian organizations work, 65 
people in Madaya died from starvation and malnutrition between July 2015 and May 
2016 (Physicians for Human Rights 2016). 
After immense pressure from the international community following these 
unfortunate conditions, the GoS allowed aid to be delivered to Madaya in return for the 
NSAGs allowing the same in Kafreya and Foah. Between the months of August and 
October 2016, only one UN interagency aid convoy managed to reach the four besieged 
towns. On September 25, a total of 49 trucks reached Madaya, carrying supplies for 
38,000 people, and four aid trucks reached Az-Zabadani. Specific numbers of aid 
shipments to Kafreya and Foah could not be obtained (Amnesty International 2017). 
The aid shipment to Madaya carried basic food supplies and non-essential medical 
items. However, it lacked necessary goods such as fuel, important medical supplies, 
protein, baby milk and salt (Amnesty International 2017).  
Between August and October 2016, negotiations over several small evacuations for 
severe medical cases were carried out, in a tit-for-tat manner from Madaya in return for 
evacuations from Foah. In August 2016, a total of 40 patients were evacuated for 
medical treatment. Four meningitis patients were also evacuated in September, and 
another eight people were evacuated from Madaya and Foah on October 6. Following 
this last evacuation, negotiations ceased and the “Four Towns Agreement” completely 
broke down. Reasons for the collapse of the agreement are conflicting. For example, 
according to The Syria Institute (2016), Iranian intermediary had suspended 
negotiations with the opposition local committee. However, according to The New 
York Times (2018), the opposition group had rejected the 2015 agreement since Iran 
had suggested swapping the residents from the four towns: residents of Kafreya and 
Foah would move to Madaya and Az-Zabadani, and vice-versa.  
In March 2017, reports demonstrated that surrender negotiations were underway by 
various actors in different parts of the country. On the side of the government, 
negotiations were led by Russia, the Syrian government, and Iran. Each actor aimed for 
different results and hence diverged in their aims of the negotiations. For example, 
Russian negotiation efforts were more inclined to maintain the presence of Syrian 
civilian populations in their own land. In that, Russian desires diverged from those of 
Syrian and Iranian negotiators who supported civilian population transfers (Amnesty 
International 2017). One of these negotiation efforts resulted in resuming 




third states. As such, the “Four Towns Agreement” was sealed in Doha, Qatar in 




Throughout the course of the armed conflict, the four towns have witnessed several 
intermittent ceasefire agreements. Under the aegis of the office of the UN Special 
Envoy for Syria in Istanbul, negotiations between the warring parties reached the first 
ceasefire agreement and began its implementation on September 22, 2015 (Reuters 
2015). The agreement stipulated a halt to hostilities, delivery of humanitarian aid and 
the medical evacuations of the ill and injured under the supervision of the UN. The 
agreement lasted for six months. While negotiations were held to seal similar ceasefire 
agreements between 2015 and 2016, none of them managed to uplift the sieges or halt 
the hostilities (UNOCHA 2017b).  
However, by the end of 2016, demands for ceasefires shifted into ones for 
evacuation of people from the four towns. Under the patronage of Iran and Qatar, 
negotiations between the warring factions over the transfer of civilians resumed 
(Amnesty International 2017). It also included the release of Qatari royal family 
members who had been kidnapped in Iraq. In return, Qatar pressured the opposition-
group to release its prisoners and uplift the siege from Kafreya and Foah.  
On March 30, 2017, UN humanitarian chief Stephen O’Brien notified that the 
warring factions informed the UN of the “Four Towns Agreement” to evacuate the 
people from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah, to deliver aid, and to halt 
hostilities for nine months. After the exchange of prisoners and bodies between the 
GoS and the NSAGs, the evacuation plan started and by April 19, 2,900 people were 
transferred from Madaya and Az-Zabadani to Idleb and 8,000 people were evacuated 
from Kafreya and Foah to Aleppo. Madaya and Az-Zabadani was handed over to pro-
regime forces.  
During April 2017, negotiation efforts by Iran and Qatar sought to add the 
evacuation of three more towns, Yelda, Babbila and Beit Sahm, (abbreviated as YBB), 
as part of the “Four Towns Agreement.” However, people from YBB took the streets 
and protested against the idea of forced displacement (The Syria Institute 2017). In 
addition, as a later phase of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the negotiating bodies 
agreed that HTS would hand over control of the Yarmouk camp to the regime and 
would be evacuated out of the area. As such, in a retaliatory dynamic, on May 8, 2017, a 
medical evacuation was carried out for a group of HTS fighters from the Yarmouk and 
four ill patients from Kafreya and Foah (The Syria Institute 2016). However, the 
agreement to transfer HTS from Yarmouk camp faltered and the transfer of the 
remaining civilians from Kafreya and Foah halted. Eight thousand civilians continued 
to be besieged by the opposition groups and lived in dire conditions (Amnesty 




evacuation of the 8,000 people in return for the release of prisoners from government 
prisons (The Independent 2018, The National 2018b).  
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4. The Themes: Securitization of the  





A friend who painted dogs and undignified men who hurt her, 
who sang delicious lines in our home, 
flew off one day, and left me a lifetime of plants to feed.  
I, who had not been green, forever. 
 
They shot tall, loomed large in the room, kept going. 
Travel plans were peppered with requests to keep them alive, 
my curtains a new form of sunlight feeding, 
fledgling shoots my secret earth, the fingers brown and happy. 
 
I learnt how the sun is a kind siren, how we bend to her will, even when heavy. 
How soil is a mystery, best left as magic.  
Why father would not leave a war zone,  
after thirty years of naming his plants. 
 
I hunger for wider leaves, longer stems, a fluorescent green glow. 
My plants pirouette, in air and light and water.  
In them,  
Mourning song of dead birds in the freckled hands of my father, 
the blue eyes of my dead farmer uncle, 
the sweaty chest of the dead Palestinian grandmother I never met, 
the memory of dead roses on balconies that left Damascus, when mother did. 
 
Do not touch my plants in disrespect, or hatred.  
It will hurt you. 
 





The Themes: Securitization of the “Four Towns Agreement” 
 
87 
Using the ECM methodology previously presented, such an analysis of the “Four 
Towns Agreement” allows for a deeper understanding of the conflict epicenter. In that, 
the ECM model explores how themes of harmony, justice, truth, and security clashed 
within the negotiated agreement and those who were affected by it. Furthermore, it 
examines the conflictive aspects of each theme of the conflict episode, and each 
relevant conflict party of the agreement.  
After adopting the principles of resonance, correspondence, and homeostasis across 
all the ECM branches, the next branch pertains to the peace families. Within this, 
analyzing the conflict episode of the “Four Towns Agreement” across the specific 
thematic emphases reveals the imbalances between these peace families. According to 
Dietrich (2012), all the thematic variations of peace are at play and sometimes at tension 
at the epicenter of a conflict episode. These themes include the following: notions of 
harmony within energetic understandings of peace, the theme of justice in their moral 
understanding of peace, the question and practice of security in modern notions of 
peace, and finally the plurality of truths within postmodern ideas of peace. For Dietrich 
(2012), it is the balance between these four themes that allows for a transrational 
understanding of peace to emerge.  
 
“Transrational peaces send the human being on a lifelong quest in search for the dynamic 
balance in which ethical moments may manifest as characteristic of aesthetic ones, and 
aesthetic moments as topic of ethical ones. Harmony may be a function of security, security 
one of justice, justice one of truth, which in turn can only exist in harmony”. (Dietrich 2012, 
268) 
 
4.1. Securitization20 of the Agreement 
 
The context of the “Four Towns Agreement” is framed around a ceasefire, the 
exchange and/or release of a set number of bodies and prisoners, and the evacuation of 
a set number of fighters, civilians, and wounded individuals from Madaya, Az-
Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah. Within each of these premises lies an over-emphasis on 
security. Yet, the question that posits itself is: does the “Four Towns Agreement” over-
emphasize the security of the people or that of the state? 
In order to explore this, I begin my analysis by resorting to international 
humanitarian law to understand the key protection and operational considerations for 
in-country evacuations. Rule 129 of the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law 
stipulates that international parties to a conflict are not eligible to initiate the 
displacement of a civilian population, unless there is an imperative security demand to 
do so. Such a demand is justified on the basis of the security of civilians, for example to 
                                                     
20 Term first introduced by Ole Wæver in 1993 (Taurek 2006) where ‘securitization’ refers to a process where a 
certain issue is made a matter of security which then allows the use of extraordinary measures. It is not necessary 
that the threat is actually real (Balzacq 2005). 
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curb any grave danger from incurring to them (UNHRC 2017). Further, Rule 109 
asserts that the evacuation of the wounded and sick individuals is an obligation at all 
times, and should not be limited to the evacuation period. In addition, according to the 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, political motives and military necessities do not justify civilian evacuations 
(UNHRC 2017).  
During the two years of the siege, both 
sides adopted a retaliatory dynamic. Within this 
sad orchestration, the residents of the four 
towns themselves were the most affected by 
virtue of their hometowns. As such, several 
reports find that the “Four Towns Agreement” 
is an agreement for the forced displacement of 
the populations from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, 
Kafreya and Foah (UNHRC 2017; Amnesty 
International 2017). According to the HRC, 
given that the residents were not allowed to 
freely decide neither on their movement, nor 
on their final destination, the evacuation efforts 
amount to an “unlawful order” (2017, 8). The 
report concludes that the evacuations do not 
fulfill the exceptions stated previously, in terms 
of security of civilians or military reasons, and 
hence, constitutes “the war crime of forced 
displacement” (2017, 8).  By examining the 
details of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the 
April 15 attack on the convoy in al-Rashideen attests to the perilous and desperate 
journeys that evacuations are. During the transfer of the populations from Kafreya and 
Foah, a suicide bomb left 125 people dead and 45 people missing (UNHRC 2017).  
Moreover, those who were evacuated from Madaya and Az-Zabadani to the Idleb 
governorate were initially poorly accommodated in schools and in overpopulated camps 
for internally displaced persons (UNHRC 2017). 
Further, with regards to the homes that were left behind in each of the four towns 
Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah, the UNHRC report found that the GoS has 
taken legislative action to confiscate land (2017). Upon the evacuation, the government 
dispossesses the populations of their left-behind homes and properties. It has also 
hindered the ability of transferred populations to register new or to retain old private 
properties. The GoS has raised legal and administrative impediments for property-
ownership where it now requires in-person registration, making it virtually impossible 
for many evacuees to do so because of the severity of the fighting countrywide 
(UNHRC 2017).  
Despite these conditions, opposition groups have reported that they accept deals 
with the regime because they want sieges to be uplifted and to bring security to their 
Figure 5: Map showing land held by Syrian 
regime and opposition groups (Osseiran and 
Solomon 2017).  
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hometown. Since the opposition groups find themselves being defeated and losing 
territory, they also find such agreements an opportunity to regroup and re-strategize 
(Hinnebusch and Imady 2017). “After years of unrest, massacres and deadlocks, public 
opinion seems to shift in favor of the security and safety which the regime could 
deliver” (Lakitsch 2017).  
Looking at these aspects through transrational lenses reveals that the “Four Towns 
Agreement” has been framed mainly as a security problem, which becomes an 
imbalance towards modern peace. Dillon (1996) asserts that within the imperative to act 
and preserve security, great insecurity is born, especially for those who are perceived to 
be a threat. By this token, the threat to the Syrian state is the presence of the NSAG 
enclave in close vicinity to the Lebanese borders and Damascus. The state is also 
threatened by the possibility of using the presence of the state’s Shiite supporters 
besieged in Kafreya and Foah as a leverage against the GoS.  
Within the ECM analysis, the transrational lens sees an imbalance in the system 
towards maintaining the security of the state, at the expense of diminishing security for 
the residents affected by the “Four Towns Agreement.” At the core of a transrational 
understanding of a system is the recognition that the existing polis is open and not free 
of tensions. That is, under a new organization of the existing system, previous 
imbalances and dysfunctional relationships are also re-organized, creating new dynamic 
equilibriums and changes. Since changes push communities away from their comfort 
zones, changes can cause tensions. This means that the transfer of people from one 
town to another is bound to cause changes in the system. And within an open and 
transrational understanding, the system finds a new balance, one that is able to 
accommodate to the new human interactions. Therefore, the question of balance 
pertains to the ability of an open system to integrate the movement of the populations 
from the four towns. Such an event not only affects those who have to be evacuated, 
but those who host them in the new governorates. Therefore, an open system is never 
the same at any given moment in time.  
In addition, the securitization of the “Four Towns Agreement” creates a strong 
sense of national identity between the populations from the NSAG-controlled areas in 
Madaya and Az-Zabadani, against those from the government-controlled areas of 
Kafreya and Foah. Echavarría Álvarez explains that when trust is restricted to only 
those who are culturally similar, “fear is externalized in the figure of the migrant” 
(Echavarría Álvarez 2014b, 181). In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the 
figure of the migrant is represented in the internally displaced persons affected by the 
evacuation deal.  
The Syrian conflict has created physical and societal threats between its own people, 
dividing the communities between regime supporters or regime opposition. Along these 
rigid divisions, the war has united political communities against ‘others.’ Transfixed by 
political identity features (such as being pro-regime, or pro-opposition), individuals 
have engaged in acts of political solidarity with the warring factions, without 
questioning ‘who we are’ (Echavarría Álvarez 2014b). From a transrational perspective, 
these rigid representations are far too reductionist and do not convey a realistic image 
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of the different people in Syria, who they support, who they oppose, and most 
importantly, who they are as Syrians. The crisis of representation is also clearly 
highlighted in the efforts by the GoS to empty Madaya and Az-Zabadani to ensure the 
security of its stronghold in Damascus. The presence of these ‘migrants,’ poses 
unequivocal threat to its centralizing power (Agamben 1998). Relationally speaking, the 
GoS takes measure to ensure its personal security.  
The physical relocation of the populations from the four towns is an act that 
separates them from their social, cultural and economic networks. This creates 
alienation and intensifies mistrust. The creation of an ‘us’ that is different and distanced 
from a ‘them,’ feeds into an image of a collective homogenous ‘other.’ Under these 
circumstances, groups are unable to see personal stories in the ‘other,’ and hence, find it 
extremely difficult to build relationships of trust or healthy communication (Echavarría 
Álvarez 2014b, 181).  
From a transrational perspective, the lack of trust prevents communities from 
establishing empathic relations, which ultimately hinders peaceful relations. Dietrich 
(2012) criticizes modern variations of peace for being grounded outside and beyond 
human relations. He argues that within such a modern understanding of peace, the 
securitization of migration issues21 becomes driven towards breaking relational bonds. 
Beyond the availability of humanity, it perceives insecurity as the failure in ‘resolving the 
conflict’ with technical knowledge. What it overlooks is the human element in conflicts: 
the people whose lives are affected and the stories they carry. Modern tools rely on data 
on conflict-ridden populations but cannot capture the perplexity of what it means to be 
a human in that conflict situation. “Herein lies one of the major pitfalls of modern 
notions of peace: to ground the ‘tools’ for solving violent conflict in legitimized state 
violence” (Echavarría Álvarez 2018, 117).  
In light of the “Four Towns Agreement,” legitimized violence is highlighted in the 
use of sieges by the warring factions (state and non-state actors) as a tool of war. It also 
becomes visible when the context and conditions of the agreement are explored with 
scrutiny. The evacuation deal achieves some key points related to security: the uplift of 
sieges, the release of prisoners and bodies, and the transfer of people and wounded 
individuals to safer zones. However, the security dystopia of the “Four Towns 
Agreement” lies in the fact that the people’s decision to evacuate from the towns of 
Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah was involuntary, their decision to return to 
their homes was almost impossible, and the evacuation exposed them to grave danger. 
What the agreement achieves is a higher sense of personal security for the state and the 
non-state actors, characterized by strategic land-control and the strategic protection of 
populations of interest.  
 
 
                                                     
21  For the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” migration refers to the internal displacement of the 
populations affected by the evacuation deal.  
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4.1.1. Beyond the Episode’s Security  
 
“In order to break the siege, you need to first break the silence surrounding it.” 
Former resident from the besieged Yarmouk camp in Damascus, Syria (SAMS 2015, 4) 
 
Beyond the episode of the “Four Towns Agreement,” local agreements in Syria have 
become a major strategy to coerce surrender of the opposition. The government 
presents the agreements as reconciliation efforts, but that reconciliation is initiated only 
after years of sieges and bombardment. The agreements result in the evacuation of 
armed groups, mass displacement, and the government’s control of previously 
opposition areas. “The population transfers on the now-infamous green buses have 
come to symbolize the dispossession and defeat” (Amnesty International 2017, 6).  
The episode of the “Four Towns Agreement” serves as a stark entry point into a 
discussion of population displacement through reconciliation agreements as 
consequences of the armed conflict in Syria. Lichtenheld (2017) asserts that warring 
factions use population displacement as part of their strategic practices, amounting to 
an association between wartime violence and displacement that is often assumed but 
not interrogated. In this section, I use the episode of the “Four Towns Agreement” as a 
starting point to examine and discuss besiegement and reconciliation efforts that trigger 
mass displacement in the Syrian conflict across the different peace families, beginning 
with the modern notions of peace that stem out of security.   
The work of Barry Buzan (1991), People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International 
Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, is foundational in the world of IR and theories of 
security. Many theories of security have emerged since the end of World War II and yet 
there is no consensus over the general definition of security. The two classical schools 
of security in IR are the realist and idealist-inspired security ideas, which continue to 
inform academic and political understandings of security.  
The realist school understands security in its relation to power, such that “an actor 
with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result” 
(Buzan 199l, 2). In contrast, the idealist school understands security as a derivative of 
peace, where peace secures security for all. A second set of definitions places notions of 
national security in tandem with notions of identity. In that, national security becomes 
concerned with maintaining a certain way of life, in accordance with the needs of the 
people. Other understandings combine national security with the state’s ability to 
pursue its national interests, in any place in the world.  
Within such discourses on security, it appears that Syria offers a confusing mix of 
failed agendas from the past and a hodgepodge of security sub-dynamics. For example, 
existing literature suggests that the deliberate displacement of populations succeeds in 
removing certain undesirable social groups in order to create homogenous territories 
(Walling 2000; Mann 2005). Also, research on counterinsurgency sees in forced 
displacement a response to information problems (Steele 2011; Zhukov 2014). 
Following the realist school of thought, such actions secure the power of the state.   
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Another lens to aid in understanding security beyond the “Four Towns Agreement” 
is the idealist school that understands security as a derivative of peace. In the context of 
the Syrian conflict, security becomes a product of ceasefires. For politicians envisioning 
the future of Syria, before anything else, a ceasefire is a starting point for any 
demonstrable good on the ground. Since the start of the conflict in 2011, there have 
been five attempts to establish a nation-wide ceasefire. Each ceasefire was negotiated by 
the conflict parties, under the aegis of third-states. Each of the attempts to halt 
hostilities in Syria came to an end (Al Jazeera 2017b). 
What seems apparent for Syria’s peace-talks is that a ceasefire is not an end in itself 
as long as the purpose out of it is only to gain time. Repeatedly, ceasefires have been a 
mere alibi by the US and UN to pretend to have achieved something. Repeatedly, 
ceasefires have been taken by the regime and Russia to regroup and re-strategize. Each 
time, both coalitions have gained time, but Syrians have lost collectively. For officials 
tasked with ‘managing’ the conflict in Syria, conventional wisdom has rendered their 
efforts a political cycle trapped within the realms of what is expected of them: of 
speaking the language of ‘stabilization’ as the war worsens, and ‘dialogue’ in the absence 
of any basis for reconciliation (Harling, Simon and Berthier 2017). As such, solution-
finders and top negotiators follow the default reconciliation narrative of attempting to 
bridge the conflicting factions while paying lip service to Syrian representation 
(Lundgren 2015). 
Reconciliation, which is primarily a concern for religious topics and social 
psychology, has now emerged as a political category (Abu-Nimer 2001; Minow 1998).  
In Lederach’s book When Blood and Bones Cry Out, he describes the term ‘reconciliation 
as “a buzzword for politicians wishing to end wars they no longer seem interested in 
supporting” (2005, 3). David Crocker (1999, 60) asserts that the political arena has 
adopted a “thin” rather than a ‘thick’ understanding of reconciliation, whereby 
politicians use reconciliation in an effort to accommodate enmities and to promote 
coexistence. This type of ‘thin’ reconciliation does not tap into the entrenched 
divisions, but is a prescriptive recipe to control the bitterness in divided societies 
(Crocker 1999). Ignatieff (2003) coins it as a ‘cold peace’ whereby coexistence becomes 
possible without actually forgiving the crimes. As the war protracts, Syrians are 
gravitating towards more isolation from each other and those who often mean to help, 
fail to listen (Harling 2016). Sensible and reasonable solutions have been offered yet by 
failing to listen to the anguished subjectivities of the people, they have shown to be far 
removed from the realities on the ground (ibid).  
 
4.1.2. The Syrian Security Apparatus  
 
In Syria, the mainstream reading of security refers to something rather specific: the 
security apparatus. Within a modern understanding of the security of the nation-state, 
the Syrian regime’s security paradigm is understood in terms of its power (Büchs 2009). 
Given the dominance of the theme of security, I am compelled to offer my readers a 
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modern understanding of how the Syrian regime maintains security and power. As such, 
in this section, I travel through concepts of a modern understanding of power, one 
which perceives power as a thing; something that can be taken away. The aim is to 
demonstrate measures of maintaining security in Syria. Although the majority of the 
sources consulted for this section date back to before the Syrian armed conflict, I find it 
important to understand the context of the Syrian armed conflict.   
According to Büchs (2009), studying comparative issues specific to Syria have 
focused on the study of coups and repressive institutions of the state. However, Büchs 
(2009) argues that coups tell us how regimes assumed power, but they tell us little about 
how they remain in power afterwards. Understanding the repressive state institutions 
through structural institutionalism is unable to form a link between the macrolevel and 
microlevel (Büchs 2009; Migdal 2001). Moreover, in Syria’s case, most functionalist 
approaches classify Syria as a subtype of “modern military praetorianism” (Perlmutter 
1981, 42) or as a military system (Nordlinger 1997).  
It is important to note the use of the terms ‘regime’ and ‘state’. The concept of the 
state is broader than the concept of the regime, where ‘regime’ typically refers to a 
broad organized system of rule (Calhoun 2002), government patterns within a space, 
and a specific form of organized power (Tripp 1989) where the regime possesses 
legitimate force within a territory (Mitchell 1991; Migdal 2001). While not equating both 
concepts, from a modern lens, the regime is studied and understood through an analysis 
of the state (Perthes 1997; Hinnebusch 1990).  
In the case of Syria, Büchs explains that “the regime appropriates the state as a 
means of gaining the obedience and compliance of the Syrian people” (2009, 6). She 
notes that in Syria there is a lack of clear distinction between regime and state since the 
regime has in large been able to create and transform state institutions in its own image 
(ibid). Within such a modern understanding of the state, the issue of power becomes 
intimately intertwined as a means through which the state maintains obedience and 
conformity (Clark and Salloukh 2008). Hence, the need to conceptualize the state 
through an understanding of the forms of power it possesses (Wedeen 1999).  
 
“The study of the regime through the state can then provide access to the power of the 
regime in so far as the Syrian regime, having appropriated the state, is exerting its power 
through and on the basis of that state” (Büchs 2009, 9).  
 
Moreover, a discussion on power entails a discussion on state autonomy. According to 
Migdal (2001), state autonomy envisages the state as a coherent entity that is 
autonomous from societal forces. This stems from conceptualizing within a state a 
subjective nature which leads to its “authoritative intentions” (Mitchell 1991, 82), 
wherein the state is seen as possessing its own subjective ideas and plans. In his critique 
on state autonomy, Timothy Mitchell (1991) challenges the state-society border on the 
basis that the mechanisms of a political order extend beyond the state.  
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Büchs (2009) argues that the Syrian regime maintains obedience through material 
and ideational forms, in the form of a ‘tacit pact’.22 A tacit pact refers to an inequitable 
relationship between two parties23. The weaker party is under permanent threat of 
exclusion from assets or coercion to ensure obedience. Despite these efforts, 
Heydemann (1999) notes that the continuous social unrest and the existence of 
opposition are clear indicators that the “tacit pact” as a form of domination and control 
is unable to produce the political stability it aspires to.   
 The material forms of power are political wherein political voice is traded for 
economic rewards. Through this, the weaker party ensures its inclusion economically, 
but is excluded politically. Ideational forms of power refer to an internalized frame 
through instilled fear, cynicism, and a concept of patriarchy. It refers to the state’s 
ability to manipulate images of power and authority. Both forms represent a “tacit pact” 
since the pact is between unequal parties.  
Using a corporatist approach, Büchs (2009) analyses the power of the Syrian regime 
through its employment of punitive measures to ensure obedience and punish 
noncompliance. Lisa Wedeen (1999) argues that the successful ability of the regime to 
build “institutions of enforcement and punishment” (1999, 5) refers to the material 
interests which stem from the ability of the regime to control and withdraw material 
resources. This is referred to as ‘material’ power. Using a corporatist lens, Büchs argues 
that it allows for an understanding of authoritarianism beyond its repressive measures. 
Crystall (1994) explains that authoritarianism should not only be understood negatively; 
that is, by that which it is not, essentially democracy.  
Punitive measures which ensure obedience attest to the Syrian regime’s successful 
means of coercion (Tripp 1989). As previously stated, the security apparatus in Syria 
includes the police, military forces, and security services. The security services are 
particularly notorious for their surveillance in an open fashion, through several legally 
unchecked nets that pervade “all parts of society, including the bureaucracy, the party 
and the army” (Perthes 1997, 48). The security apparatus is considered one of the 
regime’s most effective ways of creating an atmosphere of fear, wherein, as will be 
explained later, the power of the apparatus has been highly associated with the 
“personality cult around Hafez and Bashar al-Asad,” which has conditioned people’s 
behavior out of fear, as opposed to belief in the regime (Büchs 2009, 15).  
According to Büchs (2009), the regime has maintained tight-grip control over the 
security apparatus through the employment of two methods. First, it has offered 
material incentives to members of the security apparatus, the mukhabarat, and hence, has 
created dependency. For example, the security apparatus offers material incentives such 
as employment, certain privileges, tax exemptions, higher wages than in other areas of 
state employment, and political status24.  
                                                     
22 Nazih Ayubi originally introduced the expression “tacit political pact” (Ayubi 1995, 246).  
23 In Transrational terminology, this relationship would be seen as imbalanced. 
24 Many officials in the security apparatus end up holding key political positions in the government (International 
Crisis Group 2004).  
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Second, the regime conducts ‘checks’ which are meant to control and maintain 
balance across the forces of the security apparatus. This is intended to prevent 
independent coalitions from forming within the institutions (Perthes 1997). In addition, 
in order to increase its control over the security apparatus, every key official’s position 
was made directly dependent on the president, wherein people of trust owed the 
president their loyalty (Büchs 2009). Therefore, the Syrian regime successfully organized 
modes of punishment through creating an all-pervasive security apparatus which the 
regime maintains control over through a system of loyal patronage and effective 
‘checks.’  
According to Büchs (2009), power in Syria is also largely rooted in concepts of 
patriarchy. Images and symbols that are associated with the regime are manipulated, and 
hence, become internalized. According to Hisham Sharabi (1988), patriarchal values are 
rooted in the conceptualization of the family, clan, or religious sect in the Middle East. 
Ayubi calls them “blind sense of group loyalty” (1995, 166) which brings forth rituals of 
coercion. Lisa Wedeen (1999) explains that conformity to the patriarch ensures material 
wellbeing, while nonconformity is met with coercion and entails withdrawal of rewards. 
Ayubi (1995) explains that the regime has manipulated and mobilized these popular 
mentalities. For example, Büchs (2009) argues that the regime manipulates metaphors 
of the patriarchal family into its discourses to invoke support. Wedeen explains that 
patriarchal connectivity goes beyond specific families and extends towards a mythic, 
national family where al-Asaad is the paternal head (Wedeen 1998). This patriarchal 
metaphor frames politics as having no internal divisions (Büchs 2009), which mirrors 
the patriarchal understanding of group loyalty (Ayubi 1995).  
Büchs (2009) explains that the president and the Baath party cannot be separated 
because they cannot be conceptualized in isolation. This has been achieved through the 
president presenting himself as the sole leader of the Baath party and hence, his policies 
are always in line with that of the party. Büchs (2009) explains that this has reduced the 
Baath party to a ‘personality cult’ around the two presidents, Hafez and Bashar al-
Asaad. For example, the coup through which Hafez al-Asaad assumed power was called 
‘Corrective Movement’ invoking metaphors that the president was restoring it to the 
true path of the Baath party.  
Büchs (2009) bases her argument on Laitin’s (1986) ideas that the state defines the 
broad values and beliefs worth fighting for, but not the specific beliefs. In line with this, 
Wedeen (1999) explains that al-Asaad’s cult establishes the categories or frames of 
thinking about politics and “the ways people see themselves as citizens” (Wedeen 1999, 
19). Wedeen argues that the frame put forth concerning the understanding of politics 
and citizenship is part of the process of “killing politics” (1999, 32). This creates a 
depoliticized and demobilized citizen. As such, through the “killing [of] politics,” an 
individual no longer poses a threat to the regime (ibid). According to Al-Khalil (1991), 
the regime achieves this by eliminating political freedoms, and disorienting citizens by 
annulling differences between individuals, and “between what belongs to the state and 
what belongs to individuals” (1991, 70).  
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In addition, Syrian researcher and activist, Michel Kilo, who was a signatory to the 
‘Damascus Declaration’ of 2005, lived in Syria during both the rule of Hafez and that of 
Bashar. He was arrested twice and served three years in prison for charges of 
“weakening national sentiment and encouraging sectarian strife” (Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting 2009). He writes that people under oppressive regimes live dual, 
oftentimes antagonistic personas. One persona hates the system and “lives in the hope 
of salvation”25 from it (Kilo 2014). The other persona is the public one, which rests on 
embracing the system, through public displays of allegiance. Kilo (2014) explains that 
the individuals who live the most extreme dual personas, are those who are very close 
to the oppressive regime, or as Wedeen (1999) would call it, part of the President’s cult. 
Kilo (2014) notes that the regime is driven by its insecurity, and hence, turned the 
country into a detention site, or as Kilo calls it, “a concentration camp.” The regime 
does not trust those in his cult or the weapons they carry, and as such, subjects his close 
proxies to strict surveillance and monitors their activities (Kilo 2014).   
4.2. Moral Reconciliation  
 
Without dismissing the promise of security by the modern nation-state, the 
transrational approach calls for a balance among the themes of security with notions of 
harmony, justice and truth (Dietrich 2018). Homeostasis, one of the principles of the 
ECM model, urges us to inquire into the ways in which the system seeks to balance 
itself. In the effort to find a dynamic equilibrium, notions of justice, as linked to moral 
peace, emerge as existing tendencies to counterweight the imbalance of the 
securitization of the “Four Towns Agreement.” 
In 2012, the GoS created a Ministry of National Reconciliation under Ali Haidar 
(UNHRC 2017). Following this, a strategic vision was introduced by President Bashar 
al-Asaad to call for national reconciliation (musalaha) through local truces. Since the start 
of the Syrian war, local truces have been adopted and they varied according to the 
changing balance of power. They have ranged from what the regime calls reconciliation 
agreements to what the third powers term as de-escalation zones; from ceasefire 
agreements to surrender deals and evacuations. Grounded in moral readings of justice, 
the “Four Towns Agreement” emerged as a musalaha deal between the GoS and the 
opposition groups. How does such a musalaha fit into the logic of moral understanding 
of peace? Unraveling the word origins and the Islamic notions of peace are integral in 
capturing the mechanisms linking justice and peace.  
From the perspective of peace and conflict research, peace is understood as the 
“reduction of direct, structural and cultural violence” (Galtung 1990, 223). A further 
distinction that Galtung proposes is that between positive and negative peace. 
According to Galtung, negative peace is the “absence of violence of all kinds” (1990, 
                                                     
25 Translated from Arabic by author.  
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31), and positive peace is “a cooperative system, beyond ‘passive peaceful coexistence’ 
one that can bring forth positively synergetic fruits of the harmony” (1990, 61).  
Within the Arabic-Islamic understandings, reconciliation, which means musalaha in 
Arabic, stems from the word sulh or sulha. According to Haneef (2011), sulh is the 
Islamic equivalent of negative peace, which bears the understanding of halting 
hostilities or implementing truces. Haneef (2011) claims that the equivalent of positive 
peace in Arabic could be salam, which is a perennial relationship rooted in respect 
(Bangura 2005). “Sulh is absence of war while salam insists on promotion of social 
justice” (Haneef 2011, 126). Reconciliation, musalaha, is a means for peaceful conflict 
resolution, wherein the goal is to promote restorative justice and deter revenge against 
perpetrators. When reconciliation is successful, salam, or positive peace becomes 
possible. In the Arab-Islamic context, salam is associated with the idea of the nation, 
ummah, where all Muslims are one nation as a whole.  
In light of this, the musalaha of the “Four Towns Agreement” becomes rooted 
within moral readings of social justice. It offers a somewhat counterweight to the 
modern reading of its securitization, yet simultaneously compliments it. For example, in 
response to allegations of the securitization of the “Four Towns Agreement” which 
triggered forced displacement and forced demographic change, the GoS and its 
supporters have strongly denied such sectarian motives. For example, Nasr Qandil, a 
Lebanese politician strongly affiliated with the regime, grounds his critique of the state 
securitization of the “Four Towns Agreement” in moral readings of the social justice of 
the ummah: a united Syria for all (Osseiran and Solomon 2017).  
He asserted that the GoS had no interest in demographically changing the Sunni-
Alawite-Shiite existing balance in Damascus. Qandil confirmed that Damascus and its 
suburbs is the regime’s stronghold and that there are still seven million Sunnis in and 
around Damascus, which attests against any claims of sectarian motives to the 
evacuation of the besieged populations of Madaya and Az-Zabadani from Damascus, 
based on their Sunni profile (Osseiran and Solomon 2017). As such, percepts of 
solidarity emerge among the regime’s discourses of the “Four Towns Agreement” as 
moral virtues grounded in social justice of the ummah. 
Furthermore, since the start of the armed conflict, the Syrian regime has been 
diligent in not turning the conflict into a sectarian one in Syria. The uprisings against the 
regime initially adopted a nonsectarian approach. However, within a month after the 
first wave of protests in mid-March 2011, the rhetoric changed and sectarian 
perceptions came to prevail (Ajami 2012). However, despite this, Wimmen (2016) 
argues that it would be wrong to define Syria as experiencing exclusively, or even 
mainly, a sectarian civil war. Wimmen (2016) explains that many Syrian Sunnis continue 
to affiliate themselves with the regime, and that many Sunnis take refuge in 
government-held areas. This attests to the non-sectarian nature of the conflict. As such, 
the dividing line between regime supporters and regime opposition do not necessarily 
follow ethnic or sectarian affiliations (ibid) 
Wimmen (2016) is also skeptical about attributing the current conflict to remnants 
of the tensions from Hafez al-Asaad’s time, as some have represented it. However, a 
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crippled and mismanaged economy might have been the immediate motivation for the 
uprising (Conduit 2016). This pushed a great portion of Syrians into grinding poverty, 
where economic grievances marginalized the rural population (ibid).   
According to some researchers, the regime’s structure is more sectarian than the 
regime might admit or warrant (Heydmann 2013; Pierret 2013). The origins of 
sectarianism lie in the political behavior of the regime and the Hama events of the 
1980s. In order to counter the uprising, the regime has been motivated to blame the 
sectarian strife on external states and international interference. The regime’s statements 
have warned against turning the uprising into a sectarian conflict, and have asserted that 
the protests are part of a Western conspiracy to entrench sectarian strife between 
Syrians. Conjuring up such scenarios was successful at invoking fear in the minority 
groups, especially Alawites and Christians, encouraging them to seek affiliation and 
protection from the regime. For example, although NSAGs-held areas are 
predominantly Sunni, most internally displaced people from opposition territories flee 
to government-held areas (Lichtenheld 2017). This attests to the regime’s welcoming of 
newcomers in their new communities under the GoS rule (Al Monitor 2014). Away 
from the logic of security, the GoS makes direct references to notions of common good 
and social virtues, and the right to hospitality for Syrians who are displaced by the war. 
Within this, there is an inherent moral reading of peace: “moral concepts of peace point 
from insecurity toward security, from injustice to justice, from error to truth” (Dietrich 
2012, 114).  
According to Dietrich (2012), a transrational perspective finds questions of 
common good and social justice problematic. He finds that moral understandings of 
justice are framed in painful experiences in the past and the promises of salvation in the 
future. Moral peace has little to do with the present and hence, it stops being related to 
current needs and realities. In reference to life under siege in the four towns of Madaya, 
Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah, the people’s needs were grounded in the here and 
now. But what social justice in tandem with moral peace does, is that it turns the 
suffering and injustice that the people experienced into a chronic construct.  
Beyond the siege, and beyond the previously lived siege experiences, morally 
oriented modes of narrations maintain the emotions and memories of the siege alive in 
the people. “Authoritative discourses recall situations of helplessness that cloud the 
present moment with emotions and memories that install the past and the future in 
place of the present” (Echavarría Álvarez 2018, 119).  For this reason, Dietrich (2013) 
calls for structural justice where the current needs are not overshadowed by topics of 
past trauma and vows of future justice.  
 
“In terms of the transrational shift, justice is addressed as an issue of the subjective and 
communal satisfaction of needs, rather than the mechanistic meeting of a demand. Growth is 
understood as a process, not in teleological terms as a purpose in itself. The focus is on what 
we already are and what we need right now, and not on what we should do in order to live up 
to the definition of a future ideal”. (UIBK 2017f)  
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4.2.1. Beyond the Episode: Salaam  
 
As previously conceptualized, Salaam captures a relationship of wholeness, and is 
closely tied to notions of the ummah, the state. Based on a wide body of literature, Said 
(2001) compiles the five main approaches to peace in Islam: 
1. Power politics: peace through coercive power 
2. World order: peace through the power of law 
3. Conflict resolution: peace through the power of communication 
4. Nonviolence: peace through will power 
5. Transformation: peace through the power of love 
 
Each of the abovementioned approaches to peace is characterized by a distinct set 
of principles and values. The principles exist under more than one approach, 
henceforth, making the approaches diverse but carrying common elements found in 
Islam. The principles offer an understanding into the system of salaam in Islam. Within 
the Syrian landscape, these approaches are all at play to varying degrees. I see the 
approach of ‘Power Politics’ as the most prominent one within the Syrian landscape, 
wherein Islam is utilized to maintain power and social order. “This approach supports 
state authority, strives to maintain negative peace and accepts political necessities 
created by internal and external threats” (Haneef 2011, 128).  
Under this approach, justice and social order are overemphasized (Haneef 2011). By 
this token, social injustice and oppression are seen as pervasive structural violence, 
which often provoke violent reactions from those who are oppressed. According to 
Khadduri, in Islam’s system of peace, justice “had to prevail, if necessary, by the sword” 
(1984, 162). What is worthy to note is that this approach does not advocate positive 
peace. It does not capture the wholeness and equilibrium of salaam. Driven by such 
notions of peace, this moral framework fails to envision a long-lasting peace for Syria. 
Incapable of envisioning a future for Syria, all parties pretend to fight like the alpha 
while exploiting their opponents’ own crimes. Despite this, most Syrians continue to 
fight the course out of fear of collapsing into a state of limbo where there is no longer 
anything to cling to.  
As previously mentioned, the Syrian war has been largely characterized by failed 
attempts at nation-wide ceasefires, carried out at the whims of politicians in 
Washington, Tehran and Moscow (Sara 2019). No ceasefire or peace-treaty, no 
governmental vacuum or governmental installation will last unless an understanding of 
a perennial salaam is integrated; wherein a vision of a positive peace is integrated within 
reconciliation agreements.  
 
4.3. Truth Discourses 
 
In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the needs of the people are assumed 
instead of understood and listened to. If the conflict of displacement is given space for 
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listening to the people living in the besieged towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya 
and Foah, what would the “Four Towns Agreement” look like? Under this transrational 
vein, justice becomes structural since it grounds us into the roots of the present 
moments, in the roots of what it means to be human under siege. Within the everyday 
accounts of our humaneness, transrationality urges us to balance structural justice with 
a plurality of truths, where ‘strong thought’ (Vattimo 2006) is overshadowed by the 
many small, existing and contextual truths. In his book Imperfect Peace, Francisco Muñoz 
(2006) insists that peace research depart from understanding peace from its negative 
definition of violence.  
This type of postmodern peace, as proposed by Muñoz (2006), implies to step away 
from ontological and epistemological premises of what peace is and what peace is not. 
Instead, he calls for the recognition of a plurality of truths, where peace is not a closed 
and secure notion, but an imperfect and procedural process. Understanding the “Four 
Towns Agreement” through the post-modern peace family reveals how little space 
exists for the many clamoring truths on the ground. This conflict episode in Syria has 
turned into a firm determination to search for truth, and sustained within the sphere of 
‘strong thought,’ as Vattimo calls it (2006). The search for truth is not a postmodern 
one. Instead, the pursuit of truth is under a modern framework where truth refers to 
something quite specific: one perpetrator and one victim.  
For example, it remains unclear who committed the April 15 attack in al-Rashideen 
that targeted the evacuees from Kafreya and Foah. Although no party claimed 
involvement, according to eyewitness reports gathered by UNHRC (2017), the car 
which exploded arrived from opposition-held areas. Also, the transit point of al-
Rashideen is under NSAG-rule, including Nour al-Din al-Zenki (then part of HTS), 
Ahrar al-Sham and FSA groups (UNHRC 2017). The UNHRC reported that this type 
of attack, where explosive devices are planted into vehicles, has been “a modus 
operandi of extremist factions and some armed groups” (2017, 9). According to the 
UNHRC, HTS and Ahrar al-Sham have denied allegations of committing the attack 
(2017).  In the aftermath of the attack, 43 people went missing, including elderly 
persons and children, after receiving medical treatment by the NSAGs. Following 
negotiations for the exchange of hostages, at least 15 remain in captivity. 
The underlying tone is a strong search for truth and answers: one rigid truth and 
one straight answer, one perpetrator and one victim. The postmodern thematic notions 
of peace through a plurality of truths urges us to consider that there is more than one 
perpetrator and more than one victim, that there are as many answers to the “Four 
Towns Agreement” as there are human beings affected by it. Muñoz (2006) urges us to 
consider imperfect peace in contexts of diverse backgrounds, since peace is not a 
product of ‘untouched’ communities. Instead, within postmodern notions of peace, in 
their plurality, deep in their unfinished touches, and immersed in their uncertainty, one 
finds an imperfect and modest peace (Dietrich 2006). In postmodern peaces, everyday 
accounts of peace oppose “any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize 
violence in its direct or structural form” (Galtung 1990, 291). 
The Themes: Securitization of the “Four Towns Agreement” 
 
101 
Johan Galtung offers us a definition of a culture of violence wherein he urges us to 
consider the persons directly involved in the conflict. This is an essential step in elicitive 
mapping because at the core of the ECM model is the human, the human who 
experiences the conflict episode. In that, ECM allows us to explore the questions of 
harmony within an energetic understanding of conflict. The challenge of such a task is 
the unspeakable nature of the theme itself, where personal harmony lies in a realm 
beyond discursive narration.  
To explain the energetic peaces, Dietrich (2012) uses examples of the Great Mother, 
the Holy Wedding and the Great Triad. They point us towards characteristics that 
delineate and yet compliment the other peace families. For example, energetic peaces 
do not hold a personified God as their creator. Instead, they call for the recognition of 
a primal energy as the source of existence. Energetic peaces do not see a separation 
between the universe and the human body, and perceive the mind and body as 
inseparable. With regards to truth, energetic practices of peace perceive relative truths 
instead of ultimate ones. Dualities do not exist, which allows for a smoother flow of 
energies. Finally, energetic peaces postulate that peace begins internally and flows to the 
outside world.  
The question of personal harmony in the context of the “Four Towns Agreement” 
entails the crucial insight of perspectivity. As such, energetic understandings of peace 
are a question of experience, not of evolution or progress (Dietrich 2012). When “the 
individual experiences collective energy, conscious transpersonal harmony turns into the 
synonym for peace” (Dietrich 2012, 274). For the conflict mapping of internal 
displacement, it implies that the modern security management of displacement leaves 
little space for energetic notions of personal harmony among the internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah. Although internal 
displacement involves first and foremost a change in living conditions under the moral 
and modern promise of salvation and progress respectively, energetic concepts of peace 
are perennial “beneath the surface of a capitalistically commodified world” (Dietrich 
2012, 53). Insights of harmony under energetic peaces shine through the fissures and 
cracks of moments, events and language wherein there is an everlasting search among 
internally displaced people to crack the door of the persona for peace. 
Furthermore, from an energetic perspective, the episode of the “Four Towns 
Agreement” exposes a sense of hunger; physically, emotionally, and spiritually. Prior to 
the armed conflict, the towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah were highly 
agricultural26 (Amnesty International 2017). Since the enactment of the sieges in 2015, 
the agricultural infrastructure was destroyed, worsening the food security situation 
(UNOCHA 2017a). This had made hunger the most pressing problem facing the 
people living in those four towns. From an energetic perspective, there is a strong 
relationship between hunger and peace.  
                                                     
26 Syria was the only country in the region that was self-sufficient in food production (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 2015).  
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For life to flourish or survive, it seeks to be nourished. Nourishment manifests itself 
in different forms and under different contexts. From the moment a seed is planted 
deep within the earth, hunger manifests itself in the seed’s journey to find sunlight and 
water. The seed struggles to break the ground and flourish. A tree grows outward into 
the world. And below the ground, the tree digs its roots deeper into the Earth, and 
finds the sources of nourishment that help it grow. This journey of unfolding requires 
that the system in which the seed exists is able to satisfy its hunger to flourish.   
But what happens when the system is unable to strengthen the seed’s ability for 
growth? What happens when lightning strikes the plant, severing its branches? The 
result is an exaggerated expression of hunger, leading to no or stunted growth. In the 
context of the four towns, the war severed the branches of the trees, polluted the water 
and poisoned the soil. As a result, the people living in those four towns experienced 
aggravated hunger for two years. The earth and the system that had once satisfied their 
hunger had become imbalanced and unable to provide the conditions for their growth. 
Anthropologically speaking, the situation of hunger in the four towns demonstrates a 
state of somatic and emotional hunger. However, in the rhetoric of development 
politics that feeds Syrians empty promises, hunger is seen as almost exclusively a 
physical imbalance that must be alleviated. 
 
“[too] often, poverty and deprivation get covered as events. That is, when some disaster 
strikes, when people die. Yet, poverty is about much more than starvation deaths or near 
famine conditions. It is the sum total of a multiplicity of factors. The weightage of some of 
these varies from region to region, society to society, culture to culture. But at the core is a 
fairly compact number of factors. They include not just income and calorie intake. Land, 
health, education, literacy, infant mortality rates and life expectancy are also some of them. 
Debt, assets, irrigation, drinking water, sanitation and jobs count too”. (Sainath 1996, ix) 
  
In the Syrian context, much like other conflicts, the existing power dynamics lend 
hunger a moral persona. That is, hunger comes to be perceived along the moral 
dualities of ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ depending on who is experiencing the hunger, and who is 
inflicting the hunger. The religious, regional, and ethno-political identities dictate the 
moral nature of the hunger. For example, the Syrian regime controlled the sieges 
around Madaya and Az-Zabadani, causing extreme cases of starvation and death. And 
the Syrian opposition groups maintained the siege around Kafreya and Foah, making 
hunger and starvation the most pressing need for the people trapped within the siege. 
Within this sad orchestration, these moral dualities come to exist in a perennial, 
perpetual and irreconcilable tug between power and resistance; between the individual’s 
desire to grow and survive and the collective (Syrian regime or armed opposition 
groups) desire to control. The result is skewed expressions of hunger, locked within the 
politics of scarcity and inequity.  
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Was it one day, one breathe, one nap at a time, or an immediate persistent pang? 
How long till the skeleton is truly and well displayed? 
When did the limbs stop moving at will? 
 
What is the difference between a day and a month of hunger? 
Empty nostrils, useless tongue. 
A month and three months of hunger? 
 
Today I had four walnuts to eat.  
A man barely enunciates his emptiness…his ribs speak of another story. 
 
I hope the president feels victorious, feels powerful. 
I hope our neighbor rebels, these militiamen in hell, celebrate all this winning. 
I hope my children die quickly and their mother is not there to see them. 
 
Seige. Like sayej in Arabic. To fence, to encircle, to protect. 
To safeguard, to keep out, to keep in. 
Seige. Sayej.  
All our wars are the same. All our wars are the same. 
We who do not fast on anything, are slow to feel. 
 
-------------- Hind Shoufani, Seven Songs for Syria (2017) 
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Following the annotations of the previous chapter, ECM points us towards the strive of 
personal harmony to restore its dynamic equilibrium within the deeper layers beyond 
the physical manifestation of the conflict episode. The ECM layers mirror the chakra 
system of Yoga Philosophy, which was initially proposed by Sri Aurobidno (Dietrich 
2018). Following this system of synchronicity, the layers travel through the basic 
material needs and reach the cosmic aspects of existence. By moving towards the layers, 
we encounter the third branch of ECM, which taps into the epicenter of the conflict, 
the seat where the conflict energy is nourished and from where it emerges to the 
surface of the conflict episode. As such, seeking to use reason and rationality to resolve 
the conflict episode rarely works, since the conflictive energy lies in the epicenter, which 
continues to fuel the episode and generates new forms of conflict. Within the ECM 
model, this branch recognizes the deeper layers of the conflict episode, the roots in 
which the conflict energies take solace and intertwine.  
Previously in the research, I demonstrated that the “Four Towns Agreement” had 
been framed as a security problem within the fringes of conflict resolution, which 
focuses on prescribed solutions at the superficial level of the conflict episode. From an 
elicitive approach, the analysis interrogates into the deeper layers of the conflict 
epicenter and seeks to unravel the imbalances. The conflict parties identified in/security 
at the center of the problem: a ceasefire, the exchange and/or release of a set number 
of bodies and prisoners, and the evacuation of a set number of fighters, people, and 
wounded individuals from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah. In other words, 
the securitization of the conflict episode addresses the perpetual suffering of life under 
siege pertaining to personal insecurity, food insecurity, land insecurity, and the 
existential insecurity of the conflict parties. Within this theme, peace emerges out of 
security. This type of peace is a material one that can be measured and accumulated 
(UIBK 2017b). The imbalance towards modern understandings of peace highlights an 
overemphasis on reason, rationality, and the mind’s dogma. In turn, this reveals an 
imbalance towards the mental-societal layer which is heavily governed by the mind.    
 
5.1. The Mental-Societal Layer: The Reign of the Mind  
 
The ECM layers are based on the principle of correspondence, wherein the inner and 
outer aspects are reflected in each other: “as within, so without” (UIBK 2017g). 
Correspondence establishes a non-linear relation between the inner and outer aspects of 
human beings within their encounters and conflicts (Echavarría Álvarez 2014a). Within 
this model for the evacuation of the four towns, security becomes a relational issue and 
therefore, a systemic product. Inner security of those who were evacuated is related to 
the way they perceive the world. In such an open system, with humans engaged in 
relations and conflicts, Dietrich describes a human as an integral unit of a bigger 
system; as a holon belonging “and part of bigger holons such as families, community, 
society, humanity, planet Earth and the universe or cosmos” (2018, 28). 
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The mental-societal layer represents the anahata, the heart chakra. The modern 
Cartesian mind is dualistic, and hence, sees the heart and the mind separately, where 
feelings are associated with the heart, and the mind associated with the brain (Naranjo 
2005). In contrast, in many energetic practices, there is no differentiation between heart 
and mind. For example, in Pali, the term citta is used to describe both. In languages 
where traditional mediation work was developed, such as Tibetan, no difference was 
made between heart and mind (Dietrich 2018). As such, the mental-societal layer urges 
us not to see them dualistically, but two parts of one whole. In this line, heart and mind 
become mutually exclusive. In practical work, not annulling supremacy of one over the 
other respects the reality that we are all contact boundaries at work. As such, in order to 
make decisions that make us feel safe, and not just secure, there needs to be an 
integration of the heart and the mind together. For example, whereas modern cultures 
offer individualistic interpretations of laws, energetic cultures encourage collective 
interpretations of laws that uphold social structures and encourage collective 
compliance (Vallejo 2011).  As shall be explained later, the reign of the mind in the 
episode of the “Four Towns Agreement” translates into people experiencing pain of 
the laws.  
Therefore, according to the ECM principle of correspondence, the intrapersonal 
layer of the mind and the interpersonal layers of the society affect the conflict episode, 
wherein destructive energies can emanate from and contribute to the dysfunction of the 
system. With the loss of the mind’s dynamic equilibrium, the destructive force of the 
mental-societal layer can generate great pain and destruction, even genocide. According 
to Dietrich (2018), the desperate effort of the mind to uphold and defend societal moral 
and organizational ideals gives way to mass destruction.  
In the events leading up to, and revolving around the “Four Towns Agreement,” 
the Syrian context has shown us many scary glimpses of this destructive expression of 
the mind. In 2015, when the sieges around Kafreya and Foah were enforced by the 
opposition groups in Idleb, the Syrian regime and its allies retaliated and encircled 
Madaya and Az-Zabadani in Damascus. The tit-for-tat tactic accentuates the modern 
scientific approaches to conflict resolution. As such, tensions in the mental-societal 
layer reveal an overemphasis on the Cartesian mind, which navigates the dynamic 
equilibrium of the system. Within modern science, disturbances to the system are 
reconciled using mechanistic rationality. Following this logic, the “Four Towns 
Agreement” was a reconciliation deal prescribed as a solution for the sad tit-for-tat 
orchestration by the conflict parties. Hence, the rationale behind the “Four Towns 
Agreement” does not seek to end the cycle of violence that it finds itself entrenched 
within. Rather, the conflict and its proposed solution feed from the same pot of poison, 
creating and maintaining a sort of destructive dynamic equilibrium that is always on the 
brinks of exploding.  
Therefore, the expression of the principle of correspondence in the mental-societal 
layer appears “in the mind’s constructively and destructively high ability of abstraction, 
which enables our emotional perception of interpersonal actions and bigger social 
entities to become imaginable in the first place” (Dietrich 2018, 70). Dietrich argues 
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that this holds specific interest for conflict intervention since conflict resolution is 
based on modern and postmodern concepts of the mind (2018). That is, conflicts are 
seen as societal irrationalities, which are resolved using more rationality. In that sense, 
even the non-rational subconscious dynamics of the conflict layers are rationalized; the 
result of which is a prescribed model for a dysfunctional system.  
In the model of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the temptation for prescribing a 
reconciliation deal as a solution to besiegement and insecurity in Madaya, Az-Zabadani, 
Kafreya and Foah, drew upon the rationality of the Syrian, Iranian, Iraqi, and Qatari 
officials. The solution they prescribed, the “Four Towns Agreement,” was a result of 
drawing their own abstract concept based on their perception of a solution for the 
conflict episode, which they understood as a societal deficiency. They did so without 
engaging their own sexual-family or socioemotional-communal aspects into resonance 
with those involved in the agreement (those who were to be evacuated). “Their mind 
chides the involved parties when their relationships do not unfold according to the 
concepts of modern reason” (Dietrich 2018, 70). The officials who brokered the deal 
drew a different scenario of the conflict episode; they moved people, displaced them 
without allowing them a chance to reconcile their own fears.   
Given that the Syrian context is overwhelmingly imbalanced by relational insecurity, 
this reflects in the overbearing weight of the ego in the mental-societal layer. Dietrich 
describes the perils of the ego: 
 
“As long as there is an “I,” there will necessarily be a “you” and consequently there will be 
the specific fear that is fueled by duality… through this fear, we construct dualities such as 
identical and different, male and female, powerful and weak, ruling and submitting, belonging 
and exclusion, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong. As a result, unless the ego orientation is 
balanced by a corresponding amount of social consciousness, the hear skills of love, 
compassion and devotion are perverted into passion obsession with power and greed”. (2013, 
217) 
 
Pondering over the actual title of the deal, the “Four Towns Agreement” strongly 
asserts a physicality and a locality. In that sense, it is a very physical agreement, one that 
can be marked on a map. It asserts land as the pivotal point of the agreement among 
the parties to the conflict. In the mainstream reading of the conflict episode, the theme 
of security was translated into images and representations of ‘our’ and ‘their’ land. As 
such, these territorial representations conflate the imbalances in the themes with the 
imbalances in the layers. “The layers come much closer to dispelling illusions of 
representations and provide a systematic structure to seeing the epicenter beyond 
evident manifestations” (Echavarría Álvarez 2018, 122). 
The evident manifestation of the conflict episode – the securitization of the “Four 
Towns Agreement” – conflates the three layers (sexual-familial, socio-emotional-
communal, and the mental-societal) with security concerns. As such, the spiritual or 
policitary layers are not recognized. To better understand this, I will use the following 
section to explain the land dogma of the nation-state, which is used as the vehicle for 
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the construction of the “Four Towns Agreement.” As previously mentioned, the 
overemphasis on security implies a peace driven by fear, scarcity and starvation; fear 
from the communal belonging of IDPs from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah, 
scarcity and inequity of resources for the living, and starvation for growth, for 
accumulation and for power. In each of these, there appears to be an obsession with 
fear and an attachment and a sense of ownership to the towns in specific, and to Syria 
in general. The “Four Towns Agreement” is an expression of an imbalanced system and 
the trope of ‘land’ is an entry point through which to understand the deeper issues at 
play.   
 
5.1.1. Land Trafficking  
 
“Land is a relation of property, a finite resource that is distributed, allocated and owned, a 
political-economic question. Land is a resource over which there is competition. Terrain is a 
relation of power, with a heritage in geology and the military, the control of which allows the 
establishment and maintenance of order. As a ‘field’, a site of work or battle, it is a political-
strategic question. Territory is something that is both of these, and more than these. Territory 
must be approached in itself rather than through territoriality, and in relation to land and 
terrain. Each can, of course, be read in what appears to be non-political ways: land as an 
aesthetic category; terrain in a scientific register; territory as the mere outcome of 
territoriality. Yet each of these is shot through with relations of power. There is a political 
economy to the environment, a political strategy to the impact of technology, and an 
understated politics to territoriality”. (Elden 2010, 804) 
 
Hoebel (1949) emphasizes the significance of land by positioning it as the basis of 
human existence, and the single most important object of property. “All societies are 
territorially based, and most sustenance is drawn from the soil, either directly or 
indirectly” (Hoebel 1949, 331). In the Grundrisse, Marx (1973) recognizes that the 
emergence of land as a taxable asset was cemented by the creation of the modern 
nation-state. As such, Marx asserts that “the relation to the earth as property is always 
mediated through occupation of the land and soil, peacefully or violently” (1973, 485). 
Similarly, Lefebvre (1991) suggests that land is not limited solely to agriculture, but also 
to the subsoil and its resources; land is also the relationship between a nation-state and 
a territory. “And hence also absolute politics and political strategy” (Lefebvre 1991, 
375). According to Anderson (1974), ownership of land and power are strongly linked. 
Given that land is a scarce resource that cannot be created, the distribution and 
redistribution of land is a significant economic and political concern for power 
(Anderson 1974).  
Anderson asserts that conflict over land represents the struggle over its possession 
and the physical terrain on which the struggle takes place (1974). Terrain is the actual 
physical land that is sought to be occupied, and hence gains a strategic-military 
significance wherein terrain becomes concerned with security, management and 
territorial cohesion. Therefore, terrain is land that has political and military significance. 
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In his paper Land, Terrain and Territory, Elden (2010) claims that the etymology of the 
English word ‘territory,’ its French equivalent, territoire, and other related terms derive 
from the Latin territorium. Although it is a very rare term in classical Latin, its standard 
definition in the Middle Ages “is the land belonging to a town or another entity such as 
a religious order” (Elden 2010, 806). However, Elden asserts that there are disputes 
around the etymology of territorium, where some writers understand territorium not as a 
place around a town but rather as a place from which people are frightened. As such, 
territorium derives from Latin terrere, which means to frighten, and is itself derived from 
Greek trein, which means to be afraid and flee. This makes the term territory associated 
with fear and violence. “Creating a bounded space is already a violent act of exclusion 
and inclusion; maintaining it as such requires constant vigilance and the mobilization of 
threat; and challenging it necessarily entails a transgression” (Elden 2009, xxx).  
Foucault (2007) explains that territory is both a geographical and a political notion, 
one that is encompassed and entrenched by concepts of power. He asserts that the 
strong association between certain spaces being geographical and strategic “is only 
natural since geography grew up in the shadow of the military” (Foucault 2007, 177). As 
such, Foucault notes that the explicit linkage between geography and the military 
becomes inscribed within the material soil and within forms of discourse that we exist 
upon. Doyle and Bennet (2002) recognize the reductionist materialistic understanding 
of terrain and therefore argue that terrain also encompasses the human interaction with 
the earth. Elden (2010) adds that in the mainstream reading of terrain, it comes to be 
perceived as a virtual landscape, one that is devoid of life; references are made to cities 
but not to those living there.  
In light of this explanation, the “Four Towns Agreement” reveals a thoroughly 
contemplated and organized method of dealing with land, where the four towns are 
resources that are controlled, gained, and exchanged. The officials who brokered the 
agreement perceive the four towns, Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah, as 
strategic political terrain. What this achieves is a sentiment that ‘land’ is no longer a 
source of living and a resource for living, but a platform for plotting and for expanding 
(Al Shami 2016). Given the strong association between the state and its spatial 
territorial definition, the evacuation of the people from the four towns strengthens the 
geographical container of the responsible parties. In addition, Al Shami (2016) notes 
that forced displacement sounds very clinical and “it doesn’t capture the horror and 
heartache, the dislocation as families are severed from their lives.”   
In the mental-societal layer, the Cartesian mind navigates the conflict episode 
towards a rational and mechanistic solution. On a rational level, the main premises of 
the “Four Towns Agreement” – uplifting sieges, evacuation of besieged people and 
wounded individuals, and the exchange and release of prisoners and bodies – is surely a 
desirable outcome. However, clarifying the episode along the axes of what, who, where, 
when, how and why, reveals that the “Four Towns Agreement” entailed much deeper 
engineered changes than the main premises mentioned above. The agreement does not 
start with an evacuation and release of people and prisoners, and does not end in the 
resettlement or integration of these individuals into new homes. Expressed as a material 
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clash in the conflict episode, the mental-societal layer demonstrates the need for control 
and domination, which carries linkages to absolute end-states and violence.  
For example, the reconciliation process based on Legislative Decree No. 15 
stipulated that those who turn themselves in and surrender their weapons are given 
amnesty (UNHRC 2017). This calculated modern ‘reconciliation’ allowed officials to 
categorize the fighting-age male population of the four towns on the basis of allegiance. 
In effect, it filtered males aged 18 to 45 into two categories: wanted individuals, who if 
remain, risk detention, and those who agree to reconcile and are allowed to stay in their 
towns.  
While the latter group is allowed to stay, they are forced to serve in governmental 
units. As such, in the mental-societal layer, forced reconciliation and forced 
conscription can be seen as intended to reach an absolute end-state of territorial 
cohesion. In effect, what this achieves is a reconsolidated base of territorial support for 
the government in Aleppo. Moreover, as previously mentioned, there were negotiation 
efforts to add the evacuation of three more towns, YBB, and the Yarmouk Camp, to 
the “Four Towns Agreement.” This demonstrates the extent to which the deal is a 
platform from which to conduct political-strategic changes to the land (UNHRC 2017).  
 
5.2. The Socioemotional-Communal Layer: Internal 
Homelessness 
 
“Evacuation. It sounds like a humanitarian operation. The word conceals its brutality. 
Haunting drone footage shows a seemingly endless convoy of ambulances and green buses 
snaking their way through a destroyed and desolate wasteland. Those who leave their homes, 
the city of their childhoods, may never return. This is the Syrian Nakba. It’s a trauma both 
individual and collective. And its impact will be felt by generations to come”. (Al Shami 2016) 
 
Following this discussion on land, it is clear that what the agreement overlooks is 
precisely what Doyle and Bennet (2002) and Elden (2010) are concerned with: that land 
comes to be perceived as a devoid space, empty of people. Essentially, what any 
evacuation entails is the movement and displacement of people. After the 
implementation phase of the “Four Towns Agreement,” a total of 2,900 people from 
Madaya and Az-Zabadani became internally displaced in the Idleb governorate; and a 
total of 8,000 were uprooted from Idleb to the Aleppo governorate. Hence, between 
the April 13 and April 19, 2017, 10,900 people became IDPs in Syria as a result of the 
“Four Towns Agreement.” 
Lederach and Lederach (2010) explore the metaphorical meanings of the term 
‘internally displaced persons’ or ‘IDPs’ in their book When Blood and Bones Cry Out. They 
argue that from a modern perspective, the term functions as a category to account for 
people forced to flee their homes and communities, but remain in the boundaries of 
their nation (Lederach and Lederach 2010). This category assists international agencies 
and governments to organize their data and count people eligible for assistance, and to 
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track their mobility. What is particular about their discussion is that they unfold the 
linguistic structure of ‘IDPs,’ and unearth the lived experiences of those who find 
themselves in that category. Lederach and Lederach (2010) argue that in settings of 
violence, people look for physical spaces and mechanisms for protection. Violence 
produces a sense of internal insecurity, which largely shapes the way people react and 
perceive the world. The pain that results from this displacement reveals itself in the 
need for social belonging and recognition, all of which feed into the socioemotional-
communal layer.     
Following the ECM principle of correspondence, the socioemotional-communal 
layer attends to the intrapersonal need for belonging and the interpersonal aspects of 
ego, dynamism, expansion and determination, with the latter representing the manipura 
chakra. Beyond our families and intimate relationships, we all aspire to feel recognized 
and respected in our communities. Being deprived of social interaction that fosters 
recognition to our attributes causes emotional harm to the “persona in her ego-aspects” 
(Echavarría Álvarez 2014a, 66). As such, recognition for our positions allows us to find 
our place and belonging in our community, which promotes dynamic equilibrium of the 
system.  
The “Four Towns Agreement” provides a context in which the geographical land of 
communities attends to a sense of location, meaning and lived reality. The four towns 
of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah are much more than the physical space 
they occupy. They are communities of people, of homes, and of memories. What makes 
these towns communities is not only their spatial structures but the relationality of their 
people and the tender fragility of human connections. But what happens when 
individuals lose their community? What happens when individuals are unable to find 
their place in their new community?  
In the socioemotional-communal layer, land comes to mean something different 
than in the mental-societal layer. In Atkinson’s Trauma Trails (2002), she explores 
healing among aboriginal Australians and describes the relation between place and 
belonging. “Land holds the stories of human survival across many generations. Land 
shapes people just as people shape their countries” (Atkinson 2002, 27). She explains 
that ‘place’ is not only a geographic and time/space location, but it also links to people 
finding themselves, and creating a sense of location, name and meaning. In The 
Dictionary of Human Geography, Gregory describes home as “an emotive place and spatial 
imaginary that encompasses lived experiences of everyday, domestic life alongside a 
wider sense of being and belonging in the world” (2009, 253). As such, people derive a 
sense of belonging and connection from their land.  
In the mental-societal layer, ‘land’ is discussed without references to the homes and 
the people who live there. In the process of uprooting people from the four towns of 
Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah, displacement is discussed as the movement 
of the people into the geography of war statistics. In the socio-emotional-communal 
layer, the organizing category of IDPs sheds light on the lived experiences of people 
forced to flee their homes, “the abyss of people with no place, neither refugee nor 
functioning citizen” (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 36). 
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As such, the socio-emotional-communal layer allows us to capture the complex 
social realities of people displaced by the “Four Towns Agreement.” Lederach and 
Lederach (2010) describe the journey of discovery that internally displaced persons find 
themselves in. On a first level, displacement refers to the physical loss of place and 
land. On a second level, although IDPs remain in the same country, displaced 
communities feel lost in a country “that is familiar but no longer known” (Lederach and 
Lederach 2010, 59). Displacement sets people on a journey to locate oneself and their 
lives which “requires them to find a place to ‘land and live’ and to ‘discover and find’ 
who they are in this new landscape” (ibid, 59). In other words, displacement begins a 
process of recovery for a sense of belonging that they once had. At another level, 
rediscovering one’s place sets forth a process of relocating a sense of purpose; finding a 
place to land in, to arrive, and settle in; a place to latch meaning to one’s bearings, and 
signs that one can pin meaning onto.  
In Arabic, internally displaced persons is المشردين داخليا, which translates literally into 
‘internal homelessness.’ Lederach and Lederach (2010) explain that IDPs are not only 
internally displaced in their own country, but that they also feel displaced within 
themselves. The inability to locate oneself in a given setting means that people do not 
feel grounded in their lived experiences. Psychologically, and spiritually, the search for 
place and meaning is a deep inner process, which, when found, contributes to a sense 
of grounding and health. In many ways, this diverges from the mental-societal 
understanding of land, which derives a relation of power from spaces. In the socio-
emotional-communal layer, belonging and rootedness derive from land. “It is 
constructed around physical and figurative locations; the nurturing of a land, digging 
deep into a sense of something that holds purpose and provides sustenance” (Lederach 
and Lederach 2010, 62). In his book Community: the Structure of Belonging, Block (2008) 
suggests that belonging requires spaces where meaningful conversations can be felt and 
heard. This allows for continuous interaction and context for social healing, where the 
“small group is the unit of transformation” (Block 2008, 93).  
A discussion about displacement in the context of the “Four Towns Agreement” 
adds to the bitter reality that when people were evacuated from the four towns, they did 
not have the choice of their final destination (UNHRC 2017). In other forms of 
displacement, people flee from violence and try to find a place to settle at a 
considerable distance from their homes. However, the IDPs from Madaya, Az-
Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah were not able to choose or to find a new meaningful place 
for themselves and their families. They rode the infamous green buses and were 
transferred to Idleb and Aleppo and were forced to confront a new reality that they had 
not chosen (Amnesty International 2017).  
That this was a forced displacement plan carefully engineered by the parties to the 
conflict reveals huge infringements to the willpower and determination of the people, 
all of which are central for the socio-emotional-communal layer. Forcibly displaced and 
forcibly relocated. And for many Syrians, the question of returning to their homes 
represents the longing to physically return to the place they once knew as home, and a 
spiritual return to the purpose and meaning that their lives carried.  
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Those who find themselves in the category of IDPs from the four towns find that 
they were excluded from decisions that shaped their futures (Amnesty International 
2017). Those who were evacuated by the “Four Towns Agreement” were prevented 
from occupying their space and from exercising their willpower over their future. This 
produces blockages in the socio-emotional-communal layer particularly because those 
who were evacuated could not keep, find, or recover their place in the process of the 
“Four Towns Agreement.” According to Al Souriya Net (2017), the people from 
Kafreya and Foah felt that they were made part of a trade deal, where their evacuation 
was not cared for, nor was their final destination. As such, in desperate efforts to 
recover a sense of willpower and belonging, this can lead to actions that throw the 
system out of balance even more.  
The dynamic equilibrium of a community is maintained when the positioning of its 
members is clearly structured. Using the ECM principle of correspondence, the effects 
of disturbances to the dynamic equilibrium intrapersonally and interpersonally becomes 
visible. Dietrich (2018) explains that on an intrapersonal layer, disturbances can be 
attributed to individual trauma and wounds to the persona’s matrix. On an 
interpersonal level, blockages to the dynamic equilibrium of the system can result from 
collective trauma, rigid social structures, and the material conditions of the social world. 
By correspondence, such circumstances leave the need for belonging and affiliation 
unmet, which translates towards the outside, and disrupts the dynamic equilibrium of 
the community and that of the persona. Dietrich (2018) asserts that this can develop 
into a never-ending cycle of violence that is self-feeding and self-justifying.  
Beyond a certain limit, frustrated needs of affiliation that become solidified and 
entrenched into an imbalanced system intrapersonally and interpersonally can generate 
destructive behaviors. In the socioemotional-communal layer, given that there are more 
self-regulating factors involved than in the sexual-familial layer, communal dysfunctions 
are slower to be triggered. However, owing to the fact that conflicts in the 
socioemotional-communal layer are rooted in communal prejudices, their destructive 
energies and dysfunctions are long-lasting within their respective communities. And 
given that self-regulation encompasses more actors, when communities get out of 
balance they also release more destructive energy collectively. Therefore, physical 
violence is the destructive symptom of the manipura chakra. In Bali, the term amok, 
which is understood globally today, is used to describe the disturbance of homeostasis 
in the socioemotional-communal layer. “Originally from Bali, the term describes the 
kind of desolate constitution in correspondence with the intrapersonal emotional and 
interpersonal social layers that leads to the raging annihilation of self and others” 
(Dietrich 2018, 66).  
With respect to the “Four Towns Agreement,” the destructive aspect of the 
socioemotional-communal layer is highlighted in the attack on the evacuation convoy 
on April 15, 2017. Upon the arrival of both groups (from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, and 
Kafreya, Foah) to their respective transit points, disputes between the parties to the 
conflict resulted in a 12-hour delay. Evacuees, who were forced to leave their homes 
and were waiting to reach homes which they had not chosen, waited on the evacuation 
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buses. They were scared and hungry. In al-Rashideen transit point, where evacuation 
buses from Kafreya and Foah were waiting, two vehicles approached and started 
distributing snacks. The area was under NSAG control, and those who were guarding 
the buses encouraged the evacuees from Kafreya and Foah to go and collect the food. 
In the unfortunate hours that followed, one of the cars exploded, killing 125 people, 
including at least 67 children, 13 women and 16 men, and the wounding of 413 people 
including 58 children, and seven humanitarian workers (UNOCHA 2017b).  
No party has yet claimed responsibility of the attack. The UNHRC (2017) attest that 
the attack took place in a NSAG-controlled area and that the explosive car approached 
from NSAG loyal land, which hints that the NSAGs are responsible for the attack 
against the Shiite evacuees from Kafreya and Foah. Regardless who committed the 
attack, the socioemotional-communal layer aids us in understanding that those 
responsible for the April 15 amok have experienced exclusion themselves. The attack 
reveals deeply rooted feelings of loss, of fear, and of lack of willpower in the face of an 
agreement that would not allow them to keep, find or recover their place in their 
communities. This leads to the creation of shallow alliances and pseudo-communities 
amongst those who experience exclusion and loss of place. This pushes the system out 
of balance even further, deepening the disturbances of the dynamic equilibrium. This 
makes violence “negatively resilient, bouncing back [at the community] with new and 
old faces” (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 45). Hence, unwittingly a ceasefire and an 
evacuation, which are premises of the “Four Towns Agreement,” do not stop the 
violence, but lead to strengthening existing imbalances and create new ones.  
 
5.3. The Sexual-Familial Layer: Family Separation 
 
In the aftermath of the April 15 attack, 45 wounded individuals who were receiving 
medical treatment were kidnapped by the NSAGs. Following high-level negotiations, 
some hostages were released in a prisoner exchange of a high-ranking NSAG official 
and the wounded individuals from Kafreya and Foah. At least 15 people are still 
missing, including a four-year old child (UNOCHA 2017b). This incident is another 
face of the destructive aspect of the manipura chakra in the socioemotional-communal 
layer, and points us in the direction of the sexual-familial layer.  
The sexual-familial layer in ECM reflects the muladhara and svadisthana chakra in 
Yoga philosophy. The security of family origin and sexuality are key factors under this 
layer. Sexuality is life energy and influences all aspects of our behavior. Dietrich (2013) 
explains that owing to impulses of sexual attraction and rejection, sexuality also emerges 
as a strong desire to adapt. To maintain the security of the sexual energy, trust is central 
since it is a product of human relationships and the deep acknowledgement of personal 
experiences.  
In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” trust bears great weight for those 
who were evacuated from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah. In light of this, it is 
important to consider whether families trusted the agreement and whether their fears of 
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building new homes were acknowledged. This becomes accentuated when observing 
the 15th April attack and kidnapping of 45 wounded individuals by NSAGs. To some 
extent, families who rode the evacuation buses had trust that their relocation to new 
communities was safer than remaining in their towns and risking detention (UNHRC 
2017). To some extent, the families who evacuated together trusted that they would 
settle in their final location together (ibid).  
With the events of the April 15 attack, the trust of families was broken. Families 
were killed, wounded, and kidnapped. Family origins were broken and ties between 
families were lost. This leaves an open wound for the families of martyrs and of the 
missing who lost their communities, are now lost in their own country, and have now 
lost their relatives. Their rights of mourning are compromised in their new 
communities. And they are faced with mourning the absence and unknown fate of 
someone they once loved. It is a continuous trauma, specifically because they cannot 
really ‘land or settle’ in their new community without knowing the fate of their missing 
family members. ‘Who are we’ as a family in this new community and after having lost 
parts of our family?  In that sense, the sexual-familial and socioemotional-communal 
layer intercept and culminate the lived relationships of mistrust and social insecurity, as 
experienced by the community and by the individual families.  
Not knowing whether those who are missing are dead or alive leaves the families in 
a state of limbo where relocating a sense of location and meaning is always tarred by the 
absence of their missing family members (Helmi 2013). The families suffer the pain of 
waiting to hear from or about their missing loved ones and waiting to be reunited 
(Ghazi 2015). In their 2018 report on enforced disappearances in Syria, the two Syrian 
civil society organizations Dawlaty and Women Now for Development conducted 
interviews with families of the missing. In one of the testimonies collected, one woman 
whose husband was detained and was later killed, says:  
 
“The world has turned black. I could not have a sense of myself, I mean I felt like I was 
dreaming, could not believe that it had happened. I used to sit and wait for him. Even the 
days, I used to count them one by one. Today for example it has been 322 days, and the 
other day, it has been 250 days, and I count day by day”. (39) 
 
It is a daily struggle to maneuver through their lives as displaced individuals part of a 
displaced community from Kafreya and Foah and be confronted with a reality in which 
they are unable to settle or to move on. Their lives are on pause. The wound remains 
open, and becomes deeper with each passing day of not knowing the fate of their 
missing loved ones. There is a deep metaphoric structure which is active and resonates 
in families of those disappeared by conflict. Families have a need and a right to know 
the fate of their loved ones, and a need and right to memorialization (International 
Commission on Missing Persons 2018). When that is taken away from them, something 
deeply imbalanced is born. How can families recreate meaning and belonging in their 
new communities in the absence of their loved ones? Blockages of trust and creativity 
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in the sexual-familial layer emerge and attend to more than one aspect of their lived 
reality as families displaced by war and as families of the missing. 
 
“It is not as if an “I” exists independently over here and then simply loses a “you” over there 
especially if the attachment to “you” is part of what composes who “I” am. If I lose you, 
under these conditions, then I not only mourn the loss, but I become inscrutable to myself. 
Who “am” I, without you? When we lose some of these ties by which we are constituted, we 
do not know who we are or what to do”. (Butler 2004, 22). 
 
In the sexual-familial layer, sexuality also asserts itself as the “the need to be liked in the 
most intimate relations, to impress, to be loved, to be appreciated and receive 
affection” (Dietrich 2018, 62). In the case of the families of the missing, and families 
who have lost family members in the conflict, family separation refers to any 
relationship or intimacy they once had with the person who has been killed or 
disappeared. Dietrich (2018) argues that in the sexual-familial layer, given the creative 
power of sexuality, there lies great potential for transformation. However, in the 
context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” sexual frustration and a need for intimacy 
blocks the creative energy that is associated with sexuality.  
Family separation will inevitably affect the life and future of those families and the 
many generations to come. What does it mean to lose a father, a sister, a son? What 
does it mean to wait for a mother or a brother to return home? Ultimately, it is such 
traumatic experiences which make and unmake Syria the reality that it is. People die. 
And they leave families behind who mourn them every day. This layer is incredibly 
significant for the understanding of the “Four Towns Agreement” since it highlights 
the lived experiences of families who have experienced loss in an already tragic context.  
 
5.3.1. Beyond the Episode: Disappearances in Syria 
 
 
The issue of disappearance brings the discussion towards another tormenting reality in 
Syria. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (2018), 95,000 people have 
been forcibly disappeared since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. This number 
includes arrests and disappearances committed by all parties to the conflict, including 
the GoS, NSAGs, Islamic factions, and the Kurdish self-administration forces, such as 
the Democratic Union Party (abbreviated as PYD) (Syrian Network for Human Rights 
2018). The Syrian Network for Human Rights has documented 14,129 cases of death 
under torture at the hands of the main conflict parties (Syrian Network for Human 
Rights 2019).  
According to a statement released by Amnesty International (2019), government 
forces have committed arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances, and subjected 
prisoners and detainees to torture (ibid). In some cases, these acts amount to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (ibid). NSAGs have also committed such violations 
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of international humanitarian law such as abductions, torture and summary killings 
(ibid). For example, in areas under HTS-control, HTS have detained hundreds of 
people who are documenting abuses or who are protesting against the rule of HTS 
(ibid).   
 
“Women, standing outside detention centers and holding photographs of their disappeared 
male relatives, have become an enduring image of suffering in Syria. It is an image which 
speaks to the essence of the violation of enforced disappearance: the taking of a loved one, 
the desperate search for information through official and unofficial channels, and the 
torment of those left behind. Those who wait are often the only visible trace of the 
violation”. (United Nations Office of the High Commisioner for Human Rights 2013, 2) 
 
According to the New York Times 2019 article on Syria’s disappeared, Barnard 
discusses the reality of disappearance in Syria in relation to the time of Hafez al-Asaad, 
and calls it “the expanding gulag.” Barnard recounts the 1982 Hama events, when the 
regime arrested tens of thousands of people (2019). This again points to the importance 
of understanding the Syrian conflict in its historical context. Today’s prison system is 
part of a war effort to repress any civil protest or movement, and to push the 
opposition into an armed conflict that the GoS had a military advantage in (Barnard 
2019). Syrian researcher and activist, Michel Kilo, who was also a signatory to the 
Damascus Declaration of 2005, writes about the people in As-Swayda in Syria who 
experienced detention campaigns. The activists in As-Swayda released a statement 
saying that “every detainee is a martyr in the making” (Kilo 2014, translated by the 
author).  
Another family association was created in February 2017 called Families for 
Freedom (FFF). Families of the missing and the detainees came together and organized 
an influential family movement which calls on the GoS to provide families of the 
missing with information about their missing loved ones. FFF have also released a 
statement directed towards the delegations in the Astana negotiations, calling on the 
need to stop exchange prisoner deals since they are done in a tit-for-tat manner, and 
does not address the issue of disappearance in Syria (FFF 2017). FFF criticize the 
prisoner-exchange method since the prisoners that are chosen for these deals always 
involve high-level figures (2017). FFF also implore parties to move the file of detainees 
and missing away from military negotiations in Astana (2017). In a recent ICRC event 
in Colombo dedicated to the issue of the missing, the head of the delegation gave a 
speech where he addressed the effects of having missing family members:  
 
“Behind every missing person there is a family…the families of missing persons are living in 
uncertainty and have little outlet for their anguish. Communities are profoundly affected by 
the disappearance of persons, as the suffering of individuals weighs heavily on the 
community as a whole”. (ICRC 2019) 
 
Family therapist Pauline Boss introduced the concept of “ambiguous loss” to describe 
the experience of families of the missing (1999). She based the majority of her study on 
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families of American soldiers who went missing during the Vietnam war. Boss (1999) 
explains that when people disappear mysteriously, the inability for families to say 
goodbye continues to affect generations to come. When families do not experience 
seeing the body of a loved one who has died, they face difficult challenges about the 
presence or the absence of the person.  
Going back to the “Four Towns Agreement,” there are parallels that can be drawn. 
Following the kidnapping of the 45 injured individuals, high-level negotiations led to a 
prisoner exchange deal where the GoS released a high-level NSAG official in return for 
the release of 30 of those wounded (UNOCHA 2017b). Again, this reveals the 
mechanistic meeting of a demand. It also shows, following FFF’s demand, that prisoner 
exchange deals are sealed when the release of high-level figures are involved. 
Disturbances to the system are reconciled using mechanistic rationality, without tending 
to the relational aspects of family separation.  
Noura Ghazi, who is a member of FFF, also founded her own organization 
NoPhotozone which works on the issue of detention and enforced disappearance in 
Syria. NoPhotozone was created to provide legal aid and support to families of the 
missing and “to shed light on the stories that our eyes are not allowed to see, tales of 
arrest and torture, the tales of oppression and disappearance, the anecdotes that contain 
waiting, wrench, and hope” (NoPhotozone n.d). Noura Ghazi calls it an “open wound” 
that no political agreement can heal. Within these initiatives, storytelling becomes a 
form of resistance that preserves stories and tales that the regime seeks to hide. Noura 
Ghazi founded NoPhotozone for the legacy of her husband Bassel Khartabil who was 
detained, disappeared and later on, executed by the regime.   
Noura Ghazi and Bassel Khartabil met during a protest in Douma in April 2011. 
They planned to marry a year after meeting for the first time. However, Khartabil was 
detained by government forces on March 15, 2012; a week before their wedding. 
Nevertheless, they married while Khartabil was in Adra prison (The Telegraph 2017) 
and they soon became known as the ‘Bride and Groom of the Revolution’ (Ghazi 
2015). After his detention, his wife and other activists launched a global campaign 
demanding his release called #FreeBassel. Khartabil was a software developer for 
international companies such as Firefox and Creative Commons. He was an advocate 
for “open culture” and open source programming and sharing knowledge across the 
world. He saw the importance of the internet to connect cultures. In 2009, he co-
organized an event called Open Art and Technology at the University of Damascus 
where speakers from Creative Commons were invited. It was the first open culture 
event in Syria. Khartabil was seen as starting a digital revolution in Syria.  
The campaign was adopted by internet companies such as Mozilla (McAllister 
2012), Global Voices (Global Voices 2012), and Creative Commons (Creative 
Commons 2012). Others joined in the campaign and issued statements calling for the 
release of Khartabil such as Al Jazeera and Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch. On November 26, 2012 Foreign Policy named Khartabil one of the top 100 
global thinkers (2012). In 2013, while still in detention, Creative Commons awarded 
him the Index on Censorship’s Digital Freedom Award (Creative Commons 2013).  
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In October 2015, Khartabil was transferred from Adra prison to an unknown 
location. His whereabouts remained unknown to his friends and family for two years. 
In August 2017, his wife, Noura Ghazi, discovered that her husband was executed a 
few days after his transfer in 2015. Many initiatives were created in his legacy including 
Ghazi’s NoPhotozone Organization which supports families of the missing, and 
Creative Common’s Bassel Khartabil Fellowship which supports individuals working on 
open internet communities (Bassel Khartabil Website n.d.).  
As such, these stories continue to live in the collective and social memory of Syrians 
(Sharbaji 2016). The repercussions of the “Four Towns Agreement” go well beyond the 
dates of its implementation. For example, on December 9, 2018, two activists from 
Madaya, who were part of the “Four Towns Agreement” were arrested in Idleb by 
HTS. Hussam Mahmud and Hassan Younis, 30 and 27 years old respectively, were 
disappeared by an HTS patrol. Hassan’s brother, Bakir Younes, was arrested two days 
later as well. Four days later, prominent media activist from Madaya, Amjad Al Maleh, 
was arrested. Before his arrest, Amjad had started to establish a center for forcibly 
displaced families in Idleb. This could be the potential reason for his arrest. Following 
the arrests, HTS took the personal belongings of Amjad and Hussam from their house, 
including computers and mobiles. Amjad, Hussam, Hassan and Bakir were prominent 
media activists from Madaya, who were advocating for the life of the siege on Madaya 
(Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 2017, SCM 2017 and SCM n.d, Syrians for 
Truth and Justice 2018). Their whereabouts are still unknown.  
Returning back to the “Four Towns Agreement,” this second incident of 
disappearance, which is directly linked to the conflict episode, shows that the agreement 
was not done in a static place and time, with a clear beginning and end. The 
repercussions are strong, and continue after the agreement was deemed as ‘officially 
over.’ The lived experiences of the families continue to be affected. The agreement does 
not live in a vacuum. It continues to live in the daily lives of the families from the four 
towns. This brings the discussion towards another ECM layer, wherein space and time 
are experienced as a continuum, transcending death and climaxing in the unity of 
humans in the all-oneness. In the spiritual-policitary layer, all aspects of the ego from 
the previously mentioned layers fade away; power, greed, willpower, love and hate 
subside, making way for silence and unconditional love towards everything, free of 
judgement. 
 
5.4. The Spiritual-Policitary Layer: Reconnections  
 
Who could live, who could breathe, 
If there were not this inner glow of bliss? 
                             Taittiriya-Upanishad (in Dietrich 2012, 16) 
 
In the spiritual-policitary layer, we shift our attention beyond individual and conscious 
aspects of the ego. Given that this sphere lies outside the realm of self-awareness, it is 
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difficult to find the words, grammar and semantics of modern language to describe 
them. While modern and postmodern schools of thought have excluded this sphere, 
transrational peace research includes it in its epistemological interest. Despite that the 
Cartesian mind cannot observe or prove these aspects, nevertheless the trans-egoic 
spheres influence the conflict episodes in ways that cannot be ignored (Dietrich 2018). 
The spiritual-policitary layer refers to the visuddha in yoga philosophy and refers to our 
human aspects that lie outside of our mental or societal self-understanding. Most yoga 
systems go beyond the visuddha chakra and define the sahasrara chakra as the seventh 
one, which refers to the all-one. Within the ECM layer system, this would translate to 
the universal layer, the epicenter. 
“Spatio-temporal awareness is intrapersonally positioned in front of the mental, 
emotional, sexual and physical aspects of being human in the same way that 
interpersonally it is positioned in front of the societal, communal and family aspects” 
(Dietrich 2018, 72). Dietrich (2018) explains that dynamic equilibrium in this layer is 
equally important as in the others. In the spiritual-policitary layer, blockages emerge 
from dogmas in the socioemotional-communal and mental-societal layers that perceive 
humans as egoistic beings. Nevertheless, with spiritual-policitary spheres, humans are 
perceived as experiencing feeling, thinking and doing in ways that are different from the 
individual or collective dogmas existing in the world. As such, this different way of 
being in the world is not fearful over its existence and allows humans to be connected 
in the unity of being. Dietrich (2018) argues that it is specifically this connection that 
has healed the influence of the Cartesian sphere, and stopped the mind from its 
capability to destroy the planet.  
 
5.4.1. The Pain of the Laws 
 
“Having expelled whole communities en masse from numerous Syrian cities and towns, a 
new law now allows the Assad regime to confiscate their properties, rendering their 
displacement permanent and radically transforming the country’s demography”. (Al Shami 
2018) 
 
The destructive force of spiritual crises emerges from efforts to solidify, interpret, and 
translate spiritual realms using rationality. That is, when spirituality is institutionalized 
into the episode, destructive energies are transferred into the rational and relational 
actions in individual, family, communal and societal contexts. In the context of the 
“Four Towns Agreement,” the pain of the laws envisaged and implemented distorts the 
relationships between people, and between people and land. This opens up a discussion 
on the energetic relationship of the interconnectedness of all beings.  
Dietrich (2012) argues that peace begins in oneself, which shapes the relationship to 
other human beings, but also to all other creatures including animals, nature and the 
universe. Since energetic practices of peace assume a plurality of truths, societal 
questions are not configured by law, but by the relations of those involved. As such, all 
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decisions are made by taking into consideration the consequences of a decision on the 
relations between humans. Given that this is the first criterion, ethics and norms 
intended to help people orient themselves.  
In light of this, the pain of the laws inflicted by the “Four Towns Agreement” 
points us towards the ways in which they have distorted and dismantled the 
relationships. The first criterion for the configuration of the “Four Towns Agreement” 
and its associated rules has been the immortality of the conflict parties. The “Four 
Towns Agreement” functions as a prescribed formula for power, while diminishing 
prospects for reconciliation. For example, the GoS took legislative action to confiscate 
land following the evacuation deal (Al Shami 2018, UNHRC 2017). When people leave 
behind their homes to be transferred to their final destinations, the GoS takes 
possession of their left-behind homes and properties. The GoS has also dispossessed 
those transferred by the evacuation deal with the ability to register new properties 
where it now requires in-person registration, making it virtually impossible for many 
evacuees to do so because of the severity of the fighting countrywide (Al Shami 2018, 
UNHRC 2017).  
The GoS issued Law No. 10 on April 2, 2018 (SANA News 2018) which authorizes 
local administrative units within governorates, cities and towns to register property 
ownership within their jurisdiction. The law gives private property owners 30 days to 
register and provide proof of ownership. Otherwise, the GoS confiscates the land or 
property without compensation. The government asserted that his law would allow the 
redevelopment of areas damaged by war. Al-Shami (2018) argues that this inevitably 
allows the GoS to confiscate land and property in opposition-areas and prevent the 
return of people. Al Shami (2018) compares Law No. 10 to Israel’s Absentee Property 
Law of 1950 which authorized Israel to confiscate property from Palestinians who were 
forced out of their homes, and hence, transferring private property to Israel. “In this 
case the state wants to transfer property away from communities it will never be able to 
rule through consent, into the hands of loyalists” (Al Shami 2018). Essentially, what this 
portrays is the skewed mechanistic relationship with land. 
In addition, Syria’s reconstruction is estimated at more than $250 billion (Al Shami 
2018). Al Shami (2018) notes that the regime will reward its allies through 
reconstruction efforts, and the material incentives found therein. Going back to 
Wedeen’s (1999) arguments, the regime has continuously rewarded loyalty with material 
benefits, and as such, Al Shami infers that reconstruction will allow the GoS to 
strengthen its political and economic power base (2018). For example, the GoS issued 
Decree No. 19 in May 2015 which granted local administrative units the authorization 
to begin reconstruction work and in return, they would be exempt from taxes (Al Shami 
2018). As a result, public assets were transferred to private businesses owned by those 
loyal to the regime (ibid).  
I believe it brings us to great proximity to the epicenter of the conflict; the seat 
where the conflictive energy settles and intertwines, and fuels the episode of the 
conflict. It is the disconnection between Syrians themselves and between Syrians and 
their imagined Syria and the rest of the world that instigates much of the conflict; the 
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strong need for owning and attaching to the land, for imagining pseudo-communities 
that rage in violence, and for mourning what rightly belonged to life.  
The question of nature, land, and territorialization are at the heart of my discussion 
on belonging, loss, politics, and power. In drawing from Deleuze and Guattari’s work, 
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987), Étienne Balibar understands 
territorialization as assigning “‘identities’ for collective subjects within structures of 
power, therefore to categorialize and individualize human beings [...]” (2004, 4). Edward 
Said (1987) in his conceptualization of orientalism explains imagined boundaries and 
the mentally constructed and territorialized identities. The moment an ‘us’ is created, a 
boundary with ‘them’ is drawn, regardless the proximity or distance between the two. 
“It is enough for ‘us’ to set up these boundaries in our own minds; ‘they’ become ‘they’ 
accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from 
‘ours’” (Said 1978, 54). In their work, Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
explain that understanding entities, space, or land as bounded territories 
 
“[...] allows us to refer to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect of it, see it as a cause, act 
with respect to it, and perhaps even believe that we understand it. Ontological metaphors like 
this are necessary for attempting to deal rationally with our experiences”. (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 26) 
 
While ontological metaphors are important to know the world by categorization and 
distinction, they blur the gray area where the dynamic and emergent properties of the 
world are connected. They make the connections invisible.  
 
“When the Mind separates and draws barriers in the heart of...dualities, and the barrier 
becomes a real barrier so that there is no longer porous space for breathing, then you have 
dualism and then you have things cut off that should belong together and that’s the heart of 
all fundamentalisms and fascisms. And I think that keeping one’s imagination alive always 
keeps you in vital conversation with the othernesses that you tend to avoid or neglect”. 
(O’Donohue 2015) 
 
Therefore, this invites us to imagine our world beyond binary identity formations. The 
rupture of society and the questions we are confronted with in the “Four Towns 
Agreement” in specific and Syria in general, attests to the significance of finding and 
recovering a sense of home amidst this homelessness. Going back to the term 
‘internally displaced persons,’ a term which, on the mental-societal and socioemotional-
communal layer designates a temporary relationship to citizenship and belonging, gains 
a new depth in the spiritual-policitary layer. “The possibility of being both literally 
housed and being at-home-in-the-world, at home in our bodies, and at home together”. 
(Metzger-Traber 2017, 21) 
 
“What is home in a time of enforced exile, the age of the refugee? What can the expression to 
dwell mean in the era of homelessness? How is home to be construed when the 
circumambient world of life-giving elements—elements in the ancient pre-Socratic sense: 
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earth, air, fire, water—have become sources of pollution or death, in this age of 
environmental collapse and apocalyptic weaponry?” (Wyschogrod 1997, 187 in Metzger-
Traber 2017, 3) 
 
In their seminal book Ecofeminism, Shiva and Mies (1993) distinguish between different 
modes of mobility within globalization. “One group is mobile on a world scale, with no 
country no home, but the whole world as its property, the other has lost even the 
mobility within rootedness, lives in refugee camps, resettlement colonies and reserves” 
(Mies and Shiva 1993, 98, in Braidotti 2006, 60). Yet, the spiritual-policitary layer invites 
us to perceive how intimately connected we are across the different experiences of 
mobility. Thus, the concern of home and belonging is a spiritual connection to life, our 
families, and earth. In his phenomenological anthropology book At Home in the World, 
Michael D. Jackson (1995) asserts that the world is witnessing an era of uprootedness, 
where very few people live where they were born. This shows that the question of 
home and belonging affects us all, and is open for re-definition.  
As such, in this section I am using the tools of modernity and postmodernity, where 
they reach their limit, and inquiring into ways in which we would apply the energetic 
principles of harmonization to connect to something larger than an anthropocentric 
perspective. In this part of the book, I am particularly weary of disrespecting the 
visceral loss of home, of entertaining unanswerable human conundrums with 
intellectual violence. And yet, I do believe that a feeling of grounded 
interconnectedness, and the rekindled connection with the all-one makes our belonging 
in the world held by the composition of our ecological selves. For me, this is very 
difficult terrain that I am treading on. I do not want to insinuate disrespect for the 
political homes and the larger political implications that this holds for those involved in 
the “Four Towns Agreement.” What I would like to endeavor is to ask: what happens if 
the intimate body, land, neighborhood, even climate, are felt as interconnected? 
Following this line of thought, I think life becomes a shared process of creation of our 
homes and our nation-states; a relation that we might not always see but that inevitably 
exists.   
In an effort to reconceive political belonging, I find myself thinking about our most 
immediate home – our bodies. Our bodies, whom we are always in relation with, are 
constantly shifting and changing with our breath. Breathing is a process of 
interconnection with the world. When we breathe, we come home, we arrive, we land 
and we settle. By paying attention to our breathing bodies, we are able to recover a 
sense of grounding and stillness that has transformative repercussions (Hanh 2009). As 
beautiful as this is, the “Four Towns Agreement” forces me to realize that not all of us 
are free to breathe the air we have access to. Under the difficult living conditions in 
Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah, people do not feel safe. And when people do 
not feel safe, they cannot breathe because they hold their breath, or worse, it is taken 
away from them. Koppensteiner explains that when we cannot breathe, we cannot live, 
and hence we cannot come home. Butler (2004) asserts that although our vulnerability 
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is universal, its distribution is determined by geometrics of power that ultimately are 
inscribed on our very bodies.  
 
“The ‘disposable’ bodies of women, youths and others who are racialized or marked off by 
age and marginality come to be inscribed with particularly ruthless violence in this regime of 
power. They experience dispossession of their embodied and embedded selves, in a political 
economy of repeated and structurally enforced eviction”. (Sassen 1996 in Braidotti 2006, 60) 
 
5.5. Beyond the Episode 
 
“The exile knows that in a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional. 
Borders and barriers, which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory, can also become 
prisons, are often defended beyond reason or necessity. Exiles cross borders, break barriers 
of thought and experience”. (Said 2002, 147) 
 
In many ways, the “Four Towns Agreement” represents much more than a deal sealed 
in March 2017 following negotiations between the conflict parties, under the auspices 
of Third-States, which stipulated an evacuation deal from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, 
Kafreya, and Foah. The “Four Towns Agreement” reveals a perpetual reality and 
pattern across all the towns in Syria. The pattern of poor living conditions, bombings 
and killings, loss of homes, and displacement, repeats itself over and over again. The 
epicenter of the conflict, which, as described, appears to be the mechanistic relationship 
with land and the institutionalized spirituality, bounces back at Syria in different forms 
and faces. According to Amnesty International (2017), three other ‘reconciliation’ deals 
have been implemented between August 2016 and March 2017 under the auspices of 
international sponsors. The ‘surrender or starve’ strategy has in effect led to the 
displacement of thousands of residents from the following areas: Daraya, eastern 
Aleppo city and al-Waer. While there are differences in the agreements, they follow a 
similar pattern of sieges and bombardments.  
The dominance of the mental-societal layer has shown itself in the ‘reconciliation 
deals’ signed in 2017 in Syria, but also, perhaps even more prominently, in the creation 
of ‘de-escalation zones.’ In May 2017, just two months after the signing of the “Four 
Towns Agreement,” a deal for a series of ceasefires was signed by pro-government 
states, Iran and Russia on one hand, and Turkey on another. It was signed during the 
Astana talks in the Kazakh capital, Astana. Angered by Iran’s involvement in the 
negotiations, the opposition delegates stormed out of the meeting (Al Jazeera 2017b). 
The new agreement was called ‘De-Escalation Zones’ which stipulated the cessation of 
hostilities for six months between NSAGs and GoS forces in four areas in Syria, home 
to a total of 2.5 million people (Al-Jazeera 2017b).  
 
Zone 1: Idleb province, northeastern areas of Latakia, western areas of Aleppo, and 
northern areas of Hama. These provinces are home to one million people. The 
dominant NSAG faction is linked to Al-Qaeda.  
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Zone 2: includes the two enclaves of northern Homs: Rastan and Talbiseh where 
180,000 people live. Similar to Zone 1, the network of NSAGs is dominated by Al-
Qaeda fighters.  
Zone 3: encapsulates Eastern Ghouta in the northern Damascus countryside which is 
home to 690,000 individuals and is controlled mostly by the NSAGs faction of Jaish Al-
Islam. 
Zone 4: includes the parts of Daraa and Quneitra provinces that are under NSAGs 
control. 800,000 people live in this zone.  
 
.  
Figure 6: Four de-escalation zones in Syria (Al Jazeera 2018a) 
 
Akram Al Bunni, who is a political activist in Syria and was detained for 20 years for his 
dissident ideas under Hafez al-Asaad’s rule, writes about the Astana talks in relation to 
the de-escalation zones. Al Bunni (2018) asserts that the Astana talks sidelined the 
negotiation efforts held at Geneva. Despite the latter’s inability to bring concrete steps, 
Al Bunni (2018) insists that there is a huge difference between an international 
conference which seeks to end the conflict in Syria based on Geneva’s 2012 
Communiqué, and the Astana talks which is only a means of managing the conflict 
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through third states. Al Bunni (2018) continues that the 2012 Geneva Communiqué 
aligns with the needs of Syrians, while the Astana talks are minor steps towards 
decreasing the intensity of fighting by establishing de-escalation zones. Al Bunni (2018) 
also notes that the Astana talks demonstrate international consensus of Russia 
managing the conflict in Syria. More so, it comes as a way to decrease Iran’s influence 
in the region, especially through Russia’s military gains on the ground.  
Similar to the “Four Towns Agreement,” the de-escalation zone deal was signed 
outside of Syria, and under the auspices of guarantor states, Russia, Iran and Turkey. 
Again, the strong reign of the mental-societal layer in the Syrian war is envisaged in the 
deal, especially where land is referred to as zones; zones that can be exchanged, 
destroyed, and trafficked. This again reveals the disconnection from the connection to 
earth and the land they fight so fiercely for. In its arguments supporting the agreement, 
Russia has stipulated that the cessation of hostilities in the four zones will give space for 
focused attacks against the extremist groups such as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and the IS 
(Al-Jazeera 2017). In a similar vein to the “Four Towns Agreement,” the aim of 
creating de-escalation zones is to uphold the state. The GoS will have more resources 
and weaponry to strike the extremist groups when it is not caught up simultaneously in 
clashes in other areas. Putting this in transrational terms, these measures increase the 
personal security of the GoS.  
The “Four Towns Agreement” is a lens through which to observe the inner 
dynamics of the Syrian conflict. It has ultimately shown an orchestration of violence, a 
pendulum of displacement, and the lived realities and realities lost by the war. Here lies 
the challenge of the moral imagination, as Lederach (2005) terms it, to observe the 
episode, and more generally, to observe Syria, and not to attach my judgements to it. 
But to really look at it; to really listen to it. What is it telling me? What is screaming at 
me?  
On that note, I move to the next branch of the ECM model, the levels of the 
conflict episode, and I pose the question: what are the different levels communicating 
to each other? Do they hear each other? Are there untold and hence unheard stories? 
Communication is key in this branch of the ECM since it affects the ways in which the 
levels of the conflict episode are connected and disconnected in their communication. 
The ECM levels assist in identifying the different actors and actresses who are involved 
in the conflict episode.  
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6. The Levels: The Broken Web of  





A red stripe around a beige woolen hat. 
Blanket, cheap, polyethylene or some such irritant cloth. 
Held by unseen motherly arms, his child face the center of this world, collapsing. 
Blunt nose, cartilage still strong. 
A closed mouth, one that forgot its main purpose. 
A jawline like a coast, full of sand on his tongue, water ebbing away. 
Cheeks like a crater, impact in the form of bones. 
Held up for a journalist, a photo in front of a modern looking building, clean white 
stone walls.  
The caption says… “My only dream is to have a piece of bread”. 
Have a piece of my liver, cooked in its own anger, crisp and succulent. 
Have all the balloons in my lungs, popping to find you. 
Have what is left of my imagination, 
have my sleep, and my saliva. 
Have my tears,  
There is no place for them, anymore. 
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Dietrich (2018) bases the ECM layers on Lederach’s vertical pyramid of actors for 
peacebuilding, which he originally proposed in his book Building Peace: Sustainable 
Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997). In his more recent work, The Moral Imagination, 
Lederach (2005) grounds the blueprint pyramid in a systemic understanding of conflict, 
where the distinctions between top-leadership, middle-leadership, and grassroots levels 
are hazier than clear-cut. Dietrich takes up the vertical pyramid and adapts it into his 
multi-layered model, where he proposes the symbol of the Sri-Yantra to build the 
systemic approach wherein all levels of the conflict affect and feed each other in never-
ending feedback loops (2018). 
In the early version, Lederach (1997) only perceived a conflict surface, which he 
called the conflict episode, and three levels to the vertical pyramid: the top-leadership 
level, the middle-range level, and the grassroots level (Dietrich 2018). Lederach bases 
the distinction between the levels on the two contradictory approaches that were 
popular at the time: the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This structural 
understanding of conflict sees that state leadership, “the few ‘up there,’ would manage 
for the masses ‘down there,’ in which the Middle Range Leaders were serving as 
transmitters” (Dietrich 2018, 77).  This originates in the neoliberalism of IR whose 
main concern is to engage in the cross-national conflicts of elite-governed nation states. 
With the introduction of the New Wars (Kaldor 1999) and violence being fought inside 
instead of between states, the bottom-up approach urged the governing elite to be 
responsible for the Grassroots. While the Top Leaders enjoy the clearest overview of 
the conflict, they suffer the least from the consequences of their decisions. On the 
other hand, the Grassroots suffer directly from the Top Leaders’ decisions while having 
little knowledge or influence on the situation. At structuralism’s best, the suppressed 
Grassroots compel the Top Leader oppressors to serve the best for the state. This 
would be brokered by the Middle Ranges. Lederach has crafted his model by weaving 
connections between system theory and these structuralist beginnings in order to create 
an interplay between these approaches. As such, these approaches are now connected 
by systemic feedback loops, trickling up and down across the vertical pyramid.  
Incorporating the chosen conflict episode into the levels analysis reveals that at the 
top-leadership level are the local and international decision-makers of the “Four Towns 
Agreement.” Their agenda is geared at conflict resolution and conflict management, 
making them highly inflexible. The UN, the ICRC and the SARC, who facilitated the 
evacuation, and other local organizations who took part in mediating the evacuation, 
are grossly located in the middle-range of the levels pyramid. Finally, those who directly 
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6.1. Top-Leadership Level 
 
In the top-leadership level, we find the “institutionally legitimized representatives of the 
parties to the dispute, namely the political and military leadership” (Dietrich 2018, 77). 
It also includes businesses and religious institutions. Although this level encompasses a 
small circle of people, their decisions have great influence. Individuals in this level are 
characterized by their visibility, making them highly inflexible. The approach to 
peacebuilding in this level is to achieve a cease-fire or a cessation of hostilities. From 
that, broader political and negotiation work could culminate into an agreement that 
transitions the country from war to peace. 
 
Figure 7: Actor’s Pyramid (Dietrich 2014) 
 
Drawing from the knowledge gained about the conflict episode, I find that the process 
of the “Four Towns Agreement” was announced at the top-leadership level and was 
built to a degree on elements of a middle-range initiative. Here lies a key dilemma in 
peacebuilding: how to link the diverse needs and activities of the different levels of the 
affected society. Confidentiality was a key element in this agreement. At the top-
leadership level, the initial stages of planning, negotiating, and arranging the conditions 
of the agreement were kept confidential (The New York Times 2018). For example, a 
major confidential part of the “Four Towns Agreement” involved the release and 
exchange of hostages and prisoners (The New York Times 2018, Syrian Reporter 2017). 
Specifically, what remained mostly confidential was the release of the kidnapped Qatari 
hunters in Iraq, and Qatar’s role in brokering the “Four Towns Agreement” in order to 
guarantee the release (Al Etihad Press 2018, The New York Times 2018, Syrian 
Reporter 2017). Since the kidnapping event played such a significant role in signing the 
agreement, I will use this section to explain the actors involved in brokering the “Four 
Towns Agreement” and how the kidnapping event became strictly tied to the 
agreement.  
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In November 2015, a group of hunters, 25 Qataris, two Saudis and a Pakistani, 
entered Southern Iraq’s Muthanna province to hunt the houbara bustard bird (Al 
Etihad Press 2018, The National 2016 and 2017, The New York Times 2018, and 
Syrian Reporter 2017). Nine of the Qataris were from the al-Thani family, one of the 
wealthiest dynasties in the world (The New York Times 2018). The group had chosen 
Iraq’s Muthanna province for their hunting ground as it had become a stretch of land 
that was a haven for the houbara bird. Since the US-American invasion of 2003, the 
Muthanna province was devoid of people or visitors; to its north was IS-controlled 
land, making the Muthanna province a hardly-visited destination. The Qataris hired 
Iraqi guards to accompany their trip, and spent three weeks in the desert, giving passing 
Bedouins extravagant gifts in hopes of ensuring their safety (The National 2016 and 
2017, The New York Times 2018).  
Although the Iraqi government had granted the hunting party approval of entry, 
towards the end of their hunting trip, on the night of December 15, 2015, armed 
vehicles stormed the hunting camp and took the 28 members hostage (The New York 
Times 2018, The Washington Post 2018). When news of the kidnapping reached Qatar 
at 6 a.m., it sent the government and royal family into panic (The New York Times 
2018). At first, it was unclear who carried out the kidnapping (The New York Times 
2018, The Washington Post 2018). The hunting party had provided Iraq’s Ministry of 
Interior the precise coordinates of their camp, and a few hours before the kidnapping, 
Iraqi government representatives conducted a surprise visit to the hunting camp. As 
such, Qatari officials suspected that the Iraqi government leaked information to the 
kidnappers (The New York Times 2018).  
According to The New York Times (2018), the kidnapping incident highlights the 
vulnerabilities in Qatar’s prominent economy. Lying between the region’s Shiite power 
– Iran – and the region’s Sunni power – Saudi Arabia – its natural gas deposits in its 
deserts and coastlines have provided it with a G.D.P. of $181 billion with only 300,000 
citizens. With regards to its political decisions, Qatar angered all sides of the region at 
once. It engaged with the Shiite rising powers of the region – Iran, Syria and Hezbollah 
– aggressively angering Saudi Arabia and the United States. In parallel, it used its money 
to broker diplomatic deals with Sunnis in Lebanon and Yemen. While hosting the 
largest American base in the region, Qatar also established Al Jazeera, frequently 
broadcasting anti-American news (The New York Times 2018).  
Qatar’s political approach backfired badly. At the start of the Arab Spring uprisings 
in 2011, Qatar started funding the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, for what it saw in it as 
being sympathetic to Sunnis. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, though 
Sunni, were infuriated by Qatar’s bankrolling the Muslim Brotherhood out of fears of 
the groups becoming a threat to their states (The New York Times 2018, The 
Washington Post 2018). Another risky bankroll that Qatar carried out was its financing 
to Sunni opposition factions in Syria. Qatar envisioned the armed opposition winning 
the war and hence boosting Qatar’s standing in the region. However, the reality was 
different. As the war dragged on, the armed opposition groups only became more 
extreme with time. And soon, Qatar was associated with funding terrorist groups (The 
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New York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). “In the end, Qatar managed 
to make enemies on both sides of the worsening sectarian divide” (The New York 
Times 2018).  
A few days following the kidnapping, the Qatari government established that 
Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iraqi Shiite armed group, had kidnapped the 28 hunters (The 
National 2018b, The New York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). Kata’ib 
Hezbollah is affiliated and receives funding from Iran, and is designated as a terrorist 
group by the United States (The Washington Post 2018). Kata’ib Hezbollah joined the 
fighting in Syria and fought alongside groups loyal to the al-Asaad regime. In response 
to this, Qatari officials sought intermediary help from the Iraqi government and Iraqi 
Shiite leaders to contact the kidnappers. This forced Qatar to reach out to an Iranian 
military general, Qassim Soleimani, seen as the most powerful military officer in the 
Middle East (The New Yorker 2013, The New York Times 2018, and The Washington 
Post 2018). Soleimani heads the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and 
reports directly to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (The New Yorker 
2013, The New York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). The Quds Force of 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards is a highly secretive foreign policy instrument of the 
Iranian government that is part special operations force and part paramilitary (News 
Week 2018, The National 2018a). Given his profile and influence, I consider him to be 
one of the key actors in the Top-Leadership Level. He enjoys influence, is very 
knowledgeable of the events, and he is a highly public figure in the Syrian conflict.  
Given his public figure and desire to influence the Syrian conflict, ransom money 
was of no interest to Soleimani as his visions had long been to prop up the Syrian 
regime (The New York Times 2018). Since the 1980s, Syria became Iran’s lifeline for 
funding the Lebanese Hezbollah with weapons. This was essential since Hezbollah acts 
as Iran’s arm in Lebanon. The armed conflict in Syria threatened the link between Iran 
and Lebanon. Fearing eradication, both Sunnis and Shiites from the region poured their 
sectarian struggles into the Syrian war. In that orchestration, the Saudis and their allies 
started funding the Syrian armed opposition groups, hoping to topple the al-Asaad 
regime, making Syria more Sunni-friendly and hence isolating Iran. On the other side of 
the sectarian chessboard was Iran, and specifically Soleimani, who saw Syria as Iran’s 
lifeline and ally (News Week 2018, The New York Times 2018, and the Washington 
Post 2018). Within this geopolitical game, the Qatari hostages became valuable bait 
(The National 2018b, The New York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). For 
Soleimani, he saw in this situation an opportunity to pressure Qatar and the opposition 
factions, and in return, entrench and consolidate Iranian influence in key areas within 
Syria (The National 2018b, The New York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 
2018).  
In this situation, many imbalances emerge. From a systemic understanding, power is 
always relational; it cannot be given or taken away, but can only be exercised (Lederach 
1997). But in the orchestration between these competing states, power is understood 
from a structural perspective, and hence is driven by the desire to subjugate and 
conquer. The outcome of this is a winner and a loser. Returning to the previous ECM 
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branches (themes and layers), this is very much in line with the modern understandings 
of peace as derived from security and the overemphasis on the dogma of the mental-
societal layer. However, from a systemic understanding of conflict, there are no winners 
or losers. There can only be a relationship that is either balanced or imbalanced; that is 
either crippled or open in its communication.  
Shortly before the kidnapping incident, the UN facilitated a secret meeting in 
Istanbul in September 2015, where an envoy from Soleimani’s force proposed an 
agreement known as the “four towns” deal (The New York Times 2018). It stipulated 
the same premises of the 2017 “Four Towns Agreement,” whereby in a tit-for-tat 
manner, sieges would be uplifted from Madaya and Az-Zabadani, and in return, from 
Kafreya and Foah (ibid). While the details remained vague at first, The New York 
Times (2018) reports that the Iranians proposed swapping the residents of the towns, 
amounting to Sunnis from Madaya and Az-Zabadani being transferred to Kafreya and 
Foah, and Shiites from Kafreya and Foah being transferred to Madaya and Az-
Zabadani. Iran presented this as a humanitarian effort to alleviate the suffering of those 
living under siege. The proposal was angrily refused by rebel spokesmen, due to the 
plan’s sectarian calculus (ibid).   
Following the kidnapping of the Qatari hunters, Iran gained a powerful leverage 
card over the NSAGs and more specifically, their sponsor Qatar (The National 2018b, 
The New York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). Given that Hezbollah 
was the single group who enjoyed trusted relationships with all parties (Tehran, Doha 
and Kata’ib Hezbollah), delegates for Soleimani reached out to Qatar through the 
Lebanese Hezbollah and laid out the deal (The National 2017, The New York Times 
2018). Using Hezbollah as an intermediary to Qatar allowed Iran to gain more control 
within ransom negotiations. Iran did not want the negotiations to result in a fast cash 
payment to the Iraqi kidnappers in return for the release of the Qatari hostages (The 
New York Times 2018). Instead, Iran sent a high-ranking Hezbollah proxy to Doha and 
explained the conditions: that the hostages would be released in exchange for Qatar 
facilitating the “Four Towns Agreement” (The New York Times 2018).  
From a systemic perspective, this reveals that the relational field between the parties 
is impaired, driven mostly by incongruent communication that lacks trust and thrives 
on the threat of power. Those in the top-leadership are unable to listen to each other; 
unable to empathize with each other’s needs. Given the relational field within-which the 
negotiations take place, it becomes evident that the outcome is not intended to bring 
balance to the relational system between those involved. Lederach explains that: 
 
“…conflicts are by nature lodged in long-standing relationships. In other words, they are 
‘protracted’ or ‘intractable.’ Part of the challenge posed by many armed conflicts is the long-
term nature of the conflicting groups' animosity, perception of enmity, and deep-rooted 
fear”. (1997, 14) 
 
According to the interviews conducted by The New York Times (2018), the 
implications of the “Four Towns Agreement” meant little to the Qataris compared to 
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the release of the royal hostages, which motivated them to accept hosting a series of 
talks between the parties to the “Four Towns Agreement:” Iran, Hezbollah, and the 
militias. The New York Times (2018) reports that the parties to the deal met separately 
with the Qatari negotiators, with a heavy emphasis on the logistics of the deal. Iran’s 
initial proposal of swapping the residents of the four towns was abandoned. Instead, 
the deal stipulated that residents of the four towns are transferred to safer zones, with 
the future of each town to be dealt with separately (The New York Times 2018). 
Implementing a transfer deal in a volatile war zone is tricky, given the different 
demands of the parties (UNHCR 2016).  
Months later and there was still no news on freeing the hostages. The Qataris were 
under enormous pressure from the al-Thanis to do what is necessary for the release of 
the royal family (The New York Times 2018). With their growing desperation, Qatar 
started exploring other rescue schemes. The New York Times (2018) reports that all 
other avenues explored involved a parade of money to middlemen who claimed they 
could ensure the release of the hostages. According to the Daily Star (2017) and The 
New York Times (2018), the ruling family’s desperation led them to contract an 
American firm called Global Strategies Council Inc., and paid them $2 million upfront. 
The aim was for the firm to obtain proof of life, initiate communication with 
government agencies, and negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of the Qatari 
royals (The Daily Star 2017).  
 
“The payment, disclosed in US Justice Department documents examined by the Associated 
Press, shed new light on the opaque world of private hostage negotiation in the Middle East 
in a case that now involves hackers, encrypted internet communication and promises of 
millions of dollars in ransom payments”. (The Daily Star 2017, 8) 
 
According to The New York Times (2018), during the annual gathering of the Arab 
interior ministers, Qataris finally found the man with the right connections to seal the 
deal. In early April 2017, the Qatari interior minister met Qassim al-Araji,27 the Iraqi 
interior minister in Tunis. Al-Araji affirmed that he enjoyed the right clout into the 
Shiite-militia world. Al-Araji refused to disclose to the Qataris the party who had the 
hostages, although according to the New York Times (2018), he knew that Kata’ib 
Hezbollah was responsible for the kidnapping. Al-Araji assured the Qatari minister that 
he had a plan to free the hostages but suggested that this remain secret and not to 
notify anyone else in the Iraqi government (The New York Times 2018).  
One week after meeting al-Araji in Tunis, a crisis team was set up by Qatar, 
including Zayed Al Khayareen, the Qatari ambassador to Iraq, and Foreign Minister 
Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, and Hamad bin Khalifa al-Attiyah, the emir’s 
personal adviser (The New York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). In 
working through different channels to secure the freedom of the hostages, this event 
                                                     
27 There were charges against al-Araji for carrying out attacks against American troops. He was imprisoned twice 
by American forces in Iraq but later released for lack of evidence (The New York Times 2018). 
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became tied to the “Four Towns Agreement” (Al Etihad Press 2018, Al-Ghad TV 
2018, Syrian Reporter 2017, Tahrir News 2017, The National 2018b, The New York 
Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). According to the New York Times 
(2018), $360 million were to be paid to the Iraqi government, assumingly to finance a 
new port and embassy in Baghdad. When the negotiating team arrived with their 23 
bags of cash, the money was seized at the Baghdad airport (Al Ghad TV 2018, Al 
Etihad Press 2018, Tahrir News 2017, The New York Times 2018). What the Qatari’s 
discovered was that al-Araji had greatly overstated his influence on the Iraqi 
government and the Baghdad airport. Haider al-Abadi, Iraq’s prime minister, was 
furious when he discovered Qatar’s scheme. He insisted that the money is not paid to 
the kidnappers, and so, the cash was transferred to Iraq’s Central Bank (Al Ghad TV 
2018, Al Etihad Press 2018, Tahrir News 2017, and The New York Times 2018).   
With al-Abadi impounding Qatar’s $360 million, the carefully plotted “Four Towns 
Agreement” was now at risk. According to The New York Times (2018), the plan had 
been that the transfer of cash to the kidnappers, Kata’ib Hezbollah, would take place at 
the same time that the NSAG execute the “Four Towns Agreement.” The same day 
that the 23 bags of cash reached Baghdad, NSAGs were transferring Shiite individuals 
from Kafreya and Foah to Aleppo (Al Ghad TV 2018, Al Etihad Press 2018, Tahrir 
News 2017, The New York Times 2018). Two hundred miles south, people from 
Madaya and Az-Zabadani were being escorted to Idleb (ibid). That day, the Qatari 
negotiating team had to personally mediate and monitor the evacuation, while 
desperately trying to recover the 23 bags of cash (Al-Ghad TV 2018, The New York 
Times 2018). The Qataris tried to bribe Iraqi officials and Shiite militants with money, 
luxury apartments and offices in Doha and Dubai. All attempts were to no avail and al-
Abadi kept the $360 million with his circle of allies (Al-Ghad TV 2018, The New York 
Times 2018). In an effort to secure the cooperation of the NSAG in the “Four Towns 
Agreement,” Qatar also paid $50 million to Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham (The 
New York Times 2018, The Washington Post 2018).  
Towards the end of that day, the sad event struck the evacuees from Kafreya and 
Foah. While waiting at the al-Rashideen transit point, a car exploded killing 125 
evacuees from Kafreya and Foah (Al Ghad TV 2018, Al Etihad Press 2018, Syrian 
Reporter 2017, UNOCHAb 2017, Tahrir News 2017, and The New York Times 2018). 
The event is a stark reminder of what this deal really entailed. It goes well beyond 
“back-room negotiations and bags of cash” (The New York Times 2018). It involved 
the transfer of people who left behind their homes as part of an imbalanced geopolitical 
scheme. The imbalanced relational field of the top-leadership level causes a ripple effect 
in the other levels, relationally. Since it is an open system, the 14-April explosion can be 
perceived as a tragic expression of the violent relationships in the top-leadership level, 
that have flowed and trickled through the other levels. 
Despite the unfortunate events of April 14, the “Four Towns Agreement” resumed 
and was completed four days later. The events that took place after the “Four Towns 
Agreement” was completed are only reported by The New York Times (2018). 
According to The New York Times (2018), during that time, the Qatari negotiating 
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team were taken to meet a Shiite militia in the Karada neighborhood of Iraq, where the 
Qataris were shown a recent video of the hostages as proof of life. The Qataris quickly 
asked Iraqi authorities for permission to leave the country, although the bags of cash 
were still in Iraq’s central bank. It seemed the Qataris had found a different route to 
satisfy the kidnappers. Almost immediately after, the hostages received news that they 
would be receiving showers and haircuts. It was time for them to leave. For 16 months, 
the hostages were kept in a dark, windowless basement in the South of Iraq. They saw 
the sun for the first after 16 months. The released Qataris were driven to a luxurious 
house two hours away, where the non-royal hostages were being held. The group 
learned that the non-royals were treated much better than the royals, the al-Thanis, with 
the former allowed adequate food, showers and respectful guards.  
It took another two days before the hostages left Iraq. During those last two days, 
the al-Thanis were again treated like royalty. They were addressed with courtesy and 
provided with the finest traditional Iraqi dishes. The Qataris were addressed as guests 
and received many apologies from the attendants who had kidnapped them. On April 
21, before leaving to the airport, the released Qataris were taken to Baghdad where the 
Intelligence Ministry held a farewell reception for them. After a two-hour flight from 
Baghdad to Doha, the Qataris were reunited with their families.  
What remains unclear is how the hostages were released, when the $360 million 
ransom was still impounded. One answer is that Qatar paid another ransom, of a 
similar amount, this time via Beirut. There is speculation that Qassim Soleimani himself 
made the final call to release the hostages (The New York Times 2018). The Lebanese 
Hezbollah maintain good control over the Beirut airport, and so, as far as logic goes, 
would ensure that the cash delivery pass through (The New York Times 2018). If it is 
true that Qatar paid these two ransoms, it would mean that Qatar paid at least $770 
million to release the hostages. But probably, it paid substantially more (The New York 
Times 2018). Although not confirmed, it is believed that the Qatari negotiating team 
paid generous bribes during their week in Iraq (The New York Times 2018). And so, it 
is highly likely that the total amount approaches $1 billion. Qatari officials still insist 
that they did not make any payments besides the 23 bags that were taken to Baghdad 
(The New York Times 2018). They also assert that the money paid was to assist the 
Iraqi government in investment projects.  
 
“Almost a year later, the effects of the Qatari ransom deal can still be felt, from Doha to 
Washington. The four towns in Syria are mostly empty — a few hundred stubborn people 
cling to their homes in the Shiite towns up north, and some remain in Madaya and Zabadani. 
The jihadi rebels in Syria also continue their battle, yielding a steady trickle of battlefield 
death and dismemberment. The deal appears to have deepened the divide between the rebels 
and the people they claim to represent”. (The New York Times, 2018). 
 
Qatar’s bargaining with militants over the release of their hostages became part of a 
larger feud between Qatar and its Arab neighbors (The National 2018b, New York 
Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). Weeks after the release of the hostages, 
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Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) initiated diplomatic action against 
Qatar for paying money to Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood to broker the deal (ibid). 
It involved blockade on air travel in and out of Qatar (The National 2018b, The New 
York Times 2018, and The Washington Post 2018). However, between 2010 and 2014, 
Western governments, including France and Spain, have paid ransoms to organizations 
deemed as terrorist groups in order to secure the release of their kidnapped citizens 
(Public Radio International 2015, and The Telegraph 2016) and these European 
countries were not seen as cooperating with terrorist organizations (The New York 
Times 2018).  
The details of Qatar’s involvement in brokering the “Four Towns Agreement” 
reveals the extent to which the top-leadership level is dominant in Syria, and the extent 
to which the lives of royal families seems to be more valuable than the lives of the 
people living in Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya and Foah. The question that poses itself 
at this point is whether the “Four Towns Agreement” would have existed at all, if the 
Qatari royals had not been kidnapped. What would it have taken for the sieges to be 
uplifted? What other scheme would the fate of the four towns find itself tied with?  
 
“What began as a brazen kidnapping eventually became a measure of the geopolitical forces 
tearing the Middle East apart, and of their human cost: corruption, sectarian hatred and 
terrorism. Everyone involved had something to hide — except, perhaps, the hopeless hunters 
who set it all in motion”. (The New York Times 2018) 
 
In contexts of protracted violence, the system is imbalanced: the themes of personal 
harmony, structural justice, relational security, and plurality of truths are not balanced. 
And when they are imbalanced, it is interesting to see whether the intention of the 
“Four Towns Agreement” was to restore the balance to the system. In the case of the 
“Four Towns Agreement,” it is not. The intention of Qatar paying huge sums of money 
to broker the deal was to consolidate dysfunctional power and relationships. For 
example, this can be understood as consolidating the power and influence of the GoS 
in Damascus, making Damascus more homogenous in its support for the GoS, and 
consolidating the opposition group’s perception that its patron, Qatar, is willing to pay 
large sums of money to orchestrate certain events.  
From the perspective of the levels, the Top-Leaders level is composed of powerful 
actors such as: the royal Qatari family al-Thani, the Iranian military general Qassem 
Soleimani, the Iraqi Minister of Interior Qassim al-Araji, the Qatari negotiating team 
(Zayed Al Khayareen, the Qatari ambassador to Iraq, and Foreign Minister Mohammad 
bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, and Hamad bin Khalifa al-Attiyah, the emir’s personal 
adviser), the high-level Hezbollah proxy, and Hussam al-Shafi (also known as Zaid al-
Attar), who is the spokesman for Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and political chief of HTS. My 
perception is that the list undoubtedly comprises more actors whose names and profiles 
do not appear in the news articles, but were involved in the back-room negotiations.  
The episode of the “Four Towns Agreement” reveals the operational power of the 
Top-Leadership level. That no Syrian official was involved directly in the deal exposes 
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the extent to which the relational field is crippled. In such a setting, power is diffuse 
due to the fragmentation and multiplicity of groups, weakened central control, and the 
autonomous and shifting nature of alliances (Lederach 1997). According to Lederach 
(1997), this makes it difficult to identify decision-making structures and assess whether 
the actions of the individual Top-Leaders fulfill the expectation of the groups they 
claim to represent. But what happens when those in the top-leadership level do not 
represent the people involved in the conflict episode? In that sense, agency of Syrians is 
taken away from them. In many ways, this results in a demolished pyramid where any 
discussion of themes is toppled with the realization that no harmony, security, justice or 
truth is being sought. The attention towards the role of the local actors and civil society 
grew during the 1990s, cultivating the idea of ‘peace from below’ which nurtures the 
resources rooted in the local people (Ledearch 1997). Lederach’s pioneering work 
argues that a holistic approach to peacebuilding sees domestic and international actors 
as important, but they must recognize the visions for peace among local people. 
Lederach calls it “citizenbased peace making” (Ledearch 1997, 94). This approach 
becomes especially significant in the discussion on the middle-range and grassroots 
level leaderships.  
Moreover, according to Lederach (1997) international diplomacy has worked with a 
statist approach to face conflict in divided societies. The assumption is that conflicting 
groups operate based on the hierarchies of power between them. As such, it is 
important to have identifiable authority representatives on all sides of the conflict 
parties. But what happens when it is difficult to identify such representatives, as is the 
case in the Top-Leadership level of this ECM model? This has somehow made the top-
leadership level head-less. It is a pyramid with no head, no real authority. The power is 
so diffuse in this level that there is no legitimate process of representation in Syria. And 
given that in times of war, military power is the focus (Lederach 1997), cultural, political 
and social power are overlooked. This brings up the discussion towards the Middle-
Range leadership, where the influences of multitrack diplomacy are present in 
Lederach’s conceptualization. The “Four Towns Agreement” is an initiative that is not 
owned by Syrians but by the external states who brokered the deal. As such, in the next 
section, I will explain the importance of engaging the local communities in peace 
initiatives.  
6.2. Middle-Range Leadership Level  
 
The middle-range leadership is characterized by less public exposure than the top-
leadership level, making actors in this level more flexible in their decision-making. This 
flexibility also allows them high mobility and access to and between the high and 
grassroots levels. They are often the implementers of decisions directed by the top-
leadership level to the grassroots. They are mainly the networkers, those who are seen 
as the infrastructure for peacebuilding. The middle-rangers are quite critical for 
inclusive social change and civil society participation. Their mobility allows them to be 
transmitters of insights from the grassroots to the top-leadership level. 




Figure 8: Representation of Actor’s Pyramid for the “Four Towns Agreement” (Created by author) 
 
In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the UN, the SARC and the ICRC can 
be seen as the implementers of the deal since they facilitated the evacuation of the 
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level is so dominant, that the middle-range level is unable to fulfill its own mandate. 
And given the power diffuse in the top-level, the middle-range actors find it difficult to 
reach coherent decision-making bodies in the top-leadership. Lederach writes that 
middle-range actors “have contact with top level leaders, but are not bound by the 
political calculations that govern every move and decision made at that level” (1997, 
42). However, in the “Four Towns Agreement,” to what extent can the UN, the SARC 
and the ICRC act beyond the reach and decisions of the top-leadership level? 
The answer is very little. Very little can be done without the top-leadership level 
granting the middle-range actors permissions for access and action. The clearest and 
most stark image of the dominance of the top-leadership level over the middle-range 
actors is the fact that the four towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, and Foah were 
all besieged. They were physically encircled by the power of the top-leadership level, 
represented by forces loyal to the regime and the NSAGs. Despite many pleas by the 
middle-range actors to uplift the siege from those four towns, their voices remained 
unheard. The SARC, the ICRC and the UN were not allowed to enter the four towns 
and deliver assistance, or to evacuate persons who required medical care, except when 
the top-leadership level granted them permission to enter. The power of the top-
leadership level reigns over the middle-range actors, limiting their ability to work or 
fulfill their mandates.  
In 2015, the four towns became besieged. In March 2015, top-leadership actors 
from the NSAG side besieged Kafreya and Foah in Idleb. In a retaliatory dynamic in 
July 2015, top-leadership actors loyal to the GoS enacted a siege around Madaya and 
Az-Zabadani in Damascus. Under siege conditions, humanitarian conditions worsened, 
and were made even worse by price inflation, making access to food items very difficult 
(Amnesty International 2017). Although the SARC, the ICRC, and the UN pled for 
humanitarian corridors for the four towns, their requests for access were frequently 
denied. Between October 2015 and March 2017, which is the time between the start of 
the sieges and the agreement to uplift them, the actors of the middle-range delivered aid 
to the four towns on nine occasions (Amnesty International 2017). However, on two 
occasions, humanitarian aid was unable to reach more than 60,000 people in the four 
towns for periods of four to five months in 2016 and 2017 (ibid). Under the tight 
conditions that the middle-range actors worked, starvation and malnutrition worsened, 
causing 65 people to die in the town of Madaya between July 2015 and May 2016 
(Physicians for Human Rights 2016).  
Following these dire siege conditions, and after immense pressure from the 
international community (including the ICRC, the UN, and the EU), an agreement was 
reached whereby in a tit-for-tat manner, aid delivery was allowed in the towns Madaya 
and in Kafreya and Foah. As such, between August and October 2016, one UN 
interagency aid convoy reached all four besieged towns. During that period, 49 supply 
trucks reached 38,000 in Madaya and four aid trucks reached Az-Zabadani. The specific 
numbers of aid shipments that reached Kafreya and Foah could not be obtained 
(Amnesty International 2017). The supply trucks to Madaya contained basic food 
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supplies and non-essential medical items but did not deliver necessary goods such as 
fuel, essential medical supplies, baby milk, or salt (Amnesty International 2017).  
Furthermore, the mandate of the middle-range actors includes carrying out medical 
evacuations. But the dominance of the top-leadership level has challenged this. For 
example, in order to evacuate people who required immediate medical care, long 
negotiations were held between August and October 2016 (Amnesty International 
2017). As a result, again in a retaliatory orchestration, the middle-range actors were 
given permission to evacuate people for medical reasons from Madaya, in return for 
evacuations from Foah. In August 2016, 40 people were evacuated for medical 
treatment, four people were evacuated in September for meningitis treatment, and 
another eight people were evacuated in October (Amnesty International 2017).  
In the implementation of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the UN, the SARC and the 
ICRC facilitated the evacuation of the people from the four towns. During the delays at 
the transit points, the middle-range actors dispatched a mobile clinic at the Ramouseh 
garage, where people from Madaya and Az-Zabadani were waiting, and sent assistance 
trucks to al-Rashideen, where evacuees from Kafreya and Foah were waiting. Following 
the attack at the al-Rashideen transit point, the middle-range actors transferred 
wounded individuals to different hospitals in Syria and bordering Turkey (UNOCHA 
2017b).  
Therefore, middle-range actors in the “Four Towns Agreement” face major 
challenges in their mobility. Their mobility is largely determined by the top-leadership 
level and hence, their decision-making power is reduced as the relational field with the 
top-leadership level is hampered. This reveals disconnections in communication, and 
the way the power of the top-leadership level is exercised impedes the effectiveness of 
the middle-range. Within this ECM model, the middle-range actors are not 
implementers of the “Four Towns Agreement” but are puppets in the maneuvering 
hands of the top-level actors. Their space is limited, giving way to an imbalanced 
pyramid. This imbalance dismantled the apparatus of the middle-range leadership, 
forcing it to accept ‘reconciliation’, in a diverging yet similar way that ‘reconciliation’ 
was forced upon the grassroots-level.  
As previously stated, the middle-range level is also very important for inclusive 
social cohesion and civil society participation. In the conflict episode of the “Four 
Towns Agreement,” the top-leadership level challenges this, imposing its power in ways 
that lead to exclusion of civil society. According to Paffenholz (2015c), exclusion is the 
main reason why groups resort to violence. Paffenholz (2015c) explains that there are 
two types of exclusion: active and passive exclusion. Active exclusion refers to 
situations when power-holders proactively exclude groups from political, economic, or 
social decision-making. Passive exclusion is more subtle, and refers to groups who are 
unable to assert their power in negotiations. Armed groups are often subject to active 
exclusion and women are often subject to passive exclusion (Paffenholz 2015c). While 
most attempts at inclusivity by the UN tends to focus on addressing passive exclusion, 
remedying active exclusion is also crucial for quality and sustainability of peace 
processes (ibid). In her briefing paper on broadening the participation in peace 
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processes, Paffenholz (2015a) makes it explicit that inclusion is not enough in-and-of-
itself, but it is the quality of inclusion that is significant. That is, the ability of 
previously-excluded groups to make meaningful contributions to negotiation processes, 
to feel heard and seen by the other parties is essential for sustainable peacebuilding. 
This opens up the space for a relationship to form, or to reform between groups who, 
in settings of protracted violence, have experienced deep-rooted animosity towards 
each other.  
Lederach (2005) explains that in settings of conflict, a key part of how societies as a 
whole change and move towards new ways of relating and organizing their lives 
together depends on the willingness of societies to act. In other words, “movement 
away from fear, division, and violence toward new modalities of interaction requires 
awareness, action, and broad processes of change” (Lederach 2015, 3). Within this, the 
number of people who engage in this movement is important, but by looking deeper at 
how this shift happens, it becomes evident that what authenticates a social shift “is the 
quality of the platform that sustains the shifting process that matters” (Lederach 2015, 
3). 
The ongoing Geneva talks, which aim to end the Syrian war, can be seen as a 
platform that is trying to achieve peace in Syria by engaging Syrians in a social shift. The 
Geneva talks have included formal meetings that engaged the UN Office of the Special 
Envoy for Syria (OSE-S), Staffan de Mistura, and 39 political civil society groups 
(Paffenholz 2015a). In January 2016, under de Mistura’s leadership and guidance, the 
OSE-S established the Civil Society Support Room (CSSR) at the UN’s Palais des 
Nations in Geneva (International Peace Institute 2018). The CSSR is intended to give 
Syrian civil society a secure physical place at the UN where they are able to meet and 
engage among themselves and with the OSE-S, other UN agencies, as well as UN 
member states during official talks (International Peace Institute 2018). According to 
the International Peace Institute (2018), in line with de Mistura, the CSSR focuses on 
garnering a political rather than a military solution to the Syrian war. De Mistura has 
previously emphasized that military victory to one of the conflict parties will not bring 
peace to Syria; only an agreement that is agreed upon unanimously can do so 
(International Peace Institute 2018).  
 
“Civil society consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations and comprises 
non-state actors and associations that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, 
are autonomously organized, typically show civic virtue, and interact in the public sphere”. 
(Paffenholz 2015b, 108) 
 
In the case of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the UN was not involved in brokering the 
deal, which in turn, results in the exclusion of the Syrian civil society organizations 
enrolled in the CSSR. This is a clear example of active exclusion where there is a 
proactive act on behalf of those in power-positions (at the top-leadership level) to 
impede the decision-making of civil society organizations. Paffenholz asserts that 
connecting Track I (top-leadership level) and Track II (middle-range leadership) is 
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essential for negotiation efforts and peacebuilding (2015a). The connections can often 
be led and facilitated by civil society, where in an organic manner, information is 
channeled between civil society and the top-leaders. Giving civil society space and a 
voice at the negotiating table is essential because it is often civil society actors who raise 
issues relating to human rights, while warring factions will often neglect or disregard 
this.  
According to Rana et al. (2014), civil society activists were among the first to be 
persecuted, detained, and in some instances killed during the uprising by both the GoS 
and NSAGs. Despite this, they continue to play an essential role in balancing the 
influence of a variety of military, political, economic groups. Moreover, Syrian civil 
society has played a key role in highlighting human rights issues in the Syrian war, such 
as documentation and advocacy. Citizens for Syria, is a Syrian organization, which has 
produced a mapping of the role and challenges faced by civil society. It reports that the 
number of civil society actors that have been established between 2011 and 2017 is 
much higher than the total of civil society organizations since 1959. This points to the 
pressing need and concern of civil society in the Syrian war (Citizens for Syria 2017).  
Fetherston and Nordstrom (1995) explain that a holistic and transformative 
perspective of peacebuilding is built on the internal traditions inherent in local cultures. 
External actors can support and facilitate, but cannot decide the type of peace to be 
built. In the same vein, Donais (2012) urges international actors to provide space for 
local actors to create peace that is rooted and driven by their visions; a locally produced 
peace. Donais takes a critical perspective of international actors for being “both the 
producers and marketers of the liberal-democratic product (the only product available 
on the market), which local actors are expected to buy, and subsequently own” (Donais 
2012, 32). In conflict settings, peace can never exist in a vacuum, but is always part and 
parcel of the local culture, and is always subject to local adaptations, resistance and 
interpretations (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015).  
 
6.3. Grassroots Leadership Level  
 
At the grassroots level, the “Four Towns Agreement” gains a different understanding. 
The grassroots is part of the local culture and forms “the base of society” (Lederach 
1997, 42). In contexts of protracted violence, people in this level find themselves in a 
day-to-day struggle to secure water, shelter, food and safety. Their leadership is 
governed by a survival mentality. Leaders in this level include community leaders and 
mobilizers who have an intimate understanding of the fear and suffering of the 
grassroots level. Although civil society actors were excluded from the negotiation table 
of the “Four Towns Agreement,” at the grassroots level, they created social spaces 
across division lines by engaging in relief activities to cater for the needs of the arriving 
evacuees.  
In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” the grassroots level encompasses 
people who were transferred from the four towns of Madaya, Az-Zabadani, Kafreya, 
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and Foah. It also includes people who decided to stay in their towns and accept 
reconciliation. These actors and actresses were most affected by the “Four Towns 
Agreement” and had the least decision-making power in brokering this deal. The deal 
was made on their behalf and they were forced to accept it. According to interviews 
conducted by Amnesty International (2017) and the UNHRC (2017), people who were 
transferred from their homes shared that their decision to leave their besieged towns 
was involuntary.  
For example, people who were interviewed from the town of Madaya, affirmed 
their strong desire to remain in their hometown. However, given their lack of trust in 
Legislative Decree No. 15 – which offers amnesty from “all punishment” for those who 
“turn themselves in and lay down their weapons,” (Ezzi 2017) – they feared and did not 
trust government forces enough to stay. As such, this mistrust motivated many people 
from Madaya to accept the deal because they feared detention if they stayed in their 
hometown. Moreover, many people from Madaya feared ever returning home, 
especially after they learnt many homes had been appropriated by pro-government 
forces. This puts the grassroots level in a very difficult situation where their decision to 
leave their homes is involuntary and the journey back home almost impossible.  
People from Kafreya found themselves in very similar situations. Through 
interviews with the UNHRC (2017), people stressed that they did not want to leave 
their homes, but the difficult siege conditions motivated them to accept the deal. 
Several people affirmed that in the face of increased attacks and deteriorating health 
conditions, the evacuation agreement became their only option for survival. Most 
people from Kafreya expressed the desire to return to their homes but many had given 
up on those prospects (UNHRC 2017). As such, the involuntary evacuation reveals just 
how disconnected the top-leadership level is from the realities of the grassroots level. 
The dominance of the top-leadership level extends far across the pyramid, crippling the 
middle-range leadership actors, and in many ways, suffocating the grassroots level with 
policy talk and high-level agreements. 
Moreover, in the context of reconciliation agreements in Syria, reconciliation 
delegations were formed as a means to link the grassroots and the top-leadership level 
together. Such local councils have been created in opposition-held areas in order to 
maintain understanding with armed groups. According to Ezzi (2017), reconciliation 
delegations included persons loyal to the official establishment of Syria and these 
delegations have affirmed their capacities as acting on behalf of governance bodies. 
Ezzi (2017) affirms that the regime rehabilitated some opposition leaders and promised 
them amnesty if they supported the reconciliation efforts. These leaders were granted 
“a monopoly over representation in these towns and cities and transforming them into 
mediators between the people and the state” (Ezzi 2017). The regime also rehabilitated 
and offered amnesty to people considered as ex-convicts. For example, in Madaya, the 
regime recruited a merchant into the reconciliation delegation between the opposition 
and the GoS, whose brother led an armed group affiliated with ISIS (Ezzi 2017).  
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“Despite this, neither political leaders, such as local council representatives, nor military 
commanders, such as pro-Government or armed group fighters, possess the requisite 
authority to consent to evacuation agreements on behalf of individual civilians”. (UNHRC 
2017, 7) 
 
Despite the divisive effects of conflict, people continue to transform the conflict by 
creating relational spaces where interaction is possible. Violence creates sharp divisions, 
especially along lines of collective identities, leading to social relationships being defined 
by these divisions (Lederach 2015). As such, the social impact of conflict is very wide. 
In these settings, social spaces become very important since people find themselves 
organizing and creating a social life with people from different sides of the conflict. By 
necessity, communities besieged by violence create relationships across the lines of 
conflict to cater for their needs of schooling, healthcare, shelter, and transportation. 
Lederach (2015) calls these points of relationships social spaces. Social spaces expand 
the web of relationships across division lines.  
For example, during the implementation of the “Four Towns Agreement,” local 
grassroots organizations engaged in relief activities organized by the middle-range 
actors to manage the arrival of the evacuees to their final destination. For example, 
according to UNOCHA (2017b), in Idleb, local actors prepared two reception centers, 
dispatched child protection teams, and provided awareness-raising sessions on the 
prevention of family separation to 427 children and 178 adults. Psychosocial first aid 
sessions were provided to 427 children and risk education materials were distributed to 
614 people. Four children who had gotten lost during the evacuation process were 
reunited with their families. Two medical clinics were dispatched and four community 
health teams were sent to the reception centers. They screened a total of 366 children 
using initial rapid assessments, where four children were found to be suffering from 
moderate acute malnutrition. No severe malnutrition was found amongst the children. 
Ninety-five mothers were given infant and young child feeding counselling. According 
to UNOCHA, food, shelter, and water, sanitation and health (abbreviated asWASH) 
assistance were provided in Idleb city (2017b). Under these circumstances, communities 
as a whole were transferred from their towns and communities as a whole hosted them. 
While both communities were challenged by the “Four Towns Agreement,” hosting the 
newcomers created a different horizon and lens of action. Unlike the brokering of the 
“Four Towns Agreement” itself, it did not take on political features, but initiated a 
platform of relational capacities and social spaces.  
Similarly, local civil society actors in Aleppo city also facilitated the arrival of the 
people from Kafreya and Foah. A collective shelter in the east of the city was prepared 
to host people coming from Kafreya and Foah (UNOCHA 2017b). According to the 
SARC (UNOCHA 2017b), 4,500 were initially hosted there before leaving to take 
shelter elsewhere. The collective shelter was previously a cotton factory which was 
turned into a shelter by the SARC. The SARC created partitions in its large halls, 
creating 1,540 small spaces where IDPs are able to take shelter and privacy. It ensured 
that all people arriving from Kafreya and Foah received mattresses, hot meals and ready 
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food rations. Since Aleppo is under the control of the GoS, the Department of Health 
in Aleppo city installed mobile clinics in the collective shelter, and the SARC installed 
water points. SARC offered psychosocial support to the IDPs. 
What the ECM analysis of the levels reveals is the decreasing ability of the middle-
range and grassroots level to be heard. The dogma of the top-leadership level is heavily 
tied to the dominance of the modern peace and the mental-societal layer in this ECM 
model. The dogma of security translates into a fixation of the mental-societal layer for 
the actors of the top-leadership level. As such, the emotional-communal and sexual-
familial layer, which are associated with the grassroots level, are overlooked. The top-
leadership level actors of the “Four Towns Agreement” sees the grassroots level as a 
category in war statistics. It sees land as terrain, as a relation of power. It sees the 
agreement as a strategic move to gain money and power over the opposition and its 
patronage, Qatar, further consolidating a dysfunctional relationship and system. 
Ultimately, the ECM analysis of the levels shows the little space that is left for the top-
level leadership to see through. It sees through a tightly-knit web governed by 
dominance and power. This limited vision translates into other episodes of the Syrian 
war. In general, the disconnection between the different levels of leadership is high, 
making decisions at the top-leadership level far removed from the clamoring and many 
truths at the grassroots level.  
 
6.4. The Web of Relationships  
 
Understanding the actors of the conflict episode along the ‘levels’ pyramid gives space 
to practice active listening to the conflict parties. A transrational approach to peace 
encompasses all sectors of society and all parties to the conflict. It seeks to address 
sediment issues of the conflict episode, beyond the immediate physical manifestation of 
the conflict. In that, concerns of the broad system and subsystem are listened to, 
contributing to an understanding of peacebuilding that is a process, not an end-state.  
In the context of the conflict episode chosen, the “Four Towns Agreement,” the 
dynamic across the levels highlights the ways in which the decisions taken by those in 
the top leadership affects those in the grassroots level. Lederach (1997) cites two variant 
quotes by Professor Ali Mazrui, which belong to two different times and 
understandings. In its first version, Mazrui writes: “When two elephants fight, it is the 
grass that suffers.” In the post-Cold War era, Mazrui creates a variant quote: “When 
two elephants make love, it is still the grass that suffers.” In the “Four Towns 
Agreement,” this seems to purvey a certain reality in Syria, where parties at the top 
leadership disagree, negotiate, and fight, leaving the grassroots level at the receiving end.  
What is significant about this is what it reveals about the interconnections between 
all the levels and actors of the conflict episode. This is in line with Lederach’s view that 
the relationship between conflict parties is both the basis of conflict “and its long-term 
solution” (Lederach 1997, 26). “Relationships, it is argued, are the centerpiece, the 
beginning and the ending point for understanding the system” (Lederach 1997, 26). 
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Lederach (1997) urges us to look at relationships as whole systems, and to understand 
the knits and tugs of the dynamics and substructures. Lederach (2005) explores the 
metaphoric structures rising from healing and reconciliation. He explains that social 
healing is “an intermediary phenomenon located between micro-individual healing and 
wider collective reconciliation” (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 6). Although the term 
‘social healing’ has not been widely studied, it is considered an emerging field that 
addresses the wounds created by conflict and large-scale trauma (O’Dea 2004). 
Thompson (2005) describes social healing as the healing of social wounds without 
resorting to ways that punish the evil that has incurred. Green (2009) describes social 
healing as the reconstruction of social relationships after war. In postwar communities, 
she sees social healing as preceding reconciliation, and necessary for restoring relations 
for coexistence. “Often a prelude to reconciliation and forgiveness, social healing can 
emerge through initiatives that rehumanise broken relations, rebuild trust, normalise 
daily life and restore hope” (Green 2009, 77). 
Given that the conceptual framework of my research lies within system theory, 
healing processes are understood not as linear processes. Instead, it is seen that the 
nature of social healing adapts to change and movement. This taps into the metaphoric 
structures of healing and reconciliation, that by their very structure, provide insights 
into their multifaceted nature. As such, particularly in settings of protracted conflict, the 
way we make sense of our lives is not a linear concept. Instead, there is a plurality of 
lived experiences of how we construct meaning around our lives and our purpose. 
Following such metaphor shifts away from linearity, Lederach and Lederach (2010) 
recognize that social healing focuses on the local community, and their need to locate 
their voices individually and collectively.  
 
“Voice suggests a notion of movement that is both internal, within an individual, and 
external, taking the form of social echo and resonance that emerges from collective spaces 
that build meaningful conversation, resiliency in the face of violence and purposeful action. 
These terms suggest an important metaphor shift with reference to how we understand 
individual and social processes, a shift based on an understanding of change that reflects the 
nature and movement of sound”. (Lederach and Lederach 2005, 7) 
 
Lederach and Lederach (2010) understand the concept of social healing as not 
necessarily associated with forgiveness or restoring broken relationships. They see 
healing as permanently dynamic, and at the level of real-life, face-to-face relationships, 
the possibilities of a vigorous reconciliation may be incomplete or even impossible. “As 
such we propose to de-link social healing from politically expedient notions of 
reconciliation as a onetime event” (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 10). In contexts of 
violence, reconciliation does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, people engaged in healing 
are faced with the continued threat of violence. This is the complex reality of 
communities in the aftermath of violence. Aspects of healing or reconciliation are not 
experienced “in a neat, sequential order” (Lederach and Lederach 2010, 10). 
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Although discussions on social healing and reconciliation address post-conflict 
communities, I find them very valuable to the context of the conflict episode, the “Four 
Towns Agreement.” The “Four Towns Agreement” is framed as a ‘reconciliation deal’ 
by the GoS and is under the Ministry of Reconciliation in Syria (UNHRC 2017). In that 
model, reconciliation is pursued as a means to superficially disengage the affiliations of 
the conflicting parties. However, from a transrational perspective, which looks at the 
system as a whole, reconciliation aims to engage conflict parties in a human 
relationship. Reconciliation work assumes that a relationship between conflict parties is 
an encounter between persons and the activities they hold in their respective positions. 
These activities should be geared towards restoring the broken relationships between 
people in divided societies.  
 
“Reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious cycle 
of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. People need opportunity and space to express to 
and with one another the trauma of loss and their grief at that loss, and the anger that 
accompanies the pain and the memory of injustices experienced. Acknowledgment is decisive 
in the reconciliation dynamic. It is one thing to know; it is yet a very different social 
phenomenon to acknowledge. Acknowledgment through hearing one another’s stories 
validates experience and feelings and represents the first step toward restoration of the 
person and the relationship”. (Lederach 1997, 26) 
 
Reconciliation allows for the expression of fears from the past and for the future in an 
encounter where the present is framed by acknowledging the past and envisioning the 
future. For such an encounter to be born, people and their ‘enemies’ must meet and 
confront the fears they find in each other. Lederach (1997) suggests that reconciliation 
necessitates acknowledging the painful past in order to validate the wrongs committed, 
and then allowing space for letting go and a new beginning to be articulated. This 
means that there is no winner or loser in conflict settings; there are no fragmented or 
broken parts. Instead, there is the joining of truth and forgiveness for the purpose of 
social restructuring. Reconciliation also takes time. Similar to processes of social 
healing, reconciliation is not linear. It does not necessarily begin after the signing of a 
peace agreement. Understandings of a linear progression of conflict do not match the 
lived experiences of people. “Most local communities affected by decades of armed 
conflict do not experience violence, reconciliation or healing as having such clear 
frontiers of where they begin and end, as portrayed by the dominant metaphoric 
structure’s phase-based descriptions of conflict and peace.” (Lederach and Lederach 
2010, 49)  
According to Lederach, the nature of contemporary conflict is characterized by fear 
of neighbors and of family members, making “the emotive, perceptual, social-
psychological, and spiritual dimensions core, not peripheral, concerns” (1997, 29). As 
such, any effort directed at transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and 
spiritual dimensions; all of which have been seen as lying well beyond the realm of 
international diplomacy. Reconciliation work lies specifically in this: “the capacity to 
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imagine relationship, the insusal to fall into dualistic polarities, the creative act, and the 
willingness to risk” (Lederach 2005, 14).  
In response to W.B. Yeats’ poem “The Second Coming” (1996) where he describes 
the inevitable nature of the world falling apart, Lederach, in his seminal work, The Moral 
Imagination (2005), he tries to understand what holds the world together in the first 
place. His simple answer comes in full circle: “the invisible web of relationships” (75). 
Lederach (2005) explains that the center of social change is weakened with the collapse 
of relationships. As such, rebuilding relational spaces that hold things together is 
essential. According to Lederach (2005), relational spaces create social energy that is 
both deviating and simultaneously unifying, making peacework the art of understanding 
relational spaces as the place from which energy derives and returns for purpose. As an 
analogy, Lederach (2005) explains that the sun emanates life-giving energy, from which 
all planets are held in a certain order and derive their sense of direction. On a 
communal level, family is that central point from which we move into the world, and 
simultaneously return to for identity and purpose. 
 
“There exists a force that pushes out and pulls in, and in so doing creates a ‘center that holds 
… the center of building sustainable justice and peace is the quality and nature of people’s 
relationships. A key to constructive social change lies in that which makes social fabric, 
relationships, and relational spaces”. (Lederach 2005, 76) 
 
From this emerged a relationship-centered approach to peacebuilding which sees 
relational connections as the source for conflict response processes. Lederach (2005) 
notes that understanding the spatial geography of relations, and their patterns of 
conflict, affords a new lens and the moral imagination with which to understand the 
fabric of human community and conflict. He argues that this approach specifically 
explores that which is not always visible: the web of relationships, which entails 
exploring the physical and social geography of change processes (Lederach 2005). As 
such, this approach explores relationships through social crossroads, connections, and 
interdependence.  
Lederach’s pyramid describes peacebuilding efforts of the Top-Leadership levels as 
‘top-down approaches.’ Efforts emerging at the base of the pyramid, called the 
grassroots-level, are called ‘bottom-up’ approaches to peacebuilding. Lederach also 
explains the ways in which the levels interact across vertical and horizontal lines. 
Vertical capacity describes relational spaces across the pyramid vertically, linking people 
up and down in the society. As such, it represents links between the local communities 
with the high-level politicians. The pyramid levels interact through horizontal capacity 
as well, where relationships across people and groups in the same level cut across 
identity divisions. Vertical and horizontal linkages meet at the center of things and 
integrate each other’s elements.  
Lederach (2005) uses the analogy of web-weaving to explain peacebuilding 
processes. He describes web-making as a continuous and dynamic process of occupying 
space, where a web that took one day to form might not exist the next day. Translated 
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to a communal level, this shows that space and connections are never static. Lederach 
(2005) explains that spiders understand space strategically in order to create cross-
linkages that connect points together into a net. They do so several times a day, even 
though this might put them at potential risk. Lederach (2005) argues that this is a lesson 
in the art of spatial thinking. This refers to a process of building networks across the 
pyramid and within the same level for strategic social change.  
The web is built center-out; it expands from the center and creates visible 
connections to anchor edges. This results in intersections across points while keeping 
the center a strong hub. As such, the web is able to receive blows and structural damage 
to one part without damaging or losing the rest of the web. The strength of the web 
comes from creating coordination at the center, without centralization. Adapted to the 
levels pyramid, in the “Four Towns Agreement,” the imbalance lies in the centralization 
of power at the top-leadership level, losing the interdependent connections to the rest 
of the levels. Within the conflict episode, the top-leadership level created a strict and 
limited circle of interaction that is closed, allowing little movement and interaction with 
the rest of the levels. This makes the whole web of relationships in the “Four Towns 
Agreement” vulnerable to break. And as such, the whole web is likely to break.  
Lederach (2005) explains that the relevance of web making to peacebuilding lies in 
the understanding that, within settings of protracted violence, constructive change is the 
art of weaving and restoring relational webs across social spaces. The structure of 
connections has to be built in an unpredictable environment, with the ability to 
continuously adapt to a dynamic geography. The art of peacebuilding lies specifically in 
creating links between non like-minded people and those who are not like-situated.  
 
“Peacebuilders, no matter their location or persuasion, must eliminate the erroneous notion 
that change can happen independently of people who are not of common mind and are not 
located in similar social, political, or economic space. This is true of high-level diplomats as 
much as local community workers. Interdependence is. Period. Constructive change and 
peace are not built by attempting to win converts to one side or another, or by forcing one or 
the other’s hand. Web making suggests that the net of change is put together by recognizing 
and building relational spaces that have not existed or that must be strengthened to create a 
whole that, like the spider’s web, makes things stick”. (Lederach 2005, 85) 
 
In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” we find that efforts of active exclusion 
are prevalent. Groups with differing ideas are considered threats, and hence, the power 
of the ‘Top-Leadership Level’ is exercised in a way that tries to restrict their abilities to 
engage and relate. The relational space is hampered and the interconnections are lost. 
The web is imbalanced and instead of holding things together, the web breaks, giving 
way to violent expressions of unmet needs, such as the April 14 explosion.  
Lederach (2005) concludes that the art of peacebuilding lies not in creating the 
solution itself, but in creating platforms that generate creative and constructive 
responses. Platforms offer space to processes and ideas to emerge. In peacebuilding, 
efforts have fixated on building a platform that “produces a solution and then 
deconstruct the platform, assuming the solution has permanency. Experience suggests 
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the opposite. Solutions are ephemeral. Permanency is found in adaptive platforms 
capable of continuous response” (Lederach 2005, 85). Platforms offer relational spaces 








Eat the books. No one will read again. 
Eat the blood-soaked hair of corpses, platelets placating your gnaw. 
Eat shit. 
Eat bones. Boil them for stock. 
Eat the eyeballs that do not blink. 
Eat the hands that no longer hug. 
Eat the tongues that cannot kiss. 
 
Eat rats. Eat the dogs and the mewling thin cats and the fallen sea gulls. 
Eat the leftover sinew of others who have gone. 
Eat orange peels and weeds and dry pita bread scrounged from trash. 
Eat trees, and flowers and bushes from the raped roads.  
 
Pull out your teeth, 
falling like your cities before them, 
sit, 
read all of the stop-signs posted, 
now slashing their wrists. 
 
Think of bees and honey, of aubergines and garlic. 
Lick if you can the hairs around your mouth, think of salt, how you once swam without 
knowing what it meant. 
 
Think of us, counting our calories, buying fertilizer for indoor plants in the air 
conditioning, painting the pots colors to brighten up the new cycle, spruce up the 
silence creeping up our walls. 
And then hate the Middle East. Really really hate it.  
Hate it till the last rib cracks, till the final fall, till the cameras find you. 
Your skeleton now is a garden of untouched moss.  
 





In this book, my aim was to answer the question: What does the episode of the “Four 
Towns Agreement” reveal about deeper themes, layers and levels at the epicenter of the 
Syrian conflict? Towards this endeavor, I began the journey with unpacking my 
personal relationship to the Syrian conflict, following the perception that “the personal 
is political.” This allowed me to engage with the security discourses I had endorsed, 
which then led the inquiry towards the imbalances and frustration of a deeply-modern 
narrative of the Syrian conflict. This was followed by the realization of the complexity, 
depth and dimension that is overlooked by a modern rhetoric on the Syrian war, 
endowing me with the understanding that the political narratives surrounding Syria can 
be mapped in innumerable ways. The purpose of my research endeavor lies specifically 
in this: in listening to the different and oftentimes, opposing narratives, surrounding a 
conflict episode of the Syrian war.   
I take the conflict episode, the “Four Towns Agreement,” as an excerpt of the 
Syrian conflict, an entry point which affords a lens into the epicenter and sediment 
issues fueling the conflict episode. This inquiry allowed me to unearth deeper dynamics 
of the conflict by inquiring in an elicitive way into the agreement and its 
implementation. I posit the details of the agreement as visible expressions of the 
conflict episode, revealing a deeper web of relationality that created energy and violence 
around its implementation.  
Having explained the parameters of the conflict episode, I move towards examining 
the conflict episode using a transrational worldview and the ECM as the 
methodological approach for the book. Given that transrationality transgresses the 
limits of modern thought, the inquiry elaborates on the circular nature of conflict and 
the openness of all systems. By doing so, I highlight that peace is never an end-state, 
but it is a continuously changing and dynamic experience. The essence of this approach 
lies in understanding that if peace were a perfect end-state, it would be dead and 
tyrannous. Instead, adopting a circular understanding of social conflict recognizes 
conflict as part of daily life, and does not provide a solution to violence since it does 
not believe in the guarantee of its non-existence. By integrating relational and energetic 
understandings to conflict, I understand that the world is a relational whole constantly 
moving towards a state of dynamic equilibrium.  
Through chapter 2, I address the conceptual framework that guides my research 
inquiry. I move through concepts such as Galtung’s direct and structural violence, and 
negative and positive peace that are essential for understanding different expressions of 
violence and peace. After that, I explain modernity and postmodernity as manners of 
relating and understanding the world, and their adaptions to Syria’s “Four Towns 
Agreement.” Modernity’s dogma prescribes peace as a universal idea, which is achieved 
through the institutions of the nation-state. Modernity derives from Cartesian logic, 
where the world becomes a vast machine that can be measured and perfected. From 
this, the understanding of peace derives from security. This conceptualization of peace 
has allowed for the discursive construction of the identity of an ‘enemy’ among Syrians. 
A process of exclusion of perceived ‘enemies’ is implemented in the name of peace, 




the chosen conflict episode. Postmodernity emerged out of disappointment with 
modernity’s violent and discriminatory project. Instead of one universal peace, 
postmodernity called for the inclusion of a plurality of understandings of peace, where 
peace is a never-ending process, never perfect and never finished. In the context of the 
“Four Towns Agreement,” there is little space for postmodern thought, highlighting the 
dominance of the security narratives of modernity. The latter has repressed demands 
for recognizing the relativistic views in Syria concerning political reform. Security 
discourses reign and dominate.  
In chapter 3, I offer background knowledge of Syria, the Syrian armed conflict, and 
the conflict episode. Through this chapter, I aim to demonstrate the circular nature of 
conflicts, wherein conflicts do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it is important to 
understand conflicts in their own contexts. By describing the “Four Towns Agreement” 
across the axis of what, where, why, who, when and how, it becomes clear that the 
agreement involved the release of prisoners and bodies, the evacuation of citizens from 
four towns and the halt of hostilities. The description also highlights that many political 
representations were involved in the drafting and implementation of the agreement. For 
example, representatives from Qatar, Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria set out the 
parameters of the “Four Towns Agreement.”  
Through the ECM analysis, it appears that the “Four Towns Agreement” was also 
so much more than its main premises of evacuations and ceasefires. In chapter 4, I take 
the “Four Towns Agreement” a step further and analyze it based on the thematic 
emphases of harmony, justice, security and truth. The analysis finds an imbalance 
towards security, further consolidating a dysfunctional system of security in the name of 
peace. The “Four Towns Agreement” appeared to be a carefully engineered plan of 
enforced displacement to consolidate the regime’s presence in Damascus. As such, the 
security of the state is overemphasized, not that of the people of the four towns.  
The imbalance towards security implies a peace driven by fear, scarcity and 
starvation; fear from the communal belonging of the IDPs from Madaya, Az-Zabadani, 
Kafreya and Foah, scarcity and inequity of resources for the living, and starvation for 
growth. For me, what is most significant about the thematic analysis is how the 
dysfunctional system came to lend hunger, under the siege conditions of the four 
towns, a moral persona. The moral nature of hunger became determined by moral 
dualities of who is experiencing the hunger and who is inflicting the hunger. Within an 
imbalanced system that does not support the growth of the collective or of the 
individual, exaggerated expressions of hunger are born, both physical and emotional. 
The war in Syria destroyed the land and poisoned the soil, creating a system of stunted 
growth for the people living in the four towns.  
In chapter 5, the analysis moves on to tackle the imbalances across the layers of the 
conflict episode. In line with the analysis of the thematic emphases, the dogma of 
reason was overemphasized, largely shaping the way people relate to the land they 
inhabit. The “Four Towns Agreement” posits a locality and a physicality where the 
theme of security translated into images and representations of ‘our’ and ‘their’ land. As 




imbalances in the layers. In this chapter, I use the trope of ‘land’ as an entry point for a 
discussion of deeper sediment issues at play. There appears to be a fixation on fear and 
an attachment and a sense of ownership to the towns. The securitization of the “Four 
Towns Agreement” conflates the three layers (sexual-familial, socio-emotional-
communal, and the mental-societal) with security concerns. As such, the spiritual or 
policitary layers are not recognized. In the context of the “Four Towns Agreement,” a 
relationship of property emerges where land can be exchanged, destroyed, and 
trafficked. This reveals the disconnection from the spiritual connection to earth and the 
land fought for. Essentially, this reveals the mechanistic relationship with land and 
brings us much closer to the epicenter of the conflict: the disconnection between 
Syrians themselves and between Syrians and their land.  
In chapter 6, I analyze the conflict episode across the different levels of leadership. 
In this, there is a better understanding of the political overtones of the negotiations and 
implementation concerning the “Four Towns Agreement.” As such, the analysis reveals 
the disconnections between different levels of people, and the dominance of the top-
leadership level. This has destroyed the web of relationality among the levels of 
leadership. As such, the “Four Towns Agreement” consolidates already dysfunctional 
relationships and dynamics, by restricting the net of decision-makers and excluding 
non-like-minded groups. The dominance of the top-leadership level translates into 
efforts of active exclusion of groups with differing ideas. As such, the influence of the 
top-leaders restricts the ability of other groups to engage. The result is that the 
relational space is hampered. The breaking of the web of relationships gives way to 
violent expressions of needs, such as the attack on the evacuation buses from Kafreya 
and Foah. For me, what is the most significant about this chapter is in understanding 
that in settings of protracted violence, such as in Syria, relationships matter. It is not all 
high and policy talk. Instead, constructive change lies in restoring relationships across 
social spaces. And the art of peacebuilding initiatives requires restoring connections in a 
volatile and unpredictable environment.   
The analysis of the “Four Towns Agreement” using ECM has allowed me to inquire 
into a conflict episode and understand the many ways that it can be understood and the 
many ways that it has affected different people. Despite this, a limitation of this 
research pertains to the fact that I did not conduct first-hand interviews with people 
who were involved in the “Four Towns Agreement.” Given that the analysis 
acknowledges a plurality of truths, interviewing people would provide the book with 
different truths and experiences. This only sparks further interest in me, humbles me, 
and reminds me that my analysis is only one among many, as there are as many 
understandings of the “Four Towns Agreement” as there are people who were affected 
by it. Within this relativistic pluralism lies many possible answers and interpretations of 
the conflict episode.  
Secondly, the “Four Towns Agreement” included several phases: evacuations of the 
four towns, exchange of prisoners, and the hand-over of Yarmouk camp to the regime. 
My analysis does not focus on the last phase of the agreement, which means that there 




the “Four Towns Agreement” faltered and was not implemented until a new deal was 
reached almost a year later. For future research, this opens up a deeper discussion 
towards the many interruptions that the “Four Towns Agreement” witnessed during 
the implementation. The interruptions could be seen as the disputes between the parties 
during the evacuation process which led to the evacuees waiting on evacuation buses 
for 8 hours, the April 14 attack against the evacuees from Kafreya and Foah during the 
first day of implementation, and finally, the failure to carry out the last phase of the 
agreement. I believe that the interruptions are visible expressions of frustration with the 
deal and violence against what the agreement actually entails.   
The last phase of the “Four Towns Agreement” which included the transfer of HTS 
from Yarmouk camp and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the regime faltered and 
the transfer of the remaining individuals from Kafreya and Foah halted. Eight thousnad 
people continued to be besieged by the opposition groups and lived in dire conditions 
(Amnesty International 2017). On July 18, 2018, a deal was reached where the 
remaining people besieged in Kafreya and Foah would be evacuated to government-
held territory in exchange for prisoner releases from regime jails (The Independent 
2018, The National 2018b). Press TV (2018) state that the Syrian Observatory for 
Human Rights (2018) reported that the deal was reached between Russia and Turkey, 
while other sources assert that Iran had reached the deal with HTS (Press TV 2018, The 
Independent 2018, The National 2018b,). Almost 7,000 people were evacuated from 
Kafreya and Foah, 34 prisoners who were captured by Hezbollah during its siege of 
Madaya and Az-Zabadani were released, and 1,500 prisoners were released from regime 
prisons.  
As such, the repercussions of the “Four Towns Agreement” are still felt today. Like 
Lederach (2010) explains, the start and end of agreements are not experienced 
mechanically. The “Four Towns Agreement” and its implications continue to live and 
affect the lives of thousands of people. It is not just an agreement, but a personal 
journey of trying to find one’s place in new and continuously changing environments. 
The depth of the “Four Towns Agreement” goes far beyond its premises of halting 
violence, exchanging prisoners, and evacuations. It is so much more. Ultimately, 
studying the “Four Towns Agreement” boils down to deepening the understanding and 
answers of peaces through the many implications it leaves behind, and the many that 
still echo today.  
Finally, I ask myself why I chose the “Four Towns Agreement” as my entry point. 
In hindsight, I perceive it as a pinnacle of the Syrian war, where an association between 
war, displacement and death is more assumed than interrogated. There are so many 
versions and realities of what sparked the “Four Towns Agreement,” who it involved, 
and what it entailed. I find that it is an expression of the conflict as a whole, with large 
and wide implications depending on who is experiencing the “Four Towns 
Agreement.”  
On a personal level, I have grown in many ways through the writing of this book. 
Criticizing a system is also tied with criticizing oneself. At times, I found the book 




and insecurity. Instead, what I seek now is safety. If so far I built a habitat rooted in a 
conflict party, then in my book, I hope to let go of these attachments and ponder over 
another kind of habitat – the connections I made with Syrians. Rather than parties, I 
encounter a variety of relationships, of turbulence and how to recover. And through 
these relationsips, I continue to form my heart collectively.  
Syria has and continues to provoke an inner storm within me as I search for 
answers and understanding; and the inner resolution of maybe never finding that 
understanding. Through this book, I have come to learn that I have a choice: I can live 
and die in a world that I perceive as inherently violent. Or I can live a life where I 
constantly reflect on the ways in which I relate to the world and celebrate the plurality 
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